BG19EO

The following note was hand written by Capt. John H.M Smith Air Corp Adjutant Hq Sq: “Extracted from personal diary written by 1st Lt Glenn H Boes then Engineering Officer Hq Sq 19th Bomb Group. Killed in Java when B-18 with Major Strauble and 1st Lt John E.L. Huse was shot down." This copy of Lt Boes diary was made in Australia some 8 months after Boes made these entries. Boes must have been flown out of Del Monte to Austrilia before going to Java, and his diary, written while at Mindanao, was left with the Hdq Sqd records in Australia before he was moved to Java. There seems to have been no surviving diary records written by him after he left Mindanao. This document was provided by Conrand Marvel. DL

HEADQUARTERS

19th Bombardment Group (H)

A.P.O. 922

8 August, 1942

Journal-Headquarters Squadron, 19th Bombardment Group (H)

Record of Events from 31 December, 1941 to:___

31 December: Headquarters Squadron, under authority of Colonel George Commanding Officer Far Eastern Air Forces, divided into two sections, one to remain on Bataan Peninsula, Luzon, the other to embark on S.S.Mayon for Mindanao. Other troops aboard were 14th Squadron, 28th Squadron, and 30th Squadron of the 19th Group, all complete. Major O'Donnell, Group Commanding Officer, Lieutenant S. Maddux, Commanding Officer , 14th Squadron, Major W. Fisher, Commanding Officer, 28th Squadron, Lieutenant Ray Schwanbeck, Commanding Officer, 30th Squadron, Captain W.E. McDonald, Commanding Officer Headquarters Squadron, Major C.W, Miller, Commanding Officer of Headquarters Squadron Detachment. Left on Bataan Peninsula; Lieutenant Morris Shedd, Commanding Officer, 93rd Squadron. The mission of the 19th Group troops, as stated by the Group Commander under authority form Colonel Morse was dual: First to be equipped and trained to protect themselves and their areas from possible Japanese attacks, and second to help in the location, building, maintenance, and operation of airdromes on Northern Mindanao, forming for such fields maintenance and operational personnel to care for aircraft which would be based at an operated therefrom.

Little notice of the move was given. Each squadron was to assemble supplies and equipment then in its possession, such supplies and equipment to be loaded aboard the S.S. Mayon at Mariveles, Bataan, Philippine Islands, and pooled for equal redistribution. Fifteen days rations were to be aboard the S.S. Mayon at the time it docked for loading plus certain armament (Machine Guns, caliber 30, and rifles, caliber 30, M2), and ammunition therefore.

The loading of the ship was poorly organized and the personnel at hand to assist was not used to advantage with the result that much equipment, particularly of the 30th Squadron, was not loaded. The first nights voyage was uneventful and the ship anchored in a bay off Mindoro at about 7:30 in the morning of January 1, 1942.

1 January, 1942: The S.S. Mayon remained at anchor in the bay. At 2:00 P.M. (Approximately) a four motored flying boat was sighted at first identified by an officer of the crew of the S.S. Mayon, as an American aircraft,. The plane made a bombing run on the boat and missed, on the second run the plane dropped a bomb just aft of the boat deck off the port side and bent the plates in. At this time a number of men, contrary to order's, jumped overboard on the port side.

Orders were for men to remain below decks and hidden to conceal the fact that the S.S. Mayon was a troopship. On the third bombing run, two bombs of approximately 100 pound caliber were dropped off the port bow, the concussion injuring several of the men in the water. Of those injured Lieutenant Wade of the Signal Corps, U.S. Army, subsequently died. At the time of the first attack Colonel Morse ordered the Captain of the Mayon as follows: "Wire for Help", Lieutenant Kreps, of the 5th Bomber Command, replied "Sir, there is no help". In General the behavior of the men was admirable and almost all remained with their squads: and at their posts as ordered. After the attack Colonel Morse ordered the ships Captain to abandon the boat and upon the Captains refusing, Colonel Morse ordered the troops to abandon the ship. The first boat lowered broke loose from one end of the tackle and spilled the oars and equipment tho it was finally lowered, righted, and bailed out. No orders were given as to the order in which units would abandon the ship and disorder of an extreme nature resulted. The oars were manned by officers and men in haphazard fashion and many crew members crowded aboard. Orders were given for the men not to take their rifles or other equipment ashore, tho many did. The ship's boats were in poor condition, without oarlocks or with oarlocks broken out of the gunwales. After the danger of further attack had passed much time was lost in returning the men to the boat. About 9:30 P.M. the boat got under way and passed an uneventful nights voyage.

