WHisS\PIair-MF.DOC

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The War in the Pacific

THE FALL OF THE

PHILIPPINES

by

Louis Morton

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY

UNITED STATES ARMY

WASHINGTON D.C., 1953

The following are extracted pages provided the 19th BG Assn by Maj W. Bentson Ret, Brisbane Australia. DL 04-23-94

The Reinforcement of the Philippines

............... pointing out to the Chief of Naval Operations that it would delay the delivery of much-needed reinforcements to MacArthur by over two months. (Memo, Marshall for Stark, 25 Sept 41, sub: Conversion of Troop Transports, OCS 17396B) Despite the favorable outcome of this protest, a large back log of troops and approximately 1,100,000 tons of equipment destined for the Philippines had piled up in U.S. ports or depots by November. A group of shipping experts, including representatives from the War Department General Staff, Office of the Quartermaster General, the Navy, and Maritime Commission, met on 10 November to discuss ways of breaking the shipping block. As a result of this meeting a shipping schedule was established which recognized the priority of the Philippines over Hawaiian defenses and advanced the troop movements scheduled for mid-January to 17 and 20 December. Altogether, nine vessels were assigned to the Manila route, to sail in November and December. They would bring to MacArthur one light and one heavy bombardment group, a pursuit group, one reconnaissance squadron, a regiment of infantry, a brigade of field artillery, two battalions of light artillery, together with ground and air serape units. (Memo, Gerow for ASW, 10 Nov 41, sub: Shipping for Phil, OCS 18136121.) Had these vessels, the last of which was to leave the United States on 20 December, reached the Philippines the Japanese would have faced a far stronger force when they landed on Luzon.

Air Forces

In July 1941 the air force in the Philippines was still a token force, unable to withstand "even a mildly determined and ill-equipped foe." (Wesley F. Craven and James L. Care, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. I, Plans and Early Opertations: January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago, 1948), 177.) Air Corps headquarters in Washington had been urging for some time that additional planes be sent to the Philippines and the Joint Board, early in 1940, had proposed an increase in air strength for the island garrison. (Mark Skinner Watson, The Office of the Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950) p. 416.) The following July 1941 Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, chief of the newly created Army Air Forces, came forward with the strongest proposal yet made for the reinforcement of the Philippines. This proposal called for the transfer to the Philippines of four heavy bombardment groups, consisting of 212 air craft with 68 in reserve, and two pursuit groups of 130 planes each.( Memo, Arnold, for CofS, 19 JuL 41, cited in Craven and Care, The Army Air Forccs in World War II, I, 178.) These planes, wrote Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, chief of the Air Staff, would not be used for an offensive mission, but to maintain "a strategical defensive in Asia." (Memo, Spaatz for Maj Gen Gcorge H. Brett, 26 Aug 41, cited in Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, p. 12.)

General Arnold's recommendations, approved in August, were not easily carried out.( MacArthur on 31 July had already been told of plans to send him a squadron of B-17s. Rad, TAG to CG USAFFE, No. 1197, 31 JuL 41, AG 320.2 (7-28-41) Orgn and Reinf for USAFFE.) To have raised that number of planes in the summer of 1941 would have meant stripping the fields in the United States as well as all other overseas bases. Moreover, many of the heavy bombers were still on the production line. What could be scraped together was shipped immediately and by mid-August General Gerow reported to the Chief of Staff that thirty-one modern fighters of the P-40 type were on their way. Meanwhile General Arnold made arrangements to send fifty more directly from the factory. These, too, were soon on their way and by 2 October had arrived in the Philippines.( Memo, Gerow for CofS, 14 Aug 41, sub: Reinf of Phil, WPD 3251-55; rad, TAG to CG USAFFE, No. 56, 16 Aug 41, and memo, Twaddle for TAC, 15 Aug 41, sub: Augmentation of Phil Dept, both in AG 370.5, (8-1b1), Part I; memo, CofS for Stark, 12 Sep 41, OCS 18136-56-1/2; memos, Gerow for SW, 2 Oct and 10 Nov 41, subs: Personnel and Supplies for Phil and Shipping for Phil, OCS 18136-70 and 121.)

Some weeks earlier a historic flight of nine Flying Fortresses had reached Manila by air. These planes were part of the 19th Bombardment Group ( H ), which had been selected for transfer to the Far East. After a flight from Hamilton Field near San Francisco, the Group's 14th Squadron, under Maj. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., left Hickam Field in Hawaii on 5 September for Clark Field via Midway, Wake, Port Moresby, and Darwin. This pioneering 10,000-mile flight, almost all of it over water, was successfully concluded a week later, establishing the fact that the Philippines could be reinforced by air.( The arrangements made for this flight and the details of the trip are described in Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, pp. 12-20. A readable account of the flight can be found in Walter D. Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had (Boston, 1951 ), PP. 1-13.) But the Midway-Wake route could not be considered safe in the event of war with Japan since it passed over the mandated islands and work was begun after October to develop a South Pacific ferry route.( For a full discussion of this important route, which later became the chief link between the United States and New Zealand and Australia, see Development of the South Pacific Air Route, AAF Hist Study 45, Air University Hist Off.)

Once the pioneering flight had been successfully concluded, all heavy bombers sent to the Philippines went by air via the Central Pacific route. On 9 September, General Marshall told MacArthur that two additional squadrons of the 19th Group the 30th and 93rd--would leave the next month. At that time the ground echelon of the two squadrons and the headquarters sailed from San Francisco. The air echelon of twenty-six B-17's followed soon after. By 22 October these planes had arrived at Hickam Field in Hawaii. After a short stopover they flew on to Clark Field where all but two reported on 4 November; the other two followed soon after.

The flight of the 30th and 93d Squadrons was one in a scheduled series which called for the shipment of 33 heavy bombers in December, 51 in January 1942, and 46 more in February. By March 1942 the War Department planned to have 165 heavy bombers in the Philippines. (Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, pp. 24, 29. Estimated production of B-17s and B-24s for the period was 220 aircraft, thus demonstrating the importance which the War Departrncnt attached to the defense of the Philippines at this time.)

