WHisS\GMah-JA.DOC

The copy of this letter was been provided to the 19th BG Assn by Maj W Bentson Ret, Brisbane Australia. DL 04-23-94

July 16, 1979

To: Colonel Robert F. Schirmer (USAF-Ret. )

See. Class to 40-A Assoc.

8978 East Anna Place

Tucson, AZ 85710

Dear Col Schirmer:

Sorry about the delay in giving you a rundown on Grant Mahony.

I left China around the middle of June, 1942 after a year and a half in England and the Soviet Union. The AVG was still active but being phased down as individual fillers arrived from various points around the world. I arrived about the same time as Bob Scott and Brace Holloway. Grant, who had been in India, as aide to Gen. Brereton, arrived several weeks later. I was put into the 75th Fighter Squadron commanded by David (Tex) Hill, one of the AVG pilots who accepted a commission and stayed in China about five months before going back to the States. Grant was put into the 76th Squadron which was commanded for a short time by Ed Rector, another AVG pilot who stayed on. I believe Brace Holloway was the next commander before he became group commander; and Brace was followed by Grant as commander of the 76th. I can't remember whether that was in late '42 or early '43.

The 14th Air Force was very small during the first year. It consisted of a group headquarters under first, Bob Scott and then Brace Holloway -- three fighter squadrons, the 74th, 75th, and 76th, plus the 11th bomb squadron, equipped with B-25s built around the nucleus of a few of the Doolittle pilots who stayed on in China after the Tokyo raid. We also had two flights detached from the 16th squadron in India. The squadrons were under strength; so it wasn't difficult to extend acquaintances to almost every pilot in the 14th Air Force.

Although the details are hard to remembers, Grant told me of some of his experiences in the Philippines prior to Pearl Harbor. As you may remember, he had strong convictions, was a dedicated patriot; and to him, the war was a crusade. He fretted against restrictions imposed by superiors that he felt didn't understand future hazards which were soon to became reality. My memory is vague, but I believe he got into an argument with a superior officer who ordered him examined by a psychiatrist. They decided to send him back to the U.S. by boat, but the war intervened. When the Japanese began to move, only Grant had information on installations which the Japanese had begun to move onto islands north of the Philippines, information which he had gained by ignoring regulations and flying over prohibited areas. He was shot down once by our own anti-aircraft; and when the Philippines began to fall, he got out with Gen. Brereton via Indonesia, then on up to India when General Brereton assumed command of the 10th Air Force. I am sorry that I didn't make a record of this as this was an intensely interesting part of Grant's life, particularly in view of the fact that he was to die four years later in the battle to free the Philippines from Japanese occupation. You might try writing to Major General Walter B. (Benny) Putnam (USAF-Ret. ), PO Box 24, Shalimar, Florida 32579. Benny and Grant were close friends, an I believe they were together in the Philippines; and I feel that Benny can add to what I have told you about this phase of Grant's life and make corrections where I might be in error.

I don't believe that being an aide to General Brereton was the easiest job in the world, but Grant was an attractive and likable young man; and General Brereton thought highly of him. One interesting little anecdote occurred when Claire Booth Luce visited the 10th Air Force (I don't know the exact date, but I believe in June of '42). General Brereton apparently took Mrs. Luce on a tour, which included a short cruise in the Indian Ocean in one of the small boats that the Army had some how acquired. Col. Merrian Cooper, who later became Gen. Chennault's chief of staff, was also in the party. Coop was a combination of intellect, soldier of fortune and as zealously patriotic as Grant. He was older, having been shot down in World War I and captured by the Germans, then in 1920 after forming the Kosciusko squadron to help the Poles fight the Bolsheviks. was shot down and imprisoned by the Russians and sentenced to execution. In a way that only Coop could engineer, he escaped from a prison outside of Moscow, killed a guard with a pocket knife and walked out of Russia in the middle of Winter. This isn't intended to be a letter about Cooper, but it may give you some insight into Grant's friends. In the process of maneuvering the boat through the waves and chop, Mrs. Luce went overboard, and Coop -- who had known Mrs. Lace and her husband for years -- was first into the water. Grant, as aide, knew his responsibility; so he quickly went over the side and claimed rescue for them both! Coop was a man of unlimited courage, who admired Grant because Grant was also a man of unlimited courage. Coop was a single-minded supporter of General Chennault and an antagonist of General Stilwell, which earned him the antipathy of General Marshall. He was transferred out of China to the Pacific, where he became Chief of Staff to General Whitehead, and it was on a mission with the 5th Air Force that Grant was shot down and killed in early January of 1945.

