WHis\AFC-WB.DOC

William H. Bartsch is a development economist (Ph.D., University of London, 1970).  Between 1975 and his retirement from United Nations service in 1992, he pursued his other professional interest the history of the Pacific War on a part-time basis.  In 1992, Texas A&M University Press published his first book on this subject, Doomed at the Start, which chronicled the experiences of the pilots of the 24th Pursuit Group in the Philippines, 1941-1942.  Since 1993, Dr Bartsch has been dividing his time between overseas consultancies for the United Nations and the preparation of his next book, a detailed account of War Department plans and preparations for the defense of the Philippines, 1939-1941, and the subsequent Japanese attacks on Clark and Iba Fields of December 8, 1941, based on the personal experiences of the participants on each side.

 

 

14th Squadron B-17 at Ib a Field in autumn 1941

 

MACARTHUR SOUGHT TO ABSOLVE HIMSELF OF BLAME FOR THE DECEMBER 8 DISASTER

 AND SHIFT IT TO BRERETON AND HIS STAFF.

The Japanese attacks on Clark and Iba Fields of December 8, 1941, broke the back of MacArthur's Far East Air Force's capability to defend the Philippines against invasion by the Japanese.  Ever since, historians have searched for the explanation for the debacle.  Where did responsibility lie for such an unexpected disaster visited on the greatest concentration of American air power outside the continental United States?  Those responsible for the Philippines' aerial defense at the time -- from Army Air Forces group commanders up to the commanding general of all army forces in the Philippine -- have in defense of their reputations sought to justify their actions, with the historians left to evaluate the contradictory statements and make their own judgments.

The most public exchange of accusations took place in 1946 between the commanding general of the Far East Air Force, Maj.  Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, and the commanding general, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, Gen. Douglas A. MacArthur.  Immediately following the publication that year of The Brereton Diaries, MacArthur issued a sharp statement to the New York Times that sought to absolve himself of blame for the December 8 disaster and shift it to Brereton and his staff. {1} MacArthur's position was supported by his former chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, himself a key player in the fateful command decisions that day, but who never made any public statement of his own.

Following the publication of Brereton's account and MacArthur's rebuttal, official and semi-official renditions of the December 8 events were published, beginning with that of the U.S. Air Force in 1948, followed three years later by Walter D. Edmonds' USAF-sponsored volume, They Fought with What They Had, and in 1953 by Louis Morton's Fall of the Philippines in the series of volumes covering the U.S. Army in World War II.  Noted historian John Toland, relying mainly on interviews of participants, presented his own version in 1961 in But Not in Shame.  The most detailed and analytical review of the evidence was published in an article by Robert F. Futrell in the U.S. Air Force's Air University Review, in 1965, following the rekindling of the debate after the publication of MacArthur's Reminiscences in 1964.{2}

When previously classified records of MacArthur's USAFFE command, held among his papers at the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, Virginia, were declassified in 1975, new evidence was entered into the public arena, beginning with D. Clayton James' definitive three-volume biography of MacArthur.  Following this accurate and carefully balanced rendering of these events, more error-prone accounts of the December 8 attack and command decisions prior to it have appeared in print.  In this category are the sections of William Manchester's 1978 biography of MacArthur, American Caesar, and Stanley Weintraub's Long Day's Journey into War: December 7,1941. {3}

Lt Gen G. H. Brett & Maj Gen Lewis H. Brereton

Unfortunately, the tone of new renditions of the events of December 8, 1941, has become more stridently partisan.  In his 1994 volume, Days of Infamy, the late Pacific War historian John Costello holds MacArthur exclusively responsible for the debacle, while at the other extreme end of the controversy military historian Geoffrey Perret, in his new biography of MacArthur, Old Soldiers Never Die, puts the full blame on Brereton and his staff. {4} Both these accounts contain numerous factual errors, but those in Old Soldiers Never Die and in Perret's supporting article in American Heritage are more serious because they affect interpretation of events.

Furthermore, unlike earlier writers on the subject, Perret expands his argument to indict Brereton's predecessors back to the time of MacArthur's assumption of command of USAFFE in July 1941.  In view of the inflammatory nature of Perret's allegations against air force Brig. Gen. Henry B. Clagett and his Clark Field commander, Lt. Col. Lester B. Maitland ("notorious drunks" who "had done nothing to prepare FEAF for war") {5} and Brereton ("...ignored MacArthur's instructions...," "held half of the 19th at Clark so it could honor him........ indolent, party-loving, self indulgent....... [his] headquarters diary .. crudely falsified.... appalling performance") {6} I feel challenged to defend these air force officers, utilizing previously-untapped contemporary records, diaries, and correspondence of participants in the events described.

In presenting a rebuttal of Perret's allegations, I will distinguish between four periods of time: (1) up to MacArthur's assumption of USAFFE command on July 26, 1941; (2) from that date to the replacement of Clagett and the arrival of Brereton, November 4, 1941; (3) Brereton's command period up to December 8, 1941; and (4) the Japanese attack of December 8, 1941, on Clark and Iba fields and the subsequent repercussions for Brereton.

According to Perret: When he [MacArthur] was made commander of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East in July 1941, he needed an air commander to oversee the buildup of American air power and counter the growing Japanese air threat building up on Formosa.  What he got was Brig. Gen. Henry Clagett, a notorious drunk, who arrived with an aide, Lester B. Maitland, who was also an alcoholic. (American Heritage, p. 81) Clagett was a notorious drunk, and Clagett's aide, Lester J [sic] Maitland, was another one. (Old Soldiers, p. 235.)

            MacArthur did not "get" Clagett as his air commander when MacArthur assumed command of USAFFE in July 1941, nor did Maitland accompany him as his aide.  Clagett arrived in the Philippines on May 4, 1941, two months before MacArthur took command, and served under Maj. Gen. George Grunert, MacArthur's predecessor as commander of U.S. Army forces.  Maitland had arrived in the Philippines almost ten months earlier, on July 20, 1940, and was not Clagett's aide he was commanding officer of Clark Field. {7}

Were Clagett and Maitland "notorious drunks'?  Perret maintains that "...they got so drunk at an official banquet in China the State Department wanted them recalled, and MacArthur's failure to defend them was eloquent. "American Heritage, p. 81.)

Front:  Brig Gen H. B. Clagett & Maj G. P. Grunert

Back: aides Col H. H. George & Capt G. R. Grunert

Perret derived this allegation from the transcript of an interview with Brig. Gen. Lucas Beau in March 1970, who in 1940-1941, headed the officers' section of the personnel division of the Office of Chief of the Air Corps. {8} Beau's memory of events almost thirty years earlier was quite faulty, but Perret accepted the interview unquestioned.  While Clagett indeed did go on a mission to China-from May 17 to June 6, 1941 Maitland did not accompany him, so the two of them could not have gotten drunk together.  Beau told the interviewer that the "State Department man over there wired the State Department" about the incident, yet a search of formerly classified State Department communications from China for this period in Record Group 59 at the National Archives turned up no such message.  Beau is also the source for Perret's statement that the two were assigned together to the Philippines, Maitland as Clagett's aide, but as noted earlier Maitland had already been in the Philippines since July 1940. {9} That "MacArthur did not defend them," as Perret noted, is not surprising, considering that both were under the command of Grunert, not MacArthur, who was at that time military advisor to the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

While there is evidence that Maitland drank heavily during his air force career, at least in the Philippines such behavior was limited to after hours. {10} Grunert had a high opinion of Maitland's work at Clark Field and recommended him for promotion to lieutenant colonel in March 1941, an unlikely action on his part had Maitland's performance been impaired by drinking on duty." There is no evidence that Clagett was ever drunk during his Philippines tour of duty, if at all during his air force career.  He did suffer from ill health and following his return from his China mission, he was hospitalized for "fatigue," according to his aide, Capt. Allison Ind. {12}

Clagett's Service as Air Force Commander under MacArthur

            When MacArthur assumed command of American army forces in the Philippines, Clagett was the commanding general of what was then called the Philippine Department Air Force, which had been set up in early May 1941 and was a component of Grunert's Philippine department, the top Army command at that time.  The Philippine Department Air Force was redesignated "Air Force, USAFFE" on August 4, 1941, in keeping with the new structure of army forces in the Philippines upon MacArthur's accession to command, and Clagett was named commanding general. {13}

According to Perret, "With the activation of USAFFE, Clagett's command became the basis of a new headquarters, Far Eastern [sic] Air Force, but MacArthur asked Washington for a new air commander." (Old Soldiers, p. 235).

Perret is in error here.  The Far East Air Force was not established until November 14, 1941, as the successor to Air Force, USAFFE. {14} The documentary record does not indicate that MacArthur sought to replace Clagett at the time of MacArthur's assumption of command of USAFFE on July 26, 1941.