Scheduled for shipment after the 19th Bombardment Group was the 7th. The ground echelon reached Hawaii late in November and was held there until naval escort could be secured. The air echelon, scheduled to fly to the Philippines via the Midway route during late November and early December, had completed only the first leg of the journey before war came.( Ibid.)

In addition to heavy bombers, MacArthur was also promised a light bombardment group of three combat squadrons. Selected for shipment was the 27th Bombardment Group (L). The Air Corps experienced some difficulty in securing the 52 A-24s for this group but by early November the planes had been collected. The pilots and ground personnel reached the Philippines during November but the A-24s, loaded on a separate transport, were held at Hawaii with the ground echelon of the 7th Bombardment Group and failed to reach their destination.( Ibid.)

At the end of November General Marshall summarized for the Secretary of War the air reinforcements already shipped or scheduled for shipment to the Philippines. At that time, he noted, there were 35 B-17s already in the Islands and 52 A-24s were due there -- they never arrived -- on the 30th. Fifty P-40s had reached MacArthur in September, Marshall explained to Stimson, thus giving him a total of 81 modern fighters. In addition, 24 P-40s had left San Francisco on 19 October, and 40 more on 9 November. By 31 December, General Marshall estimated, the Philippines should have a total of 240 fighters of the latest type.( Memo, Marshall for SW, 25 Nov 41, sub: Reinf of Phil, OCS 18136-124. A detailed arccount of the air reinforcements sent to the Philippines can be found in Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, Chs. I and II. A condensation of this account has been published in Craven and Care, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 175-85. For training and state of readiness of the Far East Air Force, see Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, pp. 43-56.)

By now the War Department was fully committed to an all-out effort to strengthen the air defense of the Philippines. General Arnold, in a letter to the commander of the Hawaiian Air Force on 1 December, expressed this view when he wrote: "We must get every B-17 available to the Philippines as soon as possible." (Ltr, Arnold to Maj Gen Frederick L. Martin, 1 Dec 41, quoted in Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 193.) His statement was not an exaggeration. On the outbreak of war there were 913 U. S. Army aircraft scattered among the numerous overseas bases. This number of aircraft included 61 heavy, 157 medium, and 59 light bombers and 636 fighters. More than half of the total of heavy bombers and one sixth of the fighters were already in the Philippines.( Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 193; Army Air Forces in the War AKainst Japan, 1941-1942, (HQ AAF, 1945), pp. 2 ff.) (See Table 3.) Within a few months this number would have been raised considerably.

The arrival of the bombers and additional pursuit planes, with the promise of more to come, led to a reorganization of the air forces in the Philippines. Early in the fall of 1941 General MacArthur had asked for Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, a senior air officer, as his air commander. This request was approved and early in October Brereton was relieved of command of the Third Air Force and called to Washington. There, in a series of conferences at Army Air Force headquarters, the form of a new air organization, to be called the Far East Air Force, was drawn up.( Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, p. 31.)

General Brereton arrived in the Philippines on 3 November. He saw MacArthur that same day, and gave him the latest views about reinforcements and developments within the War Department. By the middle of the month the reorganization of the air forces had been accomplished and a short time later MacArthur told Marshall, "Brereton has taken hold in an excellentmanner.( Lt. Gen. Lewin H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, 3 October 1941-8 May 1945 (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1946), p. 16; ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, 29 Nov 41, WPD

3489-21; USAFFE GO 28, 14 Nov 41, copy in History of the Fifth Air Forces ( And Its Predcceasors ), App II, Doe 3, Air University Hist Off.)

TABLE 3

AIRCRAFT IN PHILIPPINES

AND HAWAII, 1 DECEMBER 1941

Type and Model	Philippines	Hawaii
Bombers:
B-17C & D (a)	35	12
B-18A	18	33
A-20A (a)	0	12
A-27	9	0
B-10B	12	0
Fighters:
P-4OC (a)	0	12
P-40B (a)	0	87
P-40E (b)	107	39
P-36A	0	14
P-26A	16	0
P-35A	52	0
Misc.	24	0
(Incl. Obsn Cargo etc)	34	22
TOTAL	277	231

Notes to Table 3:

(a) Modern combat aircraft.

(b) There is disagreement in all sources on the figure of 107 P-40S. Some writers place the figure at 90 and Walter D. Edmonds estimates that there were "only 54 first-line, combat worthy fighter planes to throw against the Japanese on the morning of December 8." They Fought With What They Had, p. xii.

Sources: For the Philippines, memo, Gerow for CofS, Nov 41, sub: Airplanes in P.I., Incl 1, 19 Nov 41, WPD 3633-20. The P-40 strength is from memo, CofS for SW, 25 Nov 41, sub: Reinf of Phil, OCS 18136-124; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 191-92.

For Hawaii, Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 171.

***

The newly activated Far East Air Force, with headquarters at Nielson Field in Manila, included the V Bomber Command, the V Interceptor Command, and the Far East Service Command. The main element of the bomber command, led by Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank, was the 19th Bombardment Group with its thirty -five B-17s. Only two squadrons of the original group, the 30th and 93rd, were in the Philippines. On 16 November, the 28th Squadron, a medium unit, was also assigned to the group and equipped with B-17s and on 2 December the 14th Squadron joined the group. In addition to heavy units, the bomber command also contained the ground echelon of the 27th Bombardment Group, whose fifty two A-24s were delayed at Hawaii and never reached the Philippines.( Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings Before the Joint Commtttee on the Investigation of the Pearl Habor Attack (Washington, 1946), Part 11, pp. 5317-39. This source will be hereafter cited as the Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings. The Joint Committee hearings produced altogether 39 volumes, 11 of which contain the hearings themselves and 18 the exhibits presented during the course of the hearings. A separate volume, the 40th, contains both the majority and minority reports.)