Grant was an aggressive leader and an excellent pilot. The reason that I was uncertain about his status as an ACE was that he had not had enough aerial victories at the time I left China, but he was our most effective strafer and held the theater record for steam locomotives. He added to this tally later on his next tour when he came back to Burma, and I feel that in this campaign, he must have bagged his fifth air victory to become an ACE. He may have gotten his fifth victory in China after I left, but I'm not sure as memory fails me.

In May of '43, I was sent back to the States with a small cadre from our China group to activate the 367th fighter group at Hamilton Field, CA. Four pilots out of China plus one Eagle Squadron veteran from the RAF were the nucleus for the new group. I commanded for approximately a month, when I was called back to Washington by General Arnold and told I would have to join with Phil Cochran in organizing the 1st Air Commando Group to move General Wingate's guerrilla fighters behind enemy lines in Burma. We were given no T0&E [table of organization and equipment] but directed to form an all-volunteer unit with lots left to the imagination. In addition to a small headquarters, we had a glider group of 100 CG 4-A gliders to carry troops and equipment to establish airheads deep in Japanese territory -- a group of 100 L5 ambulance aircraft to evacuate our wounded -- a squadron of P-51s for specialized support -- a squadron of B-25s equipped with 75-millimeter cannons for mobile artillery -- a squadron of specially equipped C-47s to pick up gliders down behind the lines and specially trained pilots and operators -- a squadron or UC 64 bush transports plus a small communications section. In all, we had approximately three hundred flying machines of one kind of another and slightly over five hundred men to man them. This was possible because our operation was to last only three months during the dry season, and we were allowed to choose a high level of experience in both officers and airmen. In looking for an inspired aggressive fighter squadron commander, Grant Mahony was Number One on our list. There was no question about Grant's willingness to volunteer --as a matter of fact, there would have been no way that I could have excluded him from this mission of high adventure. He chose the pilots and of course did an outstanding job. Grant wasn't an easy man to control --not that he really needed it -- but he did have a tendency to be intolerant off pilots who didn't have the same capability or who didn't aspire to the same aggressive objectives that he possessed. We used to laugh and say, "Grant's way of building a strong squadron is to use a short runway, build a brick wall at the end -- and pretty soon, only the good pilots will be left!" He pushed hard, and although he had chosen good people for his outfit, Phil was always concerned that Grant was going to wipe out a few by failing to take into account that the Grant Mahony's in this world were few and that some pilots would never be able to achieve the same level of performance as their commander.

Grant didn't believe there was such a thing as combat fatigue and he never showed, any himself. From time to time he would say that he was frightened, but I had a hard time believing that. I think he may have said it just to impress on same of us that he was more normal than we thought. When we were in Burma, me had P-51As in contrast do the P-40s in China, our P 51s had extremely long range, and Grant felt that by refueling at one of the air strips we had hacked out of the woods in Burma, we could cross Indochina, the South China Sea, make a strafing run on Clark Field and get all the way back to Burma. He didn't want to take the squadron but tried to convince me that he and I should do it. He relished thinking about what the Navy would say when intelligence agents reported that (2) P-51s had strafed Clark Field with no apparent place to come from. He was convinced that we would catch a line of Japanese bombers on the runway, and one pass would be enough. Of course, I refused, and admonished him as sternly as anyone could admonish Grant Mahony that he wasn't to go without me. He claimed to have calculated the miles and gasoline and computed them to come out even, but my computer didn't work the same as his. He had no concern about making a single-engine crossing of the jungles of Thailand and Indochina and then five hundred miles of open ocean in a single-engine airplane before reaching the Philippines, not to mention the trip back.