Perret implies that Clagett's drinking was a factor in MacArthur's alleged decision to replace Clagett: “When Clagett was not drying out in the hospital, he was out drinking with Maitland." (Old Soldiers, p. 235.)

Clagett did spend considerable time in the hospital during the period beforehand particularly during his service under MacArthur.  But according to at least two officers under his command at the time such hospitalization was due to poor health rather than alcohol.  During a long mission to Singapore, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies -- July 22 to August 20, 1941 -- Clagett had contracted tertiary malaria, "and that, with his present high blood pressure and hardened arteries is a bad condition," Maj. Kirtley J. Gregg, commander of Clagett's Pursuit squadrons, wrote his wife. {15} Obliged to return to Manila by steamer rather than airplane, Clagett was once more hospitalized, then when released suffered a severe fall, again incapacitating him. {16} In late September, when the air buildup of the Philippines was in full pace, Gen. Henry H. Arnold in Washington evidently decided to replace him with a major general. {17} The record does not support that the initiative came from MacArthur, contrary to Perret's assertion.

According to Perret, MacArthur was looking forward to the arrival of a new commander for Far Eastern [sic] Air Force.  Clagett and Maitland had to go.  They had done nothing to prepare FEAF for war, apart from digging slit trenches at Clark Field." (Old Soldiers, p. 240.)

Despite Clagett's frequent disablements, there is no documentation to indicate that MacArthur was dissatisfied with his service.  Indeed, on August 23, 1941, when Clagett and his staff paid a visit on MacArthur following Clagett's return from his mission to Singapore, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies, the USAFFE commander told the group that Clagett "has my complete backing, because I have every confidence in him.” {18}

At any rate, on September 30, 1941, Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall asked MacArthur to choose from among three candidates to take over command of his rapidly expanding air force.  Clagett would now be subordinate to Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, picked by MacArthur on October 2, to head his air command. {19}

Had Clagett and Maitland "done nothing to prepare FEAF for war?" In fairness to Clagett, it should be recognized that when not incapacitated or away on overseas missions for the War Department, he had tried to discharge his Philippines' responsibilities.  But as noted by his aide, Clagett's "long peacetime service, the collisions ... with higher authority, plus his amazing knowledge of regulations, created in him an understandable conservativeness that militated against his ready adjustment from peacetime restrictions to the unbelievable proportions of a new World War engulfment".  Such a background evidently explained Clagett's "vehement opposition to the farseeing, soundly based, and ably presented plans which Col. [Harold] George... championed for the air defense of the Philippines". {20} Maj. Gregg had complained to his wife in late October 1941, that his immediate chief, Clagett "has been slowing up things by refusing to use his staff or let them function". {21} But these factors noted by officers on Clagett's staff are not recognized by Perret as explanations for his ineffectiveness, focused as he is on Clagett's alleged alcoholism.

And what about Maitland?  While perhaps guilty of heavy social drinking off duty, he had done more for the buildup of air defenses of the Philippines than just having the slit trenches for Clark Field constructed -- an activity at that time referred to as "Maitland's folly," but which would save the lives of countless men on December 8, 1941. {22} He had overseen the massive expansion of the base to accommodate the arrival of the B-17s and their crews, ground staff, and supporting units.  Earlier, he had been promoted to lieutenant colonel on the basis of a "superior job" at Clark Field.  He had been given the responsibility to accompany Clagett on his month-long Singapore-Malaya-Dutch East Indies mission in July-August 1941.  Certainly MacArthur is not known to have had any reason to intervene in the air force chain of command and have Maitland removed.  When Maitland was eventually replaced as commander of Clark Field, it was because he was outranked by the newly arrived commander of the 19th Bomb Group, Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank, who was also based at Clark Field following his arrival on November 3, 1941. {23}

B-17’s on pioneer flight to Philippines, lined up at Port Moresby Sept 1941

 

Brereton's Prewar Command Period in the Philippines

            When Maj. Gen. Brereton, designated commanding general of the Air Force, USAFFE, reported to MacArthur the day following his arrival on November 4, 1941, he did not according to Perret,  speak his mind, to tell Mar-Arthur he was worried that the development of the FEAF [sic] was dangerously lopsided... Brereton nevertheless felt strongly that B-17s were being rushed into the Philippines too fast.  Defense should come before offense.  Fighter groups with modern planes should be introduced first, and adequate airfields constructed.  An early-warning net equipped with radar was essential too.  Without proper base defense heavy bombers were sitting ducks. Brereton had argued the issue with Amold and Marshall before leaving.  They considered that what they were doing amounted to "a calculated risk." (Old Soldiers, p. 241.)

 

            Brereton expressed his concerns to Arnold and Marshall during the two weeks Brereton spent in the War Department, beginning with his meeting with Arnold on October 6, 1941.  At a conference held in the War Room of the Air Staff on October 16, Arnold agreed to send Brereton an air warning service battalion, an airfield engineer unit, and other support units in response to Brereton's concerns and agreed to establish interceptor and bomber commands within a restructured (and to be renamed) Air Force, USAFFE. {24}

            According to Perret, regarding the equipment that Brereton would have at hand, 'Marshall.... had forced the AAF to buy a huge fleet of essentially useless A-24 dive bombers, to the intense frustration of the Air Staff... MacArthur knew the A-24 was rubbish." (Old Soldiers, p. 244

The Douglas A-24s, the army version of the Dauntless of Pacific War fame, were to be flown by the 27th Bomb Group (L), which had arrived in Manila in late November 1941, without their aircraft.  Their 52 A-24s, shipped from the U.S., did not arrive in the Philippines by the time war broke out.  They would not have been "essentially useless" in defending the Philippines against invasion if they had been on hand, but would on the contrary have been the ideal aerial weapon to attack the Japanese ships that would be landing troops off the shores of northern Luzon in December 1941.  As events in the early period of the Pacific War would prove, they were certainly more suited for that role than the Philippines' high-flying B-17s, expected by the War Department "to sink enemy invasion fleets." (Old Soldiers, p. 244.) Contrary to Perret's assertion, MacArthur did not have a bad opinion of the A-24.  Indeed, in his conference in Manila with British Admiral Tom Phillips on December 5, 1941, he described the A-24s "that have just arrived" [sic] as "excellent equipment”. {25}

14th Sqd  B-17 at Clark Field Sept 1941

            As Perret has written: As [MacArthur) had recently explained to Marshall, the abundance of the Japanese airfields on Formosa, 300 miles north of Luzon, "indicate[s] that heard, bombers should be located south of the island of Luzon, they are reasonably safe from attack, but from where  through partial utilization of auxiliary fields they can deliver their own blows.  " (Old Soldiers. p, 24

            Perret here refers to the letter that MacArthur sent to Marshall on November 29, 1941. {26} By not making any reference (except in a footnote later in his text) to the plan submitted to MacArthur eight days earlier by Brereton's chief of staff, on which MacArthur had based his letter to Marshall, Perret implies that the proposal to relocate the B-17s out of range of Japanese bombers on Formosa originated with MacArthur.  This is clearly not the case.  MacArthur had earlier asked FEAF Headquarters to prepare a plan indicating the "facilities and installations" needed by the FEAF for operational purposes.  In response, FEAF Headquarters recommended the development of air bases on Mindanao, the most southern of the Philippine Islands, since "the basing of the Heavy Bombardment Groups (the 19th and the 7th)" [the latter expected to arrive in early December] "in Mindanao is considered necessary for security purposes. " {27} Up to this point, there is no evidence that MacArthur or his staff had considered relocating the heavy bomber force south of Luzon for security reasons.  This is not surprising, since determination of the respective ranges of Japanese aircraft on Formosa and American aircraft on Luzon, and the implications thereof, would initially fall more within the domain of responsibility of the FEAF than the USAFFE.