The V Interceptor Command, first under Brig. Gen. Henry B. Clagett and later Col. Harold H. George, consisted initially of the 24th Pursuit Group with the 3rd, 17th, and 20th Squadrons. When, in November, the 21st and 34th Squadrons arrived in Manila, they were attached to the group, pending arrival of their own organization (which never arrived ). The Interceptor Command was considerably modernized during the fall of 1941 and by 1 December all but one of its pursuit squadrons were equipped

with P-40s.( Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, pp. 33, 34)

The prerequisites for an effective air force are not only modern and sufficiently numerous attack and interceptor aircraft, but adequate fields, maintenance and repair facilities, and the antiaircraft artillery and air warning service to defend these installations. The lack of fields in the Philippines was recognized early. Within eighty miles of Manila there were six fields suitable for pursuit planes and only one, Clark, for heavy bombers. Outside of Luzon were six additional Army fields, useful principally for dispersal. More were needed to base the large number of modern aircraft due to arrive before the end of the year. In August General MacArthur was allotted $2,273,000 for airfield development and in October $7,000,000 more. The largest part of these funds was to be expended on Luzon, at Nichols and Clark Fields, with auxiliary fields at Iba, on the Zambales coast west of Clark, and various points on northern Luzon.( Ibid., pp. 11, 22.)

In mid-November MacArthur decided to establish a heavy bomber base in northern Mindanao at Del Monte, which since September had had a strip capable of landing B-17s. This decision was based on the belief that heavy bombers on Luzon would be subject to attack and that they should therefore be moved south, out of reach of the enemy. His plans, MacArthur told the Chief of Staff on 29 November, called ultimately for a bomber base in the Visayas, but until such a base was completed he expected to use the field at Del Monte.( Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, 29 Nov 41, WPD 3489-21.) Work on Del Monte Field was rushed and by the beginning of December it was able to accommodate heavy bombers.( Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, p. 47; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 188; Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, pp. 53-56. )

Despite the arrival of reinforcements and the airfield construction program, the air defense system remained inadequate because of the shortage of antiaircraft artillery and aircraft warning equipment. MacArthur had requested warning equipment in September and had at that time presented a plan for the establishment of an air warning service. The War Department had approved the project and by mid September three radar sets had been shipped with three more scheduled for shipment in October. In addition, $190,000 was allotted for aircraft warning construction, with an additional $200,000 to be included in the supplemental estimate for the fiscal year 1942 for the construction of three detector stations and one information center.

The one air warning service company of 200 men in the Philippines was entirely inadequate to the needs of the Far East Air Force. In November General Arnold recommended, and the Chief of Staff approved, the shipment of an aircraft warning .....................

***. [end of extracted segment] ***

Air Hostilities in the Philippines, 8 December 1941

by Dr Robert F. Futrell for Air University Review Jan-Feb 1965

This document has been provided by Wallace Fields for inclusion in the 19th BG History. DL 07-11-94

The Purpose of the historian," stated Professor Homer Carey Hockett, "is to ascertain facts, which become the basis of all generalizations. or conclusions (these being also facts of a higher order, serving to give history its meaning and value). But the raw materials with which the historian works are statements, and the first lesson which he must learn is that statements must not be mistaken for facts.... His task is, if possible, to make such a use of statements that he will through them arrive at facts." Who fired the first shots of the American Revolution at Lexington, the reasons for Pickett's charge at Gettysburg, the purpose of President Lincoln in deciding to begin battle at Fort Sumter are problems in historiography that have long defied a determination of precise historical fact.

Much closer at hand and still within the memory' of living witnesses, the story of the initiation of air hostilities in the Philippines on 8 December 1941 and of the handling of the US. Far East Air Force on this first day of Japanese attack there provides another case study in the difficulty of determining precise historical truth. With the publication of the late General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Reminiscenes, these events are once again described, but, unfortunately, the questions surrounding them remain unanswered. Now that the case has been reopened there is ample justification for a new attempt to place these events in their historical setting and to seek to settle at least a part of the misunderstanding that has surrounded them.

With the emergence of Japan as a major world power, defense of the Philippines became an increasingly difficult task for the military planners of the United States. Separated from the coast of California by 6000 miles of Pacific waters, studded in their central reaches by Japanese bases in the Caroline and Marshall Islands, the Philippine Islands were a badly exposed American possession. From 1926 to 1938 the basic U.S. war plan for the defeat of Japan -- the ORANGE Plan -- visualized a long and costly war in which a Philippine garrison of Army troops would attempt to deny Manila and other key defenses to the enemy until the U.S. Fleet could force through the Japanese mandates and establish a secure line of communications to the Far East. As such the Philippines were no longer an element of American strength but rather a liability. In 1935, the Chief of the Army War Plans Division suggested the desirability of undertaking some negotiation by which the Philippines would remain neutral in case of a war with Japan, thus freeing American forces to fight along the line Alaska-Hawaii-Panama. The immediate prewar RAINBOW 5 plan, approved by the Joint Board on 14 May 1941, did not appreciably change the mission of U.S. forces in the Far East: the Army was assigned the mission of protecting the territory of the associated powers, preventing the extension of Axis influence, and supporting naval forces. The U.S. Navy would advance through the Carolines and Marshalls to the western Pacific.

Although the Army mission in the Philippines remained defensive, the German attack against Russia in June 1941 and the mounting evidences of Japan's warlike intentions demanded a strengthening of American forces in the Philippines. General Douglas MacArthur was recalled to active duty on 26 July 1941 and given command of the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). The Philippine Department Air Force gave way to an enlarged Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF) on 16 November 1941 under the command of Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, who had arrived in Manila thirteen days earlier. Modern planes were dispatched as they became available: P-40Bs and P-40Es were allocated to the pursuit force, the latter being shipped directly from the factories. Given priority in the assignment of the few B-17 Flying Fortresses available in the Army Air Corps, the 19th Bombardment Group managed a pioneer Pacific flight to Luzon's Clark Field in October and November. As soon as they could be equipped from current production, four heavy bomber groups were projected for the Philippines. The second of the scheduled groups-the 7th Bombardment-began leaving California on 6 December 1941. The men of an A-24 dive bomber group -- the 27th Bombardment -- reached the Philippines on 20 November, but the group's planes ware following in a slow convoy. Of modern combat aircraft the FEAF possessed on 1 December 1941 a total of (35) B-17s and about 105 P-40Bs and -Es.