We had good days and bad days. On one of our first missions to Mandalay, Phil Cochran was leading the squadron. Grant was in the group as well as R.T. Smith (an AVG ACE), and also several volunteers out of Europe who had never shot at Japanese before. Our fourteen P-51s, after bombing the airport at Mandalay, were attacked from above by approximately twelve Zeros. We lost two P-51s, almost lost several more and didn't claim a single Zero. The boys from Europe didn't realize how formidable the Japanese could be when they caught you at low altitude before you had a chance to get your speed up. One of the good days came when after bombing Mandalay the squadron led by Grant was enroute back to our base in India. I happened to be in the group operations office and was listening to the chatter on the air as the squadron was returning. As the squadron passed over an airport located near Schwebo in Central Burma, I heard one of the pilots say, "My God, what's down there??" Then someone said, "Looks like the entire Japanese Air Force sitting on the ground!" The next voice I heard was Grant' s saying, "Forget the fighters --- go after the bombers!!" Apparently, the Japanese were staging forward late in the afternoon preparing for a substantial raid on our installations early the next morning. The bombers had landed and were being refueled, but the fighter cover was still circling the airport. Grant had about twelve airplanes. He led them down under the enemy fighters, and the results were devastating. One camera film showed five bombers set on fire by one airplane on one pass. In spite of the fact that Japanese fighters were overhead, we lost only one P-51, presumably shot down by the fighters. Grant took the squadron back on repeated passes until all ammunition was expended and then headed for home.

I had listened to the conversation on the radio, and I was sure that some of the Japanese airplanes were left and that possibly the fighters would land after our fighters had departed the area. We had a unique organization where we permitted anyone who was qualified to fly any of the machines. On this particular mission, Grant had taken the commander and deputy commander of the bomber squadron as both were accomplished fighter pilots before we turned them into bomber pilots. When I knew they were on their way home, we had the bombers loaded with frag bombs and announced to the bomber pilots when they landed that they had time to make it back to Schwebo before last light. There was complaining, but they got in the B-25s and headed out. We also notified the RAF fighter command and suggested they get a force there as quickly as they could. We felt that the Japanese amidst the chaos which had been left on the air field would be immobilized for a few hours. The bombers made it back to Schwebo just at dusk, passed over the field at 1,000 feet, and dropped their load of frag bombs. When the RAF arrived on the scene a short while later, the smoke so obscured the landscape that they were unable to locate the air field or deliver their weapons.

The next morning RAF reconnaissance aircraft took pictures, and over one hundred destroyed aircraft were counted on the airdrome. Apparently, the fighters had landed before our bombers reached the airfield.

This event occurred just a few days before we launched our gliders over Central Burma and began moving in 9,000 troops, 2,000 mules, assorted small arms, light artillery, and other equipment. This raid essentially broke the back of the Japanese Air Force in Central Burma and insured minimum Japanese Air Force interference with our glider and transport operation. Before we finished this campaign, I was ordered back to the states by General Arnold to begin organizing four additional air commando groups, each with an exceptionally large air transport force composed of C-46's. It was Arnold's intent to stage a real airborne invasion the following year.

When I get back to the States and General Arnold told me of his plans, I discussed my concern that the British would not provide the essential troops. Arnold was so concerned that he sent a message to Burma ordering Phil Cochran home to confirm what I had told him. When Phil (far more assertive than I ) expressed the same doubts, General Arnold took us both over to see Sir John Dill, the senior British officer stationed in the U.S. General Arnold told Sir John of his plans, his willingness to commit an exceptionally large U.S. resource to the task and then told him of our reservation. Phil and I were not speculating but really reporting to General Arnold what General Wingate had told us. Sir John confirmed that there was considerable conflict of opinion in India as to how that war should be prosecuted. He acknowledged that the Indian Army was not to go on the offensive but to remain in a defensive mode was the prevailing point of view.