According to Brereton, when the FEAF plan was submitted by his chief of staff, Francis Brady, to Sutherland, MacArthur's chief of staff disagreed with its recommendation to base "the mass" of B-17s on Mindanao, as the USAFFE had made no provision for ground forces for the defense of Mindanao which were needed to protect the aircraft, if based there.  Instead, Sutherland argued, they must be operational "from facilities in Cebu or islands to the north, including Luzon." {28}

Sutherland's argument reflected MacArthur's position, as expressed in his letter of November 29th to Marshall, that Mindanao was "strategically a salient and its defense a difficult problem," and for that reason "the definitive location of the Bomber Command base in Mindanao is not. acceptable"; the B-17s should be based in "the Visayan Islands" (which included Cebu). {29}

As Brereton has recorded in his Diaries, "After considerable discussion with Sutherland, Brady finally received authorization to construct facilities at Del Monte and to locate temporarily part of our bomber force on Mindanao... until facilities could be completed on Luzon, Cebu, and the other islands to the North. {30}

Brereton's recollection is in line with the language of MacArthur's letter of November 29 to Marshall.  As MacArthur noted, "the initial location of the Bomber Command will be in the vicinity of Del Monte, Mindanao," which "will eventually provide an auxiliary to the Visayan base." {31}

However, while MacArthur referred to the Bomber Command (two groups) being temporarily located at the Del Monte base, Brereton indicates that the agreement with Sutherland called only for "part of our bomber force" being temporarily sited there.  Brereton's recollection corresponds with the order issued on November 28 by FEAF Headquarters, putting the FEAF on a "war footing." This order also instructed the commanding officer of the FEAF's Fifth Bomber Command "to make the necessary arrangements to provide for movement of two squadrons of 16 B-17s on 12 hours notice from Clark Field to Del Monte." {32} This order is nowhere cited by Perret in developing his argument regarding the basing of B-17s at Del Monte, despite the fact it is included in Record Group 2 of the MacArthur Memorial Archives that he researched.  As a formal order of the FEAF, an integral component of the USAFFE, it is inconceivable that it did not have the approval of MacArthur and/or his chief of staff.  Indeed, Brereton notes that approval was obtained from Sutherland, on the understanding that the B-17s would be returned to fields on Cebu and Luzon, when such facilities had been constructed. {33}

            According to Perret, MacArthur "had given orders on December 1 for FEAF to move the B-17s based at Clark ... down to Del Monte." (Old Soldiers, p. 247.) There is no evidence that MacArthur or Sutherland issued orders on December 1, or any other date, for the B-17s to be transferred to Mindanao, nor does Perret cite any.  The only written order issued was by Brereton, and that for only two squadrons of his B-17s, as noted above.

However, it does appear that USAFFE intended to shift the B-17s to Del Monte, as implied from an order Sutherland issued on behalf of MacArthur on November 29, 1941, and which Perret has failed to cite to bolster his argument.  According to the order, the ground echelon of the 19th Bomb Group, "less one squadron," was to proceed "with 10 days' rations" from Clark Field to Del Monte "on or about December 8, 1941 ." {34}

            Evidently, MacArthur intended to follow up this order with another directing that all but one of the B-17 squadrons and their flight crews be transferred to Del Monte once the ground crews sent earlier had established themselves on Mindanao and were ready to service the B-17s and provide for other operational needs of the bombers.  Similarly, once the ground echelons of the 3rd and 17th Pursuit Squadrons, also ordered to, Del Monte under the same order, were set up on Mindanao, the two squadrons' pilots would be sent south too, to provide the necessary protection for the B-17s. {35}

Brereton "ignored MacArthur's instruction to move the thirty-five B-17s of the 19th Bomb Group from Clark to Del Monte." (Old Soldiers. p. 247.  Sutherland's 1945 interview and MacArthur's 1946 statement to the New York Times, the apparent sources of Perret's allegation, Sutherland maintained that "all the B-17s been ordered to Del Monte some days before…. This direct order had not been obeyed... GHQ gave out general orders and... the AF Headquarters were [sic] supposed to execute them." MacArthur asserted that "I had given orders several days before to withdraw the heavy bombers from Clark Field to Mindanao." {36}

However, there is no evidence that MacArthur or Sutherland ever ordered the B-17s to Del Monte.  Certainly no USAFFE general order was issued for that purpose.  Thus, there were no "instructions" for Brereton to ignore.  And he himself had already issued orders for 16 B-17s to be transferred to Del Monte, as noted earlier.

This is not to deny that MacArthur or Sutherland could have issued oral orders to FEAF Headquarters to effect such a move.  MacArthur's aide, Lt. Col. Sidney Huff maintained, in a 1964 memoir, that the "directive" to move the B-17s to Del Monte "had been given orally on three occasions through Sutherland ." {37} However, in MacArthur's own headquarters diary, no reference is made to any oral orders, either by MacArthur directly or through Sutherland.

            "On December 4 ... Casey informed Sutherland that while Del Monte was now operable, not one heavy bomber had been sent south.  Infuriated, Sutherland phoned Brereton's chief of staff and berated him freely.  "Goddamnit!" he roared.  "You know General MacArthur ordered those B-17s down to Mindanao. Why the hell aren't they down there?  We want them moved." (Old Soldiers, P. 247.) Brereton grudgingly sent sixteen of his heavy bombers down to Del Monte the next day, but the rest remained at Clark. (Old Soldiers, p. 247.)

Perret cites MacArthur's engineer, Col. Hugh J. Casey, as the source for the exchange between Sutherland and Brereton's chief of staff, but has put the date on it himself.  If the phone conversation actually did take place, it would tie in with Sutherland's 1945 interview, in which he asserted that "on a check, it was found that only half [of the Clark-based B-17s] had been sent [to Del Monte]. {38}

If the date that Perret has given is correct, Sutherland's alleged outburst more likely would have related to the delay in sending the 16 B-17s to Del Monte, as ordered by Brereton on November 28, rather than the whole force, since these B-17s were not sent south until the evening of December 5. But as Brereton notes, the delay in moving the 16 B-17s was due to the need to make the crude field operational for the bombers. {39} On November 28, the 5th Air Base Group had been ordered to Del Monte "on or about November 29" for that purpose. {40} Brereton's explanation is backed up by the official air force history which notes that "Within one week, boats were provided, equipment and supplies loaded, and the 500-mile voyage was completed by the 5th Air Base Group." {41}

If Sutherland's check occurred after the 16 B-17s had already been transferred to Del Monte as he recalled in his 1945 interview, then the date would have been later than the December 4 date Perret imputes to the Sutherland-Brady- exchange of Casey's recollection, and in that case the two recollections would not have referred to the same event, assuming that both Sutherland and Casey recalled the circumstances correctly.  At any rate, the documentary evidence suggests that USAFFE did not intend to shift the whole force of B-17s to Del Monte until some time after December 8, and that it supported the move of just 16 B-17s from early December, as ordered by Brereton on November 28.

            "the new airfield suffered a major drawback: no officers' club.  Pilots could live with crude runways, but they demanded a minimum of comfort, and a club was the bottom line.  They resisted going to Mindanao.... Many were presently [sic] parading around in large, unkempt beards, in protest at being held in the Philippines beyond the expiration of their assigned tours of duty.  And Brereton was not a man to interfere." (Old Soldiers, p. 247.)

            Perret uses this explanation as the basis for Brereton’s alleged ignoring of USAFFE’s alleged order to move the B-17s to Del Monte.  Although not cited, it appears that his source for such charge derives from the Casey memoir, based his 1979 interview.  In that interview Casey recalled that "The Air Force felt that the field down at Del Monte, Mindanao, which we were building, was not fully completed -- it did not have an officers' club.  The Air Force liked to have a officers' club in connection with its airfield facility... It did not have some of the other perquisites, like good living conditions, big barracks, or special facilities for the personnel." {42}

However, Casey did not make this observation in support of any accusation of alleged resistance on the part of the Clark-based pilots or their commanders to move to Del Monte.  But some 2 years earlier, the authors of a 1952 biography of MacArthur did, but without documenting the allegation: "The air commanders, preferring Clark Field both because of its superior facilities and its proximity to the comforts of Manila ... had stalled and temporized [about moving to Del Monte]". {43}

Since Brereton had already issued the order to his 5th Bomb Command chief, Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank, for the 16 B-17s to proceed to Del Monte, any resistance in executing the order would have been on Eubank's part, rather than Brereton's.  Yet, as noted earlier, as soon as the 5th Air Base Group had prepared facilities at the field, the 16 B-17s moved south.

            There is no evidence that the 19th Bomb Group officers themselves resisted moving to Del Monte.  In the view of one of the officers scheduled to be sent down to Mindanao, it was "terrible to look forward to field conditions for an indefinite time," but at least one noted after arrival that "we were happy to be in a secluded part of the world we had always dreamed about but never had a chance to see." {44} There is no evidence that any officer resisted the order transferring their squadron.  The beards were not grown, as Perret has it, in protest to being held beyond the original two-year tour of duty in the Philippines, but rather by order of Clark Field's commander, Lt. Col. Maitland, as a morale booster following the departure of officers' wives in early May 1941. Although the order was relaxed in late July, some of the officers and men became used to their new appearance and chose to keep their beards or mustaches. {41}

The excuse Brereton gave for not sending the entire 19th Bomb Group to Del Monte was that the 7th Bomb Group was expected to arrive soon from the United States. (Old Soldiers, footnote 77, p. 616.)