Arrival of modern heavy bombers in the Philippines gave the Army forces an ability to participate in strategic offensive operations. On 14 October 1941, General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces, emphasized to General MacArthur that an offensive employment was to be expected from the new B-17s, “By utilizing Singapore, Darwin, Rockhampton Rabaul, Davao, and Aparri for operating base for B-17 types of airplanes," Arnold wrote, is our opinion that the sea routes between Japan and Singapore, and Japan and the Dutch East Indies can be very well covered.... Furthermore, B-24's operating out of Aparri can cover the south section of the Japanese Islands as far north as Nagasaki.” In Washington Army and Navy planners undertook the necessary revision of RAINBOW 5, and General Brereton carried a copy of the new tasks assigned to users to MacArthur. Changes in the revision of the basic war plan were officially mailed to MacArthur on 21 November 1941, with additional word of advice from U.S. Chief of Staff George C. Marshall. “Heretofore," Marshall wrote, “contemplated Army action in the Far 'East Area has been purely of a defensive nature. The augmentation of the Army Air Forces in the Philippines has modified that conception of Army action in this area to include offensive air operations in the furtherance of the strategic defensive, combined with the defense of the Philippine Islands as an air and naval base. In the event of hostilities, MacArthur was now directed by RAINBOW 5 to execute air raids against Japanese forces and installations with tactical operating radius of available bases.

The new concept of the defense of the Far East involved exploitation of the strategic mobility of air power from Philippine, Malay, Netherlands East Indies, and Australian bases, and General Brereton's immediate duty was to coordinate the preparation of air facilities at these places. While Brereton was in Australia, negotiating for base accommodations, his staff busied itself with the preparation of additional air facilities in the Philippines, where until then Clark Field had been the only available heavy bomber base. Colonel Francis Brady, FEAF chief of staff, Colonel Harold H. George of the V Interceptor Command and Captain Harold Eads, the FEAF engineer, drew up a plan for the relocation of air units. At the Del Monte plantation on Mindanao they found a site where a temporary heavy bomber base could be speedily prepared. According to General Brereton, the USAFFE staff met these plans for a Mindanao base with some reluctance: Brig. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur's chief of staff, pointed out that the plan for the Philippines included no American ground troops for the defense of Mindanao. On 29 November, MacArthur reiterated this same thinking in a letter to Marshall: The definitive location of the Bomber Command base in Mindanao is not acceptable because that island is strategically a salient and its defense a difficult problem with the force now in contemplation." MacArthur favored the building of a bomber base in the Visayan Islands, at the center of the archipelago, which would be well protected by coast artillery guns and troops. But to provide immediate relief for the congested air facilities on Luzon MacArthur permitted the construction of a bomber strip at Del Monte.

While the scheduled defenses of the Philippines were marching toward a readiness date in the spring of 1942, worsening relations with Japan necessitated intensified war preparations for the force at hand. On 10 November 1941, Brereton ordered all air units on the alert, requiring the 19th Bombardment Group to maintain one squadron at all times on two-hour readiness for reconnaissance and bombing missions. On 27 November, General Marshall warned MacArthur that hostile action might occur at any moment, but cautioned “If it is impossible to avoid hostilities, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." This policy, however, was not to be interpreted so as to jeopardize a successful defense of the Philippines, and MacArthur was specifically authorized to take such reconnaissance and other measure as might seem necessary prior to Japanese hostilities. In case of war, General MacArthur was directed to carry out the tasks assigned in the revised RAIBOW 5 plan, which had been delivered do him by Brereton. MacArthur immediately, replied that air reconnaissance had been extended and intensified and that within the limitations of deployment in the theater everything was in readiness for a successful defense. In reply to a message from Arnold cautioning against sabotage, MacArthur on 6 December replied that all Air Corps stations were alerted airplanes dispersed and each under guard, airdrome defense stations manned, and counter-subversive measures had started functioning.

In order to obtain greater dispersal, General Brereton sent two squadrons of B-17s to Del Monte airfield on the evening of 5 December 1941. Under command of Major Emmett O’Donnell, Jr., the 16 Fortresses of the 93rd and 14th Squadrons departed Clark Field after dark in a secret movement. Here begins the first of the controversies regarding the handling of the Far East Air Force in the initial days of hostilities. “To the best of my memory," O’Donnell wrote in February 1946, “it was never intended to send more than two squadrons of heavy, bombers from Clark Field to Del Monte prior to 7 December 1941.” In The Brereton Diaries, published in 1946, General Brereton recorded that he was able to send no more than two squadrons southward because the B-17’s of the 7th Bombardment Group were leaving the United States early in December with orders to push through as rapidly as possible and they would need to use the field at Del Monte. Brereton further stated that permission to move the 16 Fortresses to Del Monte “was obtained from General Sutherland only with the understanding that they would be returned to the airfields to be constructed on Cebu and Luzon as soon as the necessary operating facilities could be prepared.” According to Colonel Eugene L. Eubank commander of the 19th Group, when interrogated on 2 July 1942: “We were planning to keep six squadrons on Del Monte and two in Luzon.”

The USAFFE version of these events was first published in 1944 when Mr. Frazier Hunt, a press correspondent who had visited MacArthur's headquarters to gather material for a popular biography, asserted that General Sutherland on three occasions before 8 December had ordered Brereton to send all B-17s to Mindanao and that only after a last and peremptory order had Brereton finally dispatched two of the squadrons. When it was published Hunt's biography of MacArthur carried an introduction by Brig. Gen. C. A. Willoughbv, Chief of Military Intelligence, GHQ Southwest Pacific Area. In an interview with Mr. Walter D. Edmonds on 4 June 1945, General Sutherland repeated the same account:

Gen. Sutherland began by saying all the B-17s had been ordered to Del Monte some days before [8 December 1941]. On a check it was found that only half had been sent. GHQ wanted the planes in Del Monte because they would there have been safe from initial Jap attacks -- they could not have been reached at all -- and they could themselves have staged out of Clark Field to bomb Formosa. This direct order had not been obeyed. And it must be remembered that GHQ gave out general orders and that the AFHQ were supposed to execute them.