When General Arnold learned of this, we cut the new air commando groups from four to the two which had already been activated before I got home. He then ordered me to take off for the Pacific and plan an air guerrilla operation into the Southern Philippines. All of this had to be coordinated with General George Kenney; who was commander of the Far East Air Forces, who coordinated with General MacArthur. After the third air commando was organized and trained, it was deployed to New Guinea. Arvid Olson, who had been our operations officer in the 1st Air Commando Group, was the commander. I was deployed to Far East Air Forces Headquarters to do the planning. Before I was sent to the Southwest Pacific, (October '44 ), Grant had been sent back to the U.S.; and when he heard I was going to the Pacific, he insisted on going with me. I was reluctant to agree because he had lived through so many chose encounters, had married just before our deployment to Burma and now had a son only a few months old. His bride pleaded with him, but when Grant set his course, it was hard to change him.

I reluctantly agreed and orders were cut deploying Grant to the Southwest Pacific. He had no particular assignment, and even without my concurrence, he probably would have found other means to get back into the war.

I arrived in the Southwest Pacific ahead of Grant and suggested to General Hutchinson, who commanded the 308th Bomb Wing (this was not a bombardment wing but a heavy bomb T.0. which provided for one of three mobile Air Force headquarters which General George Kenney and General Ennis Whitehead used in their island-hopping campaign from New Guinea to Japan) that Grant be given command of one of the fighter groups. He discussed this with General Whitehead, commander of the 5th Air Force; and when General Whitehead -- who was a most aggressive man himself -- was told of Grant's aggressive record, he readily concurred.

Earl Dunham commanded the 8th Fighter Group but was due for rotation back to the States, and Grant was put into the group as deputy with the plan that he would assume command when Earl was reassigned. I believe this was sometime in November of '44. When I arrived in New Guinea, I was given the task of planning an air commando operation to cooperate with Philippino guerrillas prior to the landing on Mindanao. When plans were changed, and we by-passed Mindanao for the landing on Leyte, I was made deputy commander of the 308th Bomb Wing which was the advance Air Force headquarters on Leyte. The 308th was also scheduled to be the lead Air Force headquarters landing at Lingayen Gulf on Luzon. I saw Grant only one or two times before embarking on the battleship New Mexico for Lingayen Gulf for the trip ashore with the advance Air Force Party.

I don't remember the exact day, I believe January 2, 1945, when we were still on the battleship which along with the rest of the task force was bombarding the shore in preparation for the landing, we received messages that Grant had been shot down and reported killed in action over Palawan about 200 miles south of the landing area on Luzon. It was also reported in the same message that G. G. Atkinson, another close friend who commanded one of the fighter groups, had been shot down and killed in action, while strafing Clark Field. Although, we try to be philosophical about losing friends in a war, it's always a shocking experience.

Shortly after we landed, engineers began the construction of our air strip adjacent to the beach. We had brought three L5s with us aboard the LST's and these began to fly to guerrilla air strips behind the enemy lines. One of the pilots on his first trip came back with a handwritten message stating that there were about a dozen Americans needing evacuation at one of the strips and requested that this be done as expeditiously as possible. To my happy surprise, the message was signed "G. G. Atkinson. " Without waiting, I ordered the sergeant to fly back and bring Col. Atkinson out first as I wanted to know what happened. I had a strong hope and wish that maybe Grant, who had also been reported killed, had somehow survived.

Atkinson's demise was witnessed by about four or five of his squadron who saw him pull off of a strafing run at Clark Field and witnessed his aircraft fire ball at about 200 feet. They reported that there was no way that Atkinson could have survived -- what really happened was that Atkinson made a strafing run, pulled off the target, and saw a Japanese airplane approaching dead ahead. He pulled the trigger, and the eight 50-caliber guns of his P-47 fireballed the Japanese airplane, which Atkinson's squadron mates mistook for their own group commander. Atkinson was also hit at the same time and went over the side, his parachute opening just in time to break his fall. When he landed on the airdrome, the smoke, flame, and confusion created by the strafing attack and burning airplanes gave him an opportunity to get in the bushes and shortly thereafter he found his way into the hands of friendly Philippinos. From "killed in action" to "safe and sound" in a matter of seconds was no small accomplishment. I was deeply in hope that the same thing might have happened to Grant.