            Brereton did not present this explanation as an excuse," as he denied he had ever been ordered to send the whole bomber force to Del Monte.  Rather, he merely indicated that Lt. Col. Eubank had advised him against moving more than two squadrons south, due to the imminent arrival of the 7th Bomb Group at Mindanao; evidently, the question had been raised between the two. {46}

Zeros lined up at Takao Naval Air Force Base just before the first sortie on Dec 8, 1941.

 

In a 1945 interview, Col.  Eubank gave the same reason for limiting the B-17 transfer to two squadrons -- the 7th Bomb Group was "on its way" and "they had figured there was barely room for six squadrons to be based at Del Monte" at that time. {47} Similarly, the officer in command of the two squadrons being transferred recalled in 1946 that "it was never intended to send more than two squadrons of heavy bombers to Del Monte prior to December 7. In the interests of dispersion, it was decided that two squadrons were to proceed to Del Monte and two to remain at Clark. {48}

            While Perret acknowledges that the official U.S. Air Force history accepts this explanation, he still finds it "unconvincing" for four reasons that he presents in a footnote, none of which I feel are sufficiently valid to outweigh the official position taken in the history. {49}

            The pilots of the 27th Bomb Group, a dive-bombing outfit, were planning a big party at the Manila Hotel on Sunday night, December 7, in Brereton's honor, and the pilots of the 19th were expected to join in the fun.  Brereton held half the 19th at Clark so it could honor him too. (Old Soldiers, pp. 247-48.)

            Perret infers that this is the main reason why all the 19th Group's pilots were not transferred to Del Monte, as per the alleged USAFFE orders for such a move.  In so doing, Perret imputes to Brereton higher priority to self-amusement than carrying out his duties.  He does not cite a source for this allegation, but apparently derived it from-and expanded on-Casey's 1979 interview.  Casey-mistakenly-referred to the party "for personnel who were to return to the States and that may have been a factor in holding up their move until that was over. {50} But even Casey -- no friend of Brereton -- does not claim that it was Brereton who held up the move "so it could honor him too."

            William Manchester, in his 1978 biography of MacArthur, maintains that "the crews of the seventeen B-17s still at Clark Field .... have stalled and temporized with this evening's festivities in mind." {51} Thus, he holds the 19th Group's crews responsible for the delayed transfer rather than Brereton.  Manchester cites three sources to back up his allegation, but in checking each one I find that none referred to the 19th Group delaying its transfer so it could attend the party.

Like Perret and Manchester, Stanley Weintraub also alleges that the B-17 crews still at Clark at the time were participants in the Manila festivities on the night of December 7, 1941. {52} Weintraub offers no documentation for this claim; he apparently picked it up from Manchester's book.

Indeed, no evidence exists that any 19th Group personnel attended the party, since none did.  Following Brereton's readiness order of November 28, all FEAF personnel were on one hour call at all times, including the 19th Group at Clark.  At least two of the pilots of the group at Clark provide contemporary documentation that the restriction to base was in effect. {53}

The Japanese Attack on Clark and lba Fields, December 8,1941

            At 7:15 a.m. on December 8, 1941, after MacArthur had received the news of the Pearl Harbor attack, "Brereton arrived at 1 Calle Victoria.  He said he wanted to use his bombers to hit back at the Japanese.  MacArthur told him, 'Our role is defensive, but stand by for orders.’" (Old Soldiers, p. 249.)

Perret here maintains that Brereton met directly with MacArthur, but the source he cites does not indicate from whom at USAFF Headquarters Brereton's "stand by" orders were received. {54}

P-40s lined up at Clark Field

Furthermore, the 7:15 visit was evidently the second that Brereton paid in the early morning.  In his Diaries, he indicates he reported to USAFFE Headquarters "at about 5:00 a.m.,” where he found MacArthur in conference, apparently with Admiral Hart, commander of the U.S. Navy's Asiatic Fleet.  Brereton says that he asked Sutherland for permission "to carry out offensive action immediately after daylight," but was told to wait until Sutherland could obtain MacArthur's approval for such an attack. {55}

Then at 7:15 a.m. Brereton returned to USAFFE Headquarters, seeking information on MacArthur's decision.  Meeting in Sutherland's office, he was not given any decision by MacArthur.  When Brereton again argued for the bombing attack on Formosa, Sutherland went into MacArthur's office and returned a moment later.  Brereton was told that MacArthur had turned down his request -- "Don't make the first overt act." Brereton protested loudly that the Japanese had already committed the first overt act by bombing Pearl Harbor, "but Sutherland was unmoved.  Brereton was to maintain a defensive role." {56}

Brereton. thus did not meet directly with MacArthur on either of his two visits to USAFFE Headquarters this morning.  Indeed, it was not until 3:50 p.m. that the two finally had a face-to-face discussions. {57}

            Perret notes that at the time of the second meeting between Brereton and Sutherland, MacArthur wanted a clearer picture of what the Japanese were doing before he used his bombers. The War Department had confirmed the attack on Pearl Harbor nearly three hours earlier but had not given him any instructions, even though both the telephone and teletype links with Washington were working perfectly.  And so far he had heard nothing of the dawn attacks on Aparri and Davao harbor.  It would be another two hours before MacArthur would learn of these dawn attacks. (Old Soldiers, pp. 249-50.)

            Contrary to Perret, the War Department's confirmation of the Pearl Harbor attack, received at USAFFE at 5:30 a.m., included specific instructions for MacArthur: "Carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. {58} What were the tasks for MacArthur to carry out under Rainbow Five?  They were: (1) "to support the Navy in raiding Japanese sea communications and destroying Axis forces;" (2) "conduct air raids against Japanese forces and installations within tactical operating radius of available bases:" and (3) "cooperate with the Associated Powers in the defense of the territories of these Powers in accordance with approved policies and agreements." {59} Clearly, under the second task of Rainbow Five, MacArthur was to bomb Japanese bases on Formosa.

Contrary to Perret's assertion, by the time of Brereton's 7:15 a.m. meeting with Sutherland, MacArthur had heard of dawn attacks on Philippine soil, at least of the bombing of Davao.  At 6:15 a.m., the USAFFE G-2 Journal (in Record Group 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives) received a message that Davao had been bombed, with its airfield and port installations hit.  And at 8:25 a.m., or only a little over an hour after the Brereton-Sutherland meeting, the G-2 Journal received a message that "several planes bombing Camp John Hay" It is inconceivable that MacArthur's G-2 staff did not inform MacArthur immediately of these dramatic messages.

            At 8:50 a.m., Sutherland told MacArthur 'that Brereton was calling from FEAF Headquarters, still asking permission to mount an attack, but he could not specify a single military  target on Formosa for his bombers to strike.  He simply hoped they might find some shipping to attack. MacArthur said, "Hold off for the present." (Old Soldiers, p. 250.)

            Perret is correct that Sutherland called Brereton at 8:50 a.m., as recorded in Sutherland's office diary, but the conversation between the two has been manufactured by Perret; Perret himself does not cite any source.  It is apparently based on a non-time-specific conversation between Sutherland and Brereton included in a 1952 biography of MacArthur.  According to Sutherland's office diary, Sutherland told Brereton to "Hold off bombing of Formosa for the present." {60}

Brereton in his Diaries does not mention the 8:50 a.m. call from Sutherland or ever indicating to Sutherland his inability to specify military targets on Formosa.  While noting that "our photographs of Formosa were obsolete," Brereton and his staff had selected Takao as the target for any bombing attack and had instructed Col. Eubank early that morning "to plan to mount an operation against Takao Harbor, Formosa, first objective enemy transports and warships." {61} Brereton may have actually underestimated the availability to him of adequate information for attacking Japanese airfields on Formosa.  His intelligence officer, Capt. Allison Ind, had compiled objective folders on targets on Formosa, which he felt were "something complete enough to make this bombing mission [of airfields] a very far cry from the blind stab it would have had to be otherwise." {62} One of the 19th Group's pilots recalls "a classified sketch of Japanese airfields on the southern portion of Formosa" that was made available to them that day for their planned bombing mission. {63}

            At 10:00 a.m., Brereton called Sutherland and told him reports were coming in that Baguio had just been bombed.  Sutherland still would not allow him to order a bombing raid.  Exasperated, Brereton told him bluntly that if the Japanese attacked Clark Field, where 19 of the 35 B-17s were located, FEAF would be unable to undertake any offensive operations. (Old Soldiers, p. 250.)