In September 1946, after The Brereton Diaries appeared in print General MacArthur broke his silence: "X had given orders several days before to withdraw the heavy bombers from Clark Field to Mindanao... to get them out of range of enemy land-based air." In his Reminiseences, General MacArthur spoke more kindly of General Brereton:

A number of statements have been made criticizing General Brereton, the implication being that through neglect or faulty judgment he failed to take proper security measures, resulting in the destruction of part of his air force on the ground. While it is true that the tactical handling of his command, including all necessaries for its protection against air attack of his planes on the ground, was entirely in his own hands, such statements do an injustice to this officer.

Examination of related contemporary written evidence permits some evaluation of these reflections. Brereton's account of Sutherland's reluctance to permit the movement of B-17s to Del Monte is partially reinforced by MacArthur's statement on 29 November 1941 that the Mindanao base “will give immediate relief from the congested conditions on Luzon [but] is not acceptable because that island is strategically a salient... ." In another letter on 1 December, MacArthur requested antiaircraft artillery to protect Del Monte, presumably against carrier-based air attack. In neither letter did MacArthur mention any immediate intention to move all B-17's to Del Monte, and in his message of 6 December he merely noted that all airplanes were dispersed and each under guard.

There are also some inconsistencies in the recollection of the air officers. In his book They Fought With What They Had, Edmonds does not find Brereton's explanation of why he sent only half of the B-17s southward to be “too convincing ." Edmonds reasoned that the arrival of the new group of Fortresses from the United States would be stretched out over several days. As a matter of fact, back in Washington on 1 December, General Arnold planned that a total of 48 heavy bombers would have departed for the Philippines between 3 and 10 December and that the first 19 of these planes would arrive at Del Monte on 12-13 December. The initial movement would actually be delayed, and the first flights would not begin to depart for Hawaii until 6 December. It is similarly difficult to reconcile Sutherland's supposed reluctance to allow two squadrons to move to Del Monte with the inevitability that the whole 7th Group would soon have to be based there. And while MacArthur was not satisfied with the Del Monte base, he apparently visualized it as the main bomber base at least until a new Visayan airfield could be built with Clark Field to be used as a staging base for combat missions. It is possible that Sutherland's reluctance as described by Brereton was merely designed to establish the point that Del Monte was not to become the permanent bomber base. Brereton noted that Sutherland exacted ;the provision that the planes would be returned either to Clark Field or to a base constructed on Cebu in the Visayas.

While none of the Air Force officers have emphasized the fact, establishment of the entire B-17 force at Del Monte would have been hazardous. At Clark the bombers could be defended by aircraft waning radar, fighters, and antiaircraft artillery. Del Monte was completely lacking in airdrome defense, and the bombers had to be protected by dispersal and camouflage. The new airfield at Del Monte was supposedly a secret base and was believed to be outside the range of Japanese land-based bombers, but neither of these possibilities could be guaranteed, for there was a large settlement of dissident Japanese on Mindanao and the enemy was expected to use carrier aircraft in his initial assault against the Philippines. In retrospect it would appear that Brereton's disposition of his heavy bombers was sound: two squadrons at Clark under protection of fighters and artillery and two squadrons camouflaged and dispersed at Del Monte. A historian finds here, however, two opposing statements, and he must accept or reject one or the other of them in the light of his own best judgment. The Army historian Professor Louis Morton found it impossible to determine where "the responsibility lies for failing to move all the B-17's south." Morton thereby assumes that an order to move the Fortresses had been issued. In the absence of definitive contemporary evidence, the best judgment on the matter appears to be the statement of Colonel Eubank, made in July 1942 before the events became controversial, when he said: "we were planning to keep six squadrons on DeI Monte and two in Luzon.”

The beginning of hostilities in the Pacific found the Philippine. garrison alerted and, with in limits, ready for a successful defense. The timing of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, shortly after dawn on 7 December 1941, favored the American defenses in the Philippines, since H-hour in Hawaii coincided with the very early morning hours of 8 December in the Far East. Japanese aircraft on Formosa, moreover, would be weathered in during the morning and would not be able to manage an assault against Clark Field until shortly after noon. The Far East Air Force was thus permitted an opportunity to strike a first blow. Why it did not do so is the subject of the second and major controversy regarding the employment of the U.S. heavy bomber force in the Philippines on the first day of the war.

General Brereton has written that a telephone call awakened him early on the morning of 8 December, and he recalled that Lt. Col. Charles H. Caldwell, FEAF operations officer, answered and received the news from General Sutherland that Pearl Harbor had been bombed. Sutherland then told Brereton that the Japanese had attacked Hawaii at 2:35 A.M. Manila time and that a state of war existed. Caldwell's later recollection of what then transpired is as follows: "I... was standing right beside the General when he told General Sutherland to tell General MacArthur that 19th Group would be ready to bomb Formosa at daylight; Sutherland said that he would have to contact General MacArthur before such a mission could be authorized. He later called back and said that the mission would not be flown." After completing his telephone conversations with Sutherland, Brereton immediately ordered all air units notified of the Japanese attack and directed Colonel Eubank to come down to FEAF Headquarters. He recalled that it was then around 4 A.M. and still dark.

Brereton recorded that at about 5 A.M. he reported to USAFFE Headquarters in Manila, where he found that General MacArthur was in conference. Sutherland briefed him on all available information, and Brereton told Sutherland that he wished to mount all the B-17s at Clark for missions to Formosa and to prepare the Fortresses at Del Monte for similar missions to be staged through Clark Field. He requested permission to begin offensive action immediately after daylight. According to Brereton, Sutherland agreed with the plans, authorized preparations, and said he would obtain General MacArthur's authority for the attacks. At this point begins a series of entries in a typescript document, titled "Office of Commanding General, FEAF, Summary of Activities," the authenticity of which as a historical source will be subsequently examined. The first entry at 7:15 A.M. in this document records that General Brereton visited No. 1 Victoria (USAFFE Headquarters ) where he was “informed that for the time being our role was defensive but to stand by for orders."