2 January, 1942: At 7:30 A.M. (Approximately) the S.S. Mayon came to anchor in a small bay in Negros, Philippine Islands, and the men were ordered to abandon ship for the day. An order of debarkation had been determined but no provision made for the minimum essential supplies and equipment needed by the men in the event of the sinking of the S. S. Mayon, an event fully expected in view of the fact that the S.S. Panay had been bombed and sunk in the same bay the previous day. The day passed uneventfully and at 5:00 P.M. the men began to go aboard. The night again passed uneventfully and the S.S.Mayon reached Macalay Bay early on the next morning.

3 January, 1942: The boat docked at the Philippine Packing Company's dock about 7:30 A.M. and the troops were unloaded. Due to the lack of plan, the equipment and supplies were unloaded and left in an exposed position on the dock and in the building and area of the canning plant for a considerable period of time. The troops were not assigned dispersion area and were not used to unload the boat at maximum speed and to disperse the supplies and equipment. Fortunately, no attack was made on the ship or troops. By late afternoon the troops were assigned areas out along the Tagalan River and were fed.

6 January, 1942: Early in the morning, the officers of the 19th Group were ordered to attend a meeting called by Colonel Morse. He spoke of hardening the troops and of his experiences such as 30 days and nights is the rain and under constant shell fire. He stated that the experiences thru which the men of the 19th Group had passed as being very easy, not trying upon the men. The additional rifles required to arm each man were to be issued and cleaned, the belts for the machine guns were to be loaded. Later in the day, squadron representatives accompanied Colonel Morse to the new area he had chosen along the road about one mile toward Del Mote from Bugo. Headquarters Squadron was assigned an area on the hillside where it was very difficult to set up the kitchen or for the men to find places to sleep. The Group Medical truck, a panel reconnaissance, was take by Colonel Morse for a radio truck and a detachment from the 430th Communications Section under Lieutenant Halbrook was assigned to Colonel Morse's radio truck. It rained that night.

5 January, to 8 January 1942: The next three days and two nights were spent on the hill site above Bugo. The motorcycles (4 in number) were taken from Headquarters Squadron and appropriated for Colonel Morses's use. The Group Commanders' Jeep was taken by Colonel Morse but was subsequently released, to Group Commanding Officer for occasional use and for a reconnaissance of Lake Banao area. The Headquarters Squadron was reorganized with Captain McDonald, Commanding Officer, Lieutenant McDuffee, second in command, Lieutenant Crimmins, Commanding Officer first platoon, Lieutenant Green, Commanding officer second platoon, Lieutenant Ambrosius was assigned to the first Platoon and Lieutenant Donahoe to the second Platoon, Lieutenant Boes second in command first platoon, Lieutenant J.H.M. Smith, second in command 2nd platoon. Lieutenant Mackenzie was armament officer, Lieutenant Kelso was Mess Officer, the seriously hampered by a lack of any kind of transportation, there having never been any equitable distribution made of such transportation as was brought with the Group. ON the night of the third full day on the hill site, Headquarters Squadron and the 14th Squadron were ordered to move to Camp 28 on the Del Monte plantations, the 28th Squadron moved to the Del Monte plantations also. The 30th Squadron was left at the camp hill site.

9 January, 1942: Consideration of the site where the 14th and Headquarters Squadrons were located showed it to be very vulnerable to a strafing or bombing attack because all of the men, their bedding, and the two messes were between two rows of trees set 20 feet apart and extending in a straight line for about 600 yards. Lieutenant Colonel W.E. Killen, Colonel Morses's executive officer, was left in charge at Camp 28. The order to form the squadrons into rifle platoons had already been complied with, although Headquarters Squadron mustered only two squads per platoon. There followed during the six days spent at Camp 28, 3 January to 9 January, a series of infantry lessons and problems of a type employing platoons in defense and offense with most of one day spent in firing all men with rifles. Each man fired three shot on a range of 80 feet.