            The FEAF headquarters diary and Brereton in his Diaries report this conversation between Brereton and Sutherland, as Perret has indicated here. {64}

            Confirmation finally arrived of the attacks on Davao and Aparri.  At 10:14 a.m., MacArthur called Brereton and gave him permission to make a reconnaissance flight over Formosa.  If the recon photos showed worthwhile targets, it would be possible to launch a B-17 strike in the late afternoon. (Old Soldiers, p. 250.)

            Perret implies that as soon as MacArthur had confirmation of the Japanese attacks on Davao and Aparri, he authorized (at 10:14) a recon flight and a bombing raid on Formosa for later in the day, if the photos justified it.  However, the USAFFE G-3 Journal recorded a message at 9:45 a.m. confirming the Davao attack, and Sutherland's office diary notes it at 9:47, or a quarter of an hour before Brereton's 10:00 call to Sutherland, in which Brereton still could not obtain authorization to bomb Formosa. {65}

            The MacArthur-Brereton exchange described by Perret is taken from the FEAF Headquarters diary entry for 10:14 a.m. However, Perret has misreported the role of recon photos: "Lacking report of reconnaissance, Taiwan would be attacked in late afternoon," the diary reads.  Perret has it in opposite meaning: only if the photos showed good targets would the afternoon strike be launched.  Brereton apparently realized that it was unlikely that the photo recon mission would be able to return with its photos in time to launch a bombing strike timed to arrive over Formosa before sunset.  Perret makes it appear there would be no bombing mission if the awaited photos did not justify it.  But Brereton intended to bomb Formosa by late afternoon, photos or no photos.

Brereton in his Diaries has it that Sutherland, rather than MacArthur, called him and that only a recon mission was authorized." He recalled a second call from Sutherland at "about 11:00," informing him that "bombing missions" were now authorized.  The fact that he also does not give exact times for the calls, nor for most other entries in his Diaries, suggests that in the writing of his retrospective diary, he did not have the FEAF headquarters diary available to him at the time.

            Shortly before 11:00, MacArthur told Sutherland to phone Brereton and get an account of all known enemy air operations in the past two hours.  He was puzzled, like everyone else: why had not the Japanese made a heavy air attack on Clark Field?  Brereton was still unable to provide an answer. (Old Soldiers, p. 250.)

            It was not "shortly before 11:00," but at 11:55, when Sutherland phoned Brereton to request a report on air operations during the past two hours.  Furthermore, according to Sutherland's office diary, Brereton was able to give a report: "no actual contact, enemy operating in two groups, 15-24 in each group." Sutherland's diary entry matches that of the FEAF headquarters diary for 11:56: "complete report was given Sutherland of the air situation at this time.  " {67}

Documentation does not suggest that MacArthur wanted to know from Brereton why the Japanese had not yet struck Clark Field and that Brereton could not provide an answer.  This is a supposition on the part of Perret.  One of the two enemy groups mentioned by Brereton to Sutherland, picked up by Iba radar and reported to FEAF Headquarters at 11:45, was heading in the direction of Clark Field, {68} but it is not known if Brereton told Sutherland the direction in which the Japanese group was heading.  Perret has left out an important item of the conversation: that Brereton had indicated that he would be sending out a bombing mission to attack Formosan airfields in late afternoon.  Again, both the Sutherland office diary and the FEAF headquarters diary agree on this.

            At noon FEAF realized there were two groups incoming -- one heading for Clark, the other for Iba.  The commander of the 24th Pursuit Group at Clark Field ... was ordered to intercept the planes heading for Clark.  The sixteen B-17s that had spent most of the morning in the air had landed and were now being refueled.  Given the obvious danger, it is astonishing that Brereton's FEAF staff allowed all the bombers to land at the same time.  They were such sitting ducks on the ground that the only sensible thing to do was to land a few at a time -- with fighter cover over the field -- refuel them, and get them back in the air before the next flight came in.  Common sense, however, was lacking at FEAF that day. (Old Soldiers, p. 251.)

            The Clark-based B-17s had actually landed at 11:00, or an hour before the report of Japanese aircraft heading in the direction of Clark Field was received. {69} Contrary to Perret's recommendation, there would have been no point in refueling the B-17s after they had landed and getting them back in the air again for protection purposes, as they were to take off immediately for an attack mission on Formosa after being refueled and loaded with bombs.  While they were being refueled, orders were received at Clark for the bombing mission – “Just before 12:00 noon," as the Fifth Bomb Command chief recalled in 1945-and from that point on the B-17s were being bombed up, an operation that required about 1-1/2 hours, according to Brereton. {70} It was due to preparations for the attack mission on Formosa that the B-17s were on the ground at the time of the Japanese attack at 12:35. {71}

            While bombs were exploding on the runways of Clark Field, Lt.  Howard W Brown of the Signal Corps arrived at 1 Calle Victoria with a top secret message for MacArthur... MacArthur was on the telephone, getting the news from FEAF that Clark Field was under attack.  He was outraged, and he kept Brown waiting for five minutes while he upbraided Brereton's chief of staff for keeping B-1 7s at Clark in defiance of his orders. (Old Soldiers, p. 251.)

            Perret cites a book by Ronald Spector as his source for this account, but the primary source is a 1945 report of the Signal Security Agency.  According to Brown in the report, however, MacArthur was speaking to the "commanding officer" of the FEAF, not his chief of staff, and Brown does not state that he was being upbraided "for keeping the B-17s at Clark in defiance of his orders," contrary to Perret's account of the dialogue. {72}

            While Brown recalled his visit to USAFFE taking place shortly after 10:00 a.m., the attack on Clark Field began at 12:35 and USAFFE first learned of it only at 1:10 p.m., when G-2 reported that "planes very high bombed Clark at 12:35 p.m. {73} This time discrepancy is difficult to explain.  If Brown's visit actually took place three hours later than he recalled, then the conversation he overheard may have been that cited in Sutherland's office diary at 1:12 p.m.-when the attack was still taking place.  According to Sutherland's diary, Brereton telephoned to report plans to "bomb airdromes on south Formosa tonight." From the entry, it appears Brereton spoke to Sutherland, but it could have been to MacArthur.  Obviously, Brereton discussed the Clark attack during this call too, since he had learned of it himself at his headquarters at Nielson Field in Manila 12 minutes earlier. {74} After the Clark Field attack, according to Perret,

            MacArthur .. dictated a number of messages to the War Department. [In one] he said he was turning his A-24 dive-bombers over to the Filipinos. Unlike Marshall, he considered them a waste of good aluminum.  He seized this opportunity, to get rid of them and demand something better. (Old Soldiers, p. 252.)

            Although Perret cites a cable MacArthur sent to the Adjutant General on December 8, 1941, located in the MacArthur Memorial Archives, as the source of this alleged message, I have found no such cable there.  In fact, MacArthur had no A-24 dive bombers to turn over to the Filipinos, even if he had wanted to.  They were on the high seas in a convoy redirected to proceed to Australia.  Furthermore, Perret notwithstanding, MacArthur wanted dive bombers in his arsenal. As he radioed Marshall on December 14, "Dive bombers adequately supported by pursuit would offer a powerful threat to a hostile main landing and their bomb capacity is an effective threat against capital ships.  {75}

            In the early afternoon [of December 8]  Brereton arrived at 1 Calle Victoria flustered and upset.  He had just had a telephone call from Arnold, said Brereton, and Arnold had angrily demanded to know "how in hell" the B-17s had been destroyed at Clark Field.  Would MacArthur explain the situation to Arnold?  "Don't worry, Lewis," MacArthur had told him.  "You go back and fight the war." (Old Soldiers, p. 252.)

            The meeting between MacArthur and Brereton indeed did take place in the afternoon, at 3:50 p.m., according to MacArthur's office diary.  It was the first meeting between the two this disastrous day.  The subject of conversation is lost to history -- it is not mentioned in MacArthur's diary and the meeting itself is not cited in Brereton's FEAF headquarters diary.  However, it is clear that the discussion was not about any call from Gen. Arnold in Washington that Brereton had received just before his visit to MacArthur.  Brereton did receive a call from Arnold, but according to the Brereton Diaries that Perret cites as the source of this exchange between Brereton and MacArthur, it was on December 11 not December 8. {76}

Actually, Brereton also is in error on the date of this phone call: it was made by Arnold on December 8 in Washington, according to the transcript of the conversation, which, however, does not indicate the time of the call.  But since Brereton acknowledged that "we caught it pretty bad yesterday," the call must have been placed in the late afternoon or early evening of December 8 and received in the early morning of December 9 in Manila, given the 13-hour time difference between Washington and Manila.  Contrary to Brereton's recollection, Arnold did not berate him during the call. {77} Since the call Brereton recalls was clearly the first one he received from Arnold after the Clark Field disaster, and the call he received on December 9 from Arnold as documented in Arnold's papers also makes the first reference to the attack, they must be the same call.  Why Brereton would quote a statement by Arnold highly critical of him when no such harsh words were pronounced by Arnold is a mystery, unless the transcript of the conversation was sanitized and Arnold actually did berate Brereton during the call.  According to Perret,

            MacArthur was incensed at the appalling performance of Brereton, Brady, and the Far Eastern [sic] Air Force.  Publicly he defended the airmen .... In private, however, he called Brereton and Brady "bumbling  nincompoops" and looked for a way to get them out of the Philippines before they did any more damage. (Old Soldiers, p. 253.)