In the meanwhile the FEAF staff had been gathering in General Brereton's office at Nielson Field on the southern outskirts of Manila, and the staff had been joined by Colonel Eubank and his operations officer from Clark. Captain Allison Ind, FEAF intelligence officer, was assembling target folders on Formosa. As to the state of the target information be would observe: "We were as ready as we would be for a long time to come." According to the recollection of Captain Harold Eads, all those present were of the opinion that the Air Force should "strike at the Japs in Formosa with everything we had without delay." The FEAF staff was preparing to proceed on that basis.

When he arrived at Nielson Field, Brereton brought the news (as Eads expressed it) “ that we couldn't attack until we were attack” While war planning continued, Sutherland was again contacted at 9 A.M., and, according to the FEAF Summary, he again advised "planes not authorized to carry bombs at this time." Colonel Francis M. Brady, the FEAF chief of staff, who may well have made this call (although he remembered it as having been put through at about 9:30 A.M.), later stated that Sutherland told him that FEAF would be properly informed of any new decision and that he was not to call again. At 10 A.M. Brereton again telephoned Sutherland who repeated that "all aircraft would be held in reserve and that the present attitude is strictly defensive." Brereton said that he remonstrated that if Clark Field were “taken out" by the enemy the Air Force could not operate offensively.

Apparently at about this time Sutherland did authorize a reconnaissance mission to Formosa and at 10:10 A.M. Colonel Eubank left for Clark Field to send out these planes. According to the FEAF Summary, Brereton received a telephone call from General MacArthur at 10:14 A.M. authorizing him to take offensive action (in his diaries Brereton records this call as having been received at “about 11 A.M.” and as having been from Sutherland). By this time, Brereton had changed his plans. Since no attack had been made against Clark, he wished to hold the B-17s there in readiness until the reconnaissance missions could return, but, with or without photographic reconnaissance, the B-17's would attack Formosa late that afternoon. To follow the plan of operation outlined in the FFAF Summary, General Brereton had by 10:45 A.M. matured the following schedule: two squadrons of B-17s would attack known airdromes in southern Formosa at the latest daylight hour permitting visibility; the two squadrons at Del Monte would move to a dry-weather strip at San Marcelino at dusk and then to Clark after dark, where they would prepare for raids against Formosa at dawn the next day. At 11:56 A.M. this plan was communicated to General Sutherland.

The recollections of the Air Force officers -- while differing as to exact details -- are remarkably consistent in regard to the events on the morning of 8 December. Even Colonel Eubank, who said that he did not wish to discuss the matter when interrogated in July I942, commented that it was General Brereton's plan to bomb Formosa and that such had been firmly recommended by him." But the delay had been too long, and as the result of a series of unfortunate circumstances a Japanese air attack at Clark Field shortly after noon destroyed most of the two squadrons of B-17s based there. Half of the B-17s in the Far East having been eliminated, offensive action against Formosa was no longer practicable.

The recollections of General MacArthur and General Sutherland as to the events on the morning of 8 December 1941 are at sharp variance with those of the air officers. In June 1945, Sutherland told Edmonds that “there was some plan to bomb Formosa but Brereton said that he had to have photos first. That there was no sense in going up there to bomb without knowing what they were going after. There were some 25 fields on Formosa." Sutherland closed the subject with a positive assertion: “Holding the bombers at Clark Field that first day was entirely due to Brereton." In an official release issued after the publication of The Brereton Diaries, General MacArthur stated that he knew nothing of a Brereton recommendation to bomb Formosa:

I wish to state that General Brereton never recommended an attack on Formosa to me and I know nothings of such a recommendation having been made; that my first knowledge of it was contained in yesterdays press statement.

That it must have been of a most nebulous and superficial character, as no official record exists of it in headquarters.

That such a proposal. if intended seriously, should have been made to me in person by him; that he never has spoken of the matter to me either before or after the Clark Field attack.

That an attack on Formosa with its heavy air concentrations by his small bomber force without fighter support, which, because of the great distance involved, was impossible, would have had no chance of success.

MacArthur concluded this September 1946 release with the observation: "The over-all strategic mission of the Philippines command was to defend the Philippines, not to initiate outside attack." In his Reminiscences, General MacArthur wrote:

Sometime in the morning of December 8th, before the Clark Field attack, General Brereton suggested to General Sutherland a foray against Formosa. I know nothing of any interview with Sutherland, and Brereton never at any time suggested an attack on Formosa to me. My first knowledge of it was in a newspaper dispatch months later. Such a suggestion to, the Chief of Staff must have been of a most nebulous and superficial character, as there was no record of it at headquarters. The proposal, if intended seriously, should certainly have been made to me in person. He has never spoken of the matter to me either before or after the Clark Field attack.

These categorical statements made by Generals MacArthur and Sutherland necessarily give the historian some pause, especially those parts of General MacArthur's statements that refer to official records in his headquarters. It appears, however, that both MacArthur and Sutherland must have been speaking from memory rather than from recourse to records. In May 1944 the Fifth Air Force chief of staff originated a letter to MacArthur's headquarters asking for information regarding the employment of the FEAF bomber force on 8 December 1941 and received this reply: “There is no official information in this headquarters bearing upon the questions propounded in basic communication." It is entirely possible that General MacArthur may not have been informed of General Brereton's early-morning requests for authority to attack Formosa; the recollections of the air officers and the FEAF Summary attest that these requests were directed to General Sutherland.