In Grant's case, the 8th Group had escorted a group of light bombers to bomb the airport at Puerto Princessa on the island of Palawan, which is southwest of the island of Luzon. The raid was successful and as the bombers left the target, a sea-plane was observed anchored just off shore in the vicinity of the airport. Grant ordered the group to stay up stating that he would go down and get the aircraft. He made a strafing run but never fired. Apparently, he was hit by anti-aircraft on the way down -- he leveled his aircraft at about 300 feet and apparently flew in a straight line from the water directly across the airport. After he had passed over the airport, his airplane did an abrupt dive into the jungle. As was the case with G. G. Atkinson, several pilots of the 8th Group witnessed the series of events, saw no parachute, and registered Grant "killed in action."

When I learned the details of Grant's disappearance, I was most upset that the group erroneously listed him as killed. As anyone who has witnessed accidents and incidents in the air knows, what one sees is not always what actually happens. The eye will track an airplane and very often completely miss a parachute that opens close to the ground while the observer is still looking at the airplane which may crash at some point beyond. Grant's pay and allowances to his family immediately stopped. This would have continued for six months if the group had listed him missing in action and would have amounted to something over $6,000 for his wife and newborn child if the loss had been correctly reported. Every one felt badly -- but in the service, correcting a mistake of this kind is some times bigger than individuals, regardless of their importance.

Several months after our landing on Luzon, our troops landed and secured the island of Palawon. When this happened, I left the airfield at Clark where I was now stationed as operations officer for the 5th Air Force. I flew a P-51 to Palawon where I immediately checked with the graves registration officer, I had been in touch with him prior to my departure asking that he get all the information possible on Grant's disappearance. When I arrived, he met me and told me that the Japanese had not buried the body. He had found a Philippino who said that he witnessed the crash, had tried to approach the downed aircraft, but Japanese guards prevented him from doing so. He stated that the Japanese guard had told him that the pilot had been killed. The graves registration people had located the wreckage of the downed P-38, which had hit almost vertically and had penetrated to a depth of about six feet in the soft jungle earth. They had excavated to the cockpit, but there were no human remains left in the airplane. In searching in the vicinity, they found a few human bones which they speculated might have been Grant’s. It was said that there were wild dogs in the area which might have pulled the body from the aircraft, but I doubt that this happened, as the cockpit was buried deeply. To satisfy myself, I had the graves officer take me to the site of the wreckage. The aircraft had indeed come straight in -- and the cockpit appeared to be several feet below the level of the ground.

Although I recognized that there was a high probability that Grant was killed, there was no tangible evidence -- and the speculation about the bones was highly inconclusive. I felt that because we could find no body, this warranted changing the record from "killed in action!' to "missing." This started a long correspondence through channels between me and the Adjutant General of the Army for a correction of the record. I wrote my first letter prior to my visit toe Palawon. This letter had the endorsement of both General Hutchinson and General Whitehead but produced no results. About three months later, after I had visited the scene of the accident on Palawon, I wrote an even stronger letter which was not only endorsed by General Whitehead but was also endorsed by General MacArthur. Sometimes the Army can be awful tough on the ones who serve it best. The reply again came back negative, citing the fact that the human bones which had been discovered near the wreckage constituted evidence that Grant was indeed killed in action and therefore the original report made by the 8th Group was correct. In addition to the facts, I cited Grant's bravery, patriotism, extended combat service, and sense of duty -- but the finding of "killed in action" could not be changed.

I guess that about completes the Mahony saga as I remember it. I will always remember him as a good friend, an outstanding American who loved and believed in his country and its system, and who didn't hesitate to lay his life on the line for what he believed.

You indicated to me that Grant's flying school class knew little or nothing of his wartime career. I have taken the trouble to write this long letter as I feel that Grant's career should be a matter of importance to them.

Sincerely,

John Alison