            Perret cites the biography of MacArthur by Lee and Henschel as the source for MacArthur's views, but they did not maintain that MacArthur was trying to get Brereton and Brady out of the Philippines. {78} Other than the quotation in the Lee/Henschel book, there is no documentary evidence as to any alleged displeasure of MacArthur with Brereton, Brady, or his staff over their performances.

Similarly, in his American Heritage article, Perret maintains that MacArthur publicly defended his airmen, but that he got Brereton out of the Philippines "within days." ("My Search for Gen.  MacArthur," p. 82.)

Perret is incorrect both in his assertion that MacArthur sought to get Brereton out of the Philippines and on the date of his alleged success in doing so.  Brereton did not leave the Philippines until December 24, hardly "within days" of the Clark disaster, when he was transferred with his headquarters and surviving B-17s to Australia at his own request, not a result of MacArthur's displeasure with his performance.  According to Sutherland's office diary, in a meeting with Sutherland at 09:00 on December 23, "Brereton requests move and post move." The following day, Brereton sent a memo to MacArthur in which he asked to be furnished a directive assigning him "general and specific missions in Australia." According to Sutherland's office diary, a meeting was held at 12:30 on December 24, with Brereton (and evidently MacArthur), and a memo signed by MacArthur subsequently ordered Brereton south with his headquarters, quoting verbatim the mission duties that Brereton had proposed to MacArthur in his memo earlier in the day. {79} While Brereton indicates in his Diaries that during the December 24 meeting with MacArthur he had asked to remain on MacArthur's staff, {80} he was undoubtedly following military politeness towards a superior.

Walter D. Edmonds, in his authoritative 1951 volume, They Fought with What They Had, also supports the argument that it was Brereton -- not MacArthur -- who initiated efforts leading to his transfer out of the Philippines.  According to Edmonds, Brereton "had maintained for some time that it was no longer possible for FEAF Headquarters to function in the Philippines and had advocated its removal to a base in which it might operate to some purpose .... On December 24, [MacArthur] finally gave Brereton permission to leave. {81}

            Almost as soon as the war ended, Brereton got his account of what had happened published as The Brereton Diaries.  Few readers ever realized that the section dealing with the Philippines was not based on a diary at all but was written months, possibly years later.  Its aim was to defend Brereton's reputation, and to a large extent it succeeded, despite its mendacity.... His so-called diary offers an undocumented, uncorroborated and implausible version of events in December 1941.  This has proved no obstacle to its being used by two generations of writers and historians as if it were a reliable, contemporaneous account of air operations in the Philippines. (Old Soldiers, pp. 253-54.)

            Brereton's account has been used by many writers, including Perret himself, where it suited his arguments in developing his version of events of November-December 1941 covered by his book, as cited in this article.  Perret is indeed correct in asserting that The Brereton Diaries -- at least the Philippines section -- was not originally written in diary form at all, as evidenced by the widespread misdating of events he describes.  However, the version of the events themselves Brereton has presented is not "implausible," contrary to Perret's assertion, nor is there any indication that he was "mendacious" in developing his story, as Perret maintains.

Brereton's memoir apparently originated as a draft document covering a Part I of seven chapters sent to Arnold at some unrecorded time, but evidently during the war, for Arnold's comments and perhaps clearance.  This draft is a skeleton work of just 20 pages, not presented in its subsequent diary form, and which Brereton evidently fleshed out later as the Diaries, with Part I in both accounts covering the Philippines phase. {82} In the preface to his Diaries, Brereton maintains that "sufficient records were available [to me] and events were so fresh in my memory and to my staff that I believe the Philippines story is as accurate as it can be. {83} But it is not just Brereton's book that Perret discounts as "mendacious":

            MacArthur was the victim of a deliberate attempt to falsify the documentary record.... The headquarters diary of his [Brereton’s] Far Eastern Air Forces [sic] for December 1941 was crudely falsified a day or two after the Japanese attack.  Both Army and Air Force official historians noticed this long ago, and when I looked at it myself at the Air Force's Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, the erasures and type-overs were still plain fifty years later. ("My Search", pp. 81, 82.)

            The implication of Perret's charge here is that Brereton or his staff altered the FEAF diary to strengthen Brereton's case against that of MacArthur and Sutherland as regards the activities of each side on December 8, 1941, the date on which the diary begins.

Perret bases his rejection of the diary on the "erasure and typeovers" that "were still plain" when he examined it at the AFHRA.  However, Richard L. Watson in the USAF official history questioned only the fact that the year "1942" had been corrected in ink to "1941" for the entries of December 8, 9, and 10, and for December 11, 12, and 13, left to stand as 1942. {84} Contrary to Perret's charge, neither he nor Louis Morton, in his official army volume on the Philippines campaign, {85} note any erasures and typeovers.  My own copy shows no evidence of alteration except on the correction of the year for December 8, 9 and 10. Watson feels the entries for the December 8-13 dates may "represent a compilation from available records for assistance in the preparation of such a report as is understood to have been made by General Brereton in late January or early February," or that perhaps "they are copies made from the original by a careless typist. {86}

But, as Watson concluded in 1948, 'Whatever the case, the fullness and exactness of detail given, together with the fact that at so many points independent corroboration can be had, lead to the conclusion that the document represents a valuable record compiled closer to the events described than any other known source of comparable scope. {87} Similarly, Robert Futrell maintained in a 1965 article that "The Summary .. possesses the precision and definition which usually characterize the difference between a contemporary document and the memories of participants in events. {88}

None of these historians was able at the time to benefit in their research from Sutherland's office diary nor the memoranda and orders of USAFFE and FEAF for November-December 1941 residing in the collection of the MacArthur Memorial Archives, which were not declassified until 1975.  As noted in this article, Sutherland's diary entries closely match those in the FEAF diary, as do the FEAF memoranda and FEAF orders.  There can be little doubt of the authenticity of the FEAF diary.

Based on the detailed reexamination of the events following the arrival of Brereton in the Philippines in early November 1941, what conclusions can we reach about the conflicting claims of MacArthur and his Chief of Staff on one side and Brereton and his FEAF staff on the other?

MacArthur laid out his position in a September 1946 statement to the New York Times: {89}

1)  "General Brereton never recommended an attack on Formosa to me and I know nothing of such a recommendation having been made;... my first knowledge of it was contained in yesterday's press statement,"

            2)  "it must have been of a most nebulous and superficial character, as no official record exists of it at headquarters,"

            3)  "such a proposal, if intended seriously, should have been made to me in person by him; ... he never has spoken of the matter to me either before or after the Clark Field attack,"

            4)  "an attack on Formosa with its heavy air concentrations by his small bomber force without fighter support, which, because of the great distance involved, was impossible, would have had no chance of success,"

            5)  "in the short interval of time involved, it is doubtful that an attack could have been set up and mounted before the enemy arrived,"

            6)  "the enemy's bombers from Formosa had fighter protection available in their attack on Clark Field from their air carriers, an entirely different condition than our own,"

            7)  "I had given orders several days before to withdraw the heavy bombers from Clark Field to Mindanao, several hundred miles in the south, to get them out of range of enemy land-based air,"

            8)  "half of the bombers, 18, had already been so withdrawn when war broke,"

            9)  "General Brereton was fully alerted on the morning of December 8, 1941 and his fighters took to the air to protect Clark Field but failed to intercept the enemy,"

            10)  "tactical handling of his air force, including all measures for its protection against air attack of his planes on the ground, was entirely in his own hands,"

            11)  "the overall strategic mission of the Philippine Command was to defend the Philippines, not to initiate an outside attack."

            Based on the analysis presented in this article, most of MacArthur's points can be dismissed as factually incorrect.

            1)  Even on the highly unlikely assumption that Sutherland never checked with MacArthur on Brereton's many requests from early morning, the FEAF diary provides documentation that at 10:14 a.m. MacArthur himself called Brereton and authorized a B-17 strike on Formosa in late afternoon.