MacArthur's reasoning that unescorted B-17 attacks against Formosa would have been "impossible" does not coincide with then current thinking or with other events that happened on 8 December. In the prewar period the B-17 Flying Fortresses were believed to have great defensive capabilities. General Arnold envisioned that long-range B-17 missions would be conducted without fighter escort. This was further borne out by the fact that the radius of action of the P-40s sent to the Philippines was only 285 miles. MacArthur, moreover, apparently authorized the B-17 attack that was supposed to have been sent to Formosa late on the afternoon of 8 December. At any rate on 8 December he signaled the War Department that "the intended attack on Formosa had to be canceled in view of damage reported at Clark Field." MacArthur's statement that the strategic mission of the Philippine command was “to defend... not to initiate outside attack," was at variance with the amended RAINBOW 5, plan which directed “air raids against Japanese forces and installations within tactical operating radius of available bases.”

When he published his Diaries in 1946, General Brereton surmised that he might have been unable to get authority for the early morning attacks against Formosa because MacArthur had been instructed not to attack unless attacked first and that the Pearl Harbor attack might not have been construed as an overt act against the Philippines.” Although MacArthur had been officially directed to implement the revised RAINBOW 5 plan by the Chief of Staff’s letter of 21 November 1941, the month or less permitted change from defense to offense was a short time in which to reorient planning and thinking, especially since MacArthur (as he wrote Marshall on 29 November ) had not previously planned to include heavy bombers in the Philippine Army because of their cost. Hard on the heels of the revised RAINBOW 5 came the 27 November directive that "the United Status desires that Japan commit the first 0vert act." Literal interpretation of this order led USAFFE to refuse Brereton's request for a few high-level reconnaissance flights over southern Formosa on 1 December, and Sutherland later cited this order when he explained the exceedingly circumscribed authority granted the commander of the V Interceptor Command against Japanese planes reconnoitering Luzon: "We told him he could effect it,” Sutherland recollected, “ but that he must act defensively; but if the Japs came in near enough he could go to it."

Based upon personal interviews with General Sutherland in November 1946 and June 1951, Professor Morton concludes that Brereton's surmise that the Pearl Harbor attack was not considered an overt act against the Philippines "must be dismissed.” In support of this position, Morton further cites the fact that MacArthur received a message from Washington at 5:30 A.M. on 8 December informing him that hostilities had begun, and that he was to execute RAINBOW 5. In drawing his conclusion, Morton ignored MacArthur's statement that his mission bad been “to defend... not to initiate outside attack." MacArthur's Reminiscences now reveal that USAFFE was thinking defensively. MacArthur states that initial reports of the Pearl Harbor attack left him with the impression that the Japanese had suffered a setback and that the failure of the Japanese to close against Luzon during the morning of 8 December supported this erroneous belief. “I therefore contemplated," MacArthur wrote, “an air reconnaissance to the north, using bombers with fighter protection, to ascertain a true estimate of the situation and to exploit any possible weaknesses that might develop on the enemy's front.” This statement adds weight to the conclusion that the incubus of a long period of defensive thinking, unfamiliarity with strategic air capabilities, and the hesitation arising from the directive that the Japanese should attack first may well have contributed to the fatal delay in launching the heavy bomber attack against Formosa, although more than one Air Force officer has since- -observed that “the bombing of Pearl Harbor was a first-class overt act.”

Under normal circumstances the existence of contemporary documentary evidence enables a historian to evaluate the statements of interested participants in the events they describe. Unfortunately, only a limited amount of documentary evidence bearing upon the employment of the FEAF bomber force in the Philippines can be found. With surrender imminent, Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, commanding on Corregidor, used two small aircraft on the night of 12 April 1942 to transport some 150 pounds of what he described as “General Staff Section Journals, documents, and my diaries" to Mindanao, whence they were taken by special courier to General Sutherland in Australia. these papers when they arrived,” Sutherland directed, “are to be delivered to me not to staff sections." Another notation on Wainwright's message stated that the documents described were received on 19 April 1942 and placed in a vault in the Chief of Staffs office. In September 1942, General Marshall sent a message to Brisbane stating that it was understood that the staff journals of the Headquarters Forces in the Philippines from the beginning of the war to 1 April were in GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area, and that they should be forwarded to the War Department without delay. The Brisbane headquarters replied that complete staff journals from the Philippines were "not available." Although virtually complete G-4 records ultimately arrived in Washington, the location of USAFFE-USFIP G-2 and G-3 journals was never discovered by Professor Morton, who wrote: “A careful search... has failed to produce them, and the principals, Generals Wainwright and Sutherland, assert they have no knowledge of their where abouts."

Very few Far East Air Force records survived the retreat from the Philippines. Generals Brereton and Brady have pointed out that two official reports were made to General Arnold, one before FEAF Headquarters left the Philippines and the other shortly after the evacuation of Java. Diligent search of official records collections failed to disclose the original of either report. General Arnold, moreover, made no apparent use of the reports when he wrote his Global Mission, but instead remarked that he had never been able to get “the real story of what happened in the Philippines."

That the two FEAF reports were made is nevertheless fairly certain. General Brady recalled that the first report was carried out of the Philippines by Brig. Gen. Henry B. Clagett, the commander of the V Interceptor Command, w ho was ordered to Australia to establish a rear base. The FEAF Summary of Activities notes that a memorandum was prepared for General Arnold on 18 December 1941, Giving a chronological statement of events between 3 November and 8 December 1941. General Clagett departed the Philippines on the following day, and it is to be assumed that he later fowarded the report to General Arnold from Australia. If it could be located, this document might well clear up the dispute about the basing of the B-17s at Del Monte. General Clagett died before replying to a request for information regarding his knowledge of this historical source.

The second report must have covered FEAF activities from 8 December 1941 through 24 February 1942. While the original of report has never been located the USAF Historical Division Archives contains a typescript document which is either a carbon copy of the report or the working data from which the report was prepared. This document -- entitled “Office of Commanding General, FEAF, Summary of Activities” -- was discovered in the retired files of the Tenth Air Force (Breretons next command after leaving Java) in India and it was routinely transmitted to the Archives in October 1945." Buried in a bulk shipment of documents, this FEAF Summary of Activies was not noticed until the first volume of The Army Air Forces in World War II was nearing publication. The summary was of such importance that the editors of the Air Force historical series immediately undertook to incorporate its information wherever possible.