            2)  Contrary to MacArthur's assertion, an official record of Brereton's attack request did exist at USAFFE headquarters: in Sutherland's office diary.  According to this "Brief Summary," at 08:50 a.m. Sutherland called Brereton to "Hold off bombing of Formosa for present."

            3)  Brereton tried to make the request for the Formosa attack in person to MacArthur, but was rebuffed twice during his visits to USAFFE Headquarters at 5:00 and 7:15 a.m. and obliged to receive instructions from Sutherland instead.  Col.  William Morse, an impartial observer, overheard the conversation between Sutherland and Brereton on this subject during the second visit.  Except for the 10:14 a.m. call, Brereton was reduced to dealing with Sutherland instead of MacArthur on his critical requests for a mission.

            4)  If a bombing attack on Formosa "would have no chance of success," why did MacArthur inform the War Department that he was "launching a heavy bombardment counter attack the next morning on enemy airdromes in southern Formosa" when the chances of success would have been even less? {90}

5)      If Brereton had been authorized at the 5:00 a.m. meeting to mount a B-17 attack on Formosa, Brereton had opted for flying fields as targets, and the bombers had been airborne by 6:30 a.m., they could have reached the Japanese Navy airfield at Takao the prime target-while the field was recovering from being fogged in and caught the main part of the Japanese Navy's attack force on the ground, being loaded with fuel and bombs, before its takeoff beginning at 9:38 a.m. {91} Indeed, the staff of the Japanese Navy's 11th Air Fleet at Takao was in a state of anxiety that a B-17 strike had been ordered after news of the Pearl Harbor attack had reached USAFFE and that the B-17s could reach Formosa after 7:00 a.m. Manila time. {92} As an 11th Air Fleet staff member recalled, "Our defenses were far from complete.  The air raid warning system and antiaircraft defenses were totally inadequate.  Moreover, we had little air strength left .... which would have been ineffective against a determined enemy attack. {93}

            If the B-17s had taken off anytime after 7:00 a.m., but before the Clark attack at 12:35 p.m., they would have reached Takao from 10:00 a.m. on and found a base empty of the attack force, but without effective opposition, and could have at least bombed the field and destroyed the 11th Air Fleet headquarters buildings and air base facilities.

            Contrary to MacArthur's statement, an attack on Formosa could "have been set up and mounted before the enemy's arrival", as noted above, provided MacArthur had approved the strike a good 1-1/2 hours-to allow time for loading up with bombs-before the B-17s at Clark were obliged to go aloft for protection at 8:15 a.m. {94} When they were called back in and landed at about 11:00 a.m., it was indeed too late to have them refueled and bombed up for a take-off before the Japanese attacked at 12:35 p.m.

            6)  The Japanese bombers were not protected by carrier-based, but rather, land-based fighters, the incomparable Zeros which no one at FEAF expected would be able to fly nonstop to central Luzon and return and still have enough fuel to engage in attacks on American air bases there.  Carriers were not an alleged advantage for the Japanese.

            7)  The only record extant that relates 'to any formal order by MacArthur (or Sutherland) to transfer the 35 B-17s to Mindanao is S.O. 83 of November 29, 1941, which ordered the ground echelon of the 19th Bomb Group to Del Monte, and that only from December 8, 1941. As noted in this article, it was Brereton who ordered half of them to Del Monte as from November 28, 1941, not MacArthur or Sutherland.

            8)  Indeed, 16 of the 35 bombers -- not 18-had been relocated, albeit temporarily, to Del Monte.

            9)  MacArthur is evidently referring to the first, Japanese Army Air Force, bombing mission heading towards Clark in the early morning of December 8 and that subsequently bombed Tuguegarao and Baguio.  These bombers' targets were north of the patrol area assigned the pursuit pilots who had taken off to intercept the Japanese, who were erroneously believed by the Americans to be on a mission to bomb Clark further south. {95}

            10)  Tactical handling of Brereton's air force was indeed Brereton's responsibility, but Sutherland would not let him operate the B-17 force offensively or even on reconnaissance missions without his permission.

            11)  MacArthur misconstrues his role here.  His strategic mission was indeed defensive, but once hostilities had commenced, he was under orders to execute Rainbow Five to take offensive actions in the defense, specifically including the "mounting of air raids against Japanese forces and installations within tactical operating radius." These obviously included Japanese airfields on southern Formosa.

MacArthur's chief of staff raised similar charges against Brereton in his interview with Walter D. Edmonds in June 1945. {96} These included: 1) FEAF did not obey the direct order of USA.FFE to transfer all B-17s to Del Monte where they would be safe from Japanese attacks, although USAFFE gave out general orders which were to be executed by FEAF headquarters. 2) There was "some plan to bomb Formosa," but Brereton said he had to have photos first.  "There was no sense in going up there to bomb without knowing what they were going after." and 3) "Holding the bombers at Clark Field that first day was entirely due to Brereton".

These three assertions have been shown in this article to have no foundation in fact.  USAFFE issued no direct orders regarding movement of the B-17s to Del Monte, at least no formal directives in the form of USAFFE's general or special orders, to which Sutherland appears to be referring here.  Brereton did have a plan to bomb Formosa -- initially, to attack ships in Takao Harbor, but, later, to hit airfields-and it was not predicated on obtaining photos.  Sutherland and MacArthur held the B-17s at Clark by not authorizing missions for the bombers.  When the bombers were finally allowed to go on mission, it was too late.

Were there other factors explaining the refusal to allow a strike on Formosa that morning other than the reasons put forth by MacArthur and Sutherland?  Air force historian Robert Futrell, after carefully sifting the various hypotheses, concluded that "the incubus of a long period of defensive thinking, unfamiliarity with strategic air capabilities, and the hesitation arising from the directive that the Japanese should attack first may well have contributed to the fatal delay in launching the attack against Formosa," though the bombing of Pearl Harbor was clearly an overt act. {97}

A basic question left unasked by MacArthur and Sutherland is how the B-17s of the 19th Group and the P-40s of the 20th Pursuit Squadron could have been caught on the ground at Clark at 12:35 p.m., when just before noon Clark had received a teletype message that a flight of planes was heading south over the Lingayen Gulf, only some 100 miles north of Clark Field. {98} Responsibility here clearly lay with Brereton and his FEAF commanders, not with the USAFFE staff.  After sifting the evidence, including as provided by 24th Pursuit Group officers and enlisted men, it becomes clear that the message was sent to and received by 24th Pursuit Group Headquarters at Clark, but apparently not directly by 19th Bomb Group Headquarters there, or by Clark Field Headquarters.  The 24th Group commander delayed until 12:15 in getting the 17th Pursuit Squadron aloft, and then sent it to the Manila Bay area to intercept, apparently assuming that the Japanese aircraft were heading for Manila, not Clark.  When a teletyped order from FEAF came in five minutes later to intercept aircraft approaching Clark, the 24th Group commander still held the other pursuit squadron -- the 20th -- at Clark on the ground until it was too late to intercept or even for all but three of the pilots to get off the ground before the bombs started blasting the field. {99}

The failure to order the 24th Group pursuit pilots aloft in time to intercept the Japanese aircraft approaching Clark and the subsequent loss of all but three of the 20th Pursuit's 23 P-40Bs on the ground {100} was not the fault of Brereton or his FEAF staff but rather the 24th Group's commander, Maj. Orrin Grover.  He should also have alerted 19th Bomb Group Headquarters by relaying the warning messages from Air Warning at FEAF Headquarters at Nielson Field, so that the B-17s could have aborted their preparations for the Formosa strike and taken off for protection.

In early 1942, Brereton himself tried to explain the Clark Field debacle in replying to a request from the War Department.  He saw it as originating with the War Department for having failed "to provide combat commanders with the properly-balanced components of an air force with which to wage war against a well-led enemy of superior strength specifically, "proper and adequate anti-aircraft defenses, including air warning equipment, personnel, and antiaircraft artillery." Protesting "against the implication [of the War Department] that failure to use every means available for protection on the ground has been responsible for losses", he maintained that "against determined and well-executed attacks by low-flying fighter-bombers [sic] and ground strafing pursuit, passive defensive measures, such as dispersion, protection of pens, and camouflage are futile." He reminded the War Department that prior to his departure for the Philippines, he had warned that in the event of war a bomber force put in the Philippines without adequate anti-aircraft defense was "almost certain to incur destruction. {101}

In his published Diaries four years later, Brereton made his 1942 position public.  As he noted, during his October 1941 Washington briefing, he expressed concerns about the basing in the Philippines of "unprotected bombardment units," but Marshall and Arnold indicated that they recognized the hazards and that it was "a calculated risk," but that the decision was to build up the B-17 force "as quickly as possible and reinforce it as soon as the fighters and air warning services were available. {102} Indeed, additional fighters and a battalion of air warning services were scheduled to leave the west coast of the U.S. in early December.  Unfortunately, the Japanese attack came earlier.