In its form, this FEAF Summary of Activities appears to be a detailed daily diary of FEAF Headquarters, with time entries for the events of each day between 8 December 1941 and 24 February 1942. General Brereton has recalled that he instituted the practice of keeping a detailed daily diary at FFAF: “It was my invariable habit,” he stated, "to report for the record the substance of personal conferences outside headquarters immediately upon return." Lt. Col. Keith P. Siegfried, who as a warrant officer joined FEAF Headquarters in Java, recalled that the format of the Summary was that generally employed in the Headquarters diary. “At that time," Siegfried recollected, "the minute-by-minute recording of incidents, conversations, phone calls, and the receipt or dispatch of messages as they occurred was an established SOP." Internal evidence points to Major Norman J. Lewellyn ( Brereton's aide who was killed in India in 1943) as the keeper of the portion of the Summary through 29 January 1942, and General Brereton remembers that Lewellyn went about FEAF Headquarters each day collecting information. General Brereton has also stated that Lewellyn was the custodian of the FEAF War Diary.

While the FEAF Summary appears to be a day by day report of events, internal evidence makes it apparent that it was transcribed in its present form somewhat later than the events it describes. The most certain evidence of this is the erroneous dating of many of the earlier entries as “1942" rather than "1941." One rarely if ever makes an advance error in setting down a date, and it is likely that these misdated entries were transcribed early in 1942, when the harassed typist was overly conscious that a new year was at hand. Misspelled place names scattered throughout the Summary (not an unusual feature in military records) indicate that the typist was transcribing unfamiliar material. Additional internal analysis also indicates that the FEAF Summary is a compilation of several different diaries: .( 1 ) General Brereton is "positive that the entries from 8 December to 23 December are accurate transcriptions taken from the Headquarters War Diary." ( 2 ) From 24 December 1941 through 29 January 1942, the Summary's entries follow the travels of Brereton's headquarters to Australia and Java, this portion of the document unquestionably represents the work of Major Lewellyn. (3:) The portion of the Summary for 30 January through 22 February 1942 is a carbon copy identical to a similar portion of the FEAF Headquarters diary in the Kansas City Records Center. (4) The last page of the Summary covers events on 24 February 1942, the date that General Brereton gave up command of FEAF, and does not appear in the Kansas City file copy of the FEAF Headquarters diary.

Two significant questions emerge from this internal criticism: When was the FEAF Summary transcribed in its existing form? Were the sources edited before their transcription? Watermarks of a Javanese hank on a portion of the paper used in the Summary point to the time and place of the assembly of the information as late January or early February 1942 in Java. When asked about the matter, Generals Brereton and Caldwell were certain that the Summary was carried by Lewellyn when they departed from Java for India on 25 February 1942. After what appears to have been a cursory examination of the Summary, Walter D. Edmonds commented that he felt “fairly sure that it has been re-edited." Reports of pursuit activity, Edmonds claimed, coincided more closely with statements in the 24th Pursuit Group's history than did the recollections of the various personnel he interviewed. As a matter of record, however, the 24th Group's history was written in Australia during October 1942, and by this time the FEAF Summary was already resting in the files of the Tenth Air Force in India. It may be noted, moreover, that the details in the FEAF Summary coincide generally but not exactly with the recollections of the Air Force officers regarding the happenings of December 1941. The Summary thus possesses the precision and definition which usually characterize the difference between a contemporary document and the memories of participants in events. Finally, both Generals Brereton and Caldwell accepted the authenticity of the Summary after they had examined it in 1952. “There is no doubt in my mind of the authenticity of the diary," General Caldwell stated, while General Brereton wrote: “I am absolutely certain that the Diary is an authentic record of the facts as they were recorded at that time." Additional criticism thus buttressed the initial conclusion of the Air Force historical editors that the FEAF Summary “represents a valuable record compiled closer to the events described than any other known source of comparable scope ."

It is not really within the province of proper historical reporting to speculate on what might have been the result of a heavy bomber attack against Japanese bases on Formosa in the opening hours of American participation in World War II. “As a matter of fact," General MacArthur suggested, “an attack on Formosa, with its heavy air concentrations, by our small bomber force without fighter cover, which because of the great distance involved and the limited range of the fighters was impossible, would have been suicidal." On the other hand, Japanese officers interrogated after World War II were less certain as to what the effect of such an attack might have been. With 150 Army and 300 Navy aircraft crowded into Formosa's limited air facilities, depending on overhead fighter cover for protection, Japanese commanders knew many anxious moments during the morning of 8 December. Only the Navy planes had range enough to reach Manila, and the delicately adjusted attack plan called for the launching of a strike from Formosa at sunrise. When ground fog delayed the takeoff, the Japanese greatly feared that American aircraft would initiate the first strike. This fear was increased at 8 A.M. when an American radio message was intercepted indicating that an attack was being considered and that the B-17s would arrive over Formosa at 10:10. At this hour, a Japanese Army plane falsely reported the approach of the B-17s, and, expecting the worst, the Japanese donned gas masks and otherwise prepared for the American attack that never came.

Actually, however, the facts that must be gathered about the initial phase of American air operations in the Philippines involve not what might have been but what actually happened. Acceptance of the FEAF Summary of Activities as a nearly contemporary and almost certainly authentic source permits little doubt to remain that General Brereton did request and was denied authority to send a B-17 strike against Formosa early in the morning of 8 December. Complete resolution of the question as to whether Brereton had been ordered to move all the B-17s back to Mindanao well before the war's beginning must await the location of additional documentary evidence. One may hope that as the passing of time diminishes the keenness of the controversy the appearance of additional source material will allow historians to tear away the "conspiracy of silence" that so long surrounded the beginning of the war in the Philippines.

Aerospace Studies Institute

Notes: Omitted DL