            At the higher level of War Department strategy for the defense of the Philippines, Marshall and Arnold can be faulted for the decision to send B-17s in increasing numbers to the Philippines in the first place.  The army chief of staff and secretary of war Henry Stimson held an unfounded and exaggerated view of the capabilities of the new four-engine bomber to influence the Japanese against moving south to the resources-rich areas there and seizing the Philippines on their flank. {103} As events in early December would prove, the high-flying B-17s were ineffective against moving warships; dive-bombers were the appropriate aerial weapons against such targets.  Rainbow Five called for strikes against Japanese bases within range of the B-17s, a logical mission for the B-17 that Brereton tried in vain to have approved on December 8. Marshall and Stimson apparently also had Japan proper in mind as a target for the B-17s, a naive notion considering the impossibility of reaching Japan with the range limitations of the B-17. {111}

In conclusion, is Perret's judgment valid that MacArthur was ill-served by his air force commanders from the time he was put in charge of American forces in the Philippines in late July 1941 through the December 8 disaster?  For the pre-Brereton period, it could be argued that Clagett was unsuited to head MacArthur's air force in the Philippines, considering his personality, management style, and chronic illnesses.  Fortunately, his chief of staff, Col. Harold H. George, filled in for him in such a highly professional way that the responsibilities of the air force were fully and competently discharged within the materiel limitations it faced.  No case can be made against Clagett's Clark Field commander, Lt.  Col. Lester Maitland, his excessive social drinking notwithstanding.

It is Brereton who has borne the brunt of Perret's charges, ranging from alleged greater priority given to social pleasures than duty, disregard of official orders, appalling performance, and mendacity in accounting for his actions, including implied falsification of FEAF records.  None of these accusations stands the test of an analysis of the record as provided in this article.  A better case might be made that it was Brereton who was ill-served by MacArthur and his chief of staff-and the War Department -- rather than vice versa.

 

NOTES

1.      Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries (New York, William Morrow, 1946); “MacArthur Denies Brereton Report," New York Times, September 28, 1946, p. 6.

2.      Richard L. Watson, "Pearl Harbor and Clark Field," Chapter 6 in Wesley F Craven and James L. Cate (eds.), The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. I, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939-August 1942 (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 194-233; Walter D. Edmonds, They Fought with What They Had (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1951); Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1953); John Toland, But Not in Shame (New York: Random House, 1961); Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964); Robert F. Futrell, "Air Hostilities in the Philippines: 8 December 1941," Air University Review, January-February 1965, pp. 33-45.

3.      D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1970) and Vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton-Mfflin, 1975); William Manchester, American Caesar Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1978); Stanley Weintraub, Long Day's Journey into War-December 7,1941 (New York: Truman Talley Books, 1991).

4.      John Costello, Days of Infamy (New York: Pocket Books, 1994); Geoffrey Perret, Old Soldiers Never Die (New York: Random House, 1996).

5.      Geoffrey Perret, "My Search for General MacArthur," American Heritage, February-March 1996, p. 81, and Old Soldiers, p. 240.

6.      Perret, "Search," p. 81, and Old Soldiers, pp. 247-48, 253.

7.      Capt. Allison Ind, Clagett's intelligence officer, was assigned as Clagett's aide a few days after Clagett's return on June 6, 1941, from his China mission. See Allison Ind, Bataan: The Judgment Seat (New York: Macmillan, 1944), pp. 28-29.

8.      "Biographical Study of USAF General Officers 1917-1952," (Manhattan, Kan: MA/AH Publishing, n.d.), Vol. I entry for Lucas Beau.

9.      Interview of Brig. Gens. Martin Scanlon and Lucas Beau, March 25, 1970, in Hap Arnold-Murray Green Collection, Special Collections, USAF Academy Library, Colorado Springs, Colo.

10.  Maitland evidently enjoyed "going calling" down Officers' Row at Clark Field after hours, having a drink with each of the officers and their families at their houses, providing his own bottle of whiskey, according to the wife of a pilot based at Clark at the time. (Letter, Miriam Pachacki to author, September 22, 1996.) None of the officers based at Clark Field at the time with whom I have been in contact, or whose 1941 correspondence I have, recall him ever "in his cups" while on duty.

11.  "Maitland is doing a superior job at Clark Field and deserves consideration for temporary promotion." Letter, Grunert to George C. Marshall, March 6, 1941, in Grunert correspondence, George C. Marshall Papers, George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, Va.

12.  Ind, p. 29.

13.  USAFFE General Order No. 4, August 4, 1941, in RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, Va., and as cited in "Diary of General Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East," also in RG 2.

14.  USAFFEGeneralOrderNo.28,Novemberl4,1941, in RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives.

15.  Letter, K J. Gregg to wife, August 17, 1941, in author's collection.

16.  Ind,pp.52,61.

17.  MacArthur's chief clerk in USAFFE in 1941 notes that "In September it was decided in Washington that the USAFFE air force required a new commander." See Paul P. Rogers, The Good Years: MacArthur and Sutherland (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 67.

18.  "Diary of General Douglas MacArthur," entry for August 23, 1941, and Ind, p. 62.

19.  Radiogram, MacArthur to Marshall, October 2, 1941, in RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives.

20.  Ind, p. 32.

21.  Letter, K.J. Gregg to wife, October 21, 1941, in author's collection.

22.  Maitland wanted to be remembered in history for having had the trenches dug.  See his letter to Edmonds, November 20,1950, in the Walter D. Edmonds collection, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.

23.  Interview of Eugene L. Eubank, November 29, 1945, in Walter D. Edmonds collection.  Maitland was appointed executive officer of the newly-formed Far East Air Service Command as from November 24, 1941. (Letter, K.J. Gregg to wife, November 22, 1941, in author's collection.)

24.  Brereton Diaries, pp. 5-1 1; "Visitors' Log of General Arnold," entry for October 6, 1941, in Series 5, Box 90, Envelope 7, Hap Arnold-Murray Green Collection; Memo, Secretary of the Air Staff to Chief of Staff, October 22, 1941, "Augmentation of Arms and Services with the Air Forces, Plum," and Memo, OCAC to Adjutant General, October 20, 1941, "Activation of Air Corps Units," both in National Archives, RG 407, AG 320.2 (7-28-41).

25.  "Report of Conference," December 6, 1941, in Hart Personal Papers, Series 1, Item 12, Operational Archives, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.

26.  LetterMacArthurtoMarshall,November29,1941, in RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives.

27.  Memo, Francis Brady to MacArthur, "Proposed Installations and Facilities for the Far East Air Force," November 21, 1941, in RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives; Brereton Diaries, p. 32.

28.  Brereton Diaries, p. 32.

29.  Letter MacArthur to Marshall, November 29, 1941.

30.  Brereton Diaries, pp. 32-33.

31.  Letter MacArthur to Marshall, November 29, 1941.

32.  Memo, Brady to Commanding Officers, 5th Interceptor Command, 5th Bomber Command, FEAF Service Command, and 2d Observation Squadron, "Readiness Status of Far East Air Force," November 28, 1941, in RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives.

33.  Brereton Diaries, p. 35.

34.  USAFFE Special Order No. 83, November 29, 1941, paragraph 4, in RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives.

35.  Rumor at Nichols Field in late November 1941 had it that the 17th Pursuit based there was to be transferred down to Del Monte. (Letters, William Sheppard to "Bob and Mary Jane," November 25, 1941; George Armstrong to wife, November 28, 1941; and Grant Mahony to mother, November 30, 1941; all in author's collection.

36.  Interview with Lt. Gen. R. K. Sutherland, Manila, June 4, 1945, in Edmonds Collection; “MacArthur Denies Brereton Report", New York nmes, September 28, 1946, p. 6.

37.  Sid Huff, with Joe Alex Morris, My Fifteen Years with General MacArthur (New York: Paperback Library, 1964), p. 32.

38.  Sutherland interview.

39.  "Three days were required to move personnel and equipment to Del Monte and it was occupied and ready for operation on December 5." Rough draft of Brereton book, n.d., in Box 201, Folder 4, "Philippines 1941," Arnold Papers, Library of Congress.

40.  USAFFE Special Order No. 82, November 28,1941, in RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives.

41.  Watson, p. 188.

42.  Hugh J. Casey, Engineer Memoi-- (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1992 p. 149.

43.  Clark Lee and Richard Henschel, Douglas MacArthur (New York: Henry Holt, 1952), p. 140.

44.  Diary of lst Lt. Edward Jacquet, entry for December 5, 1941, and log of 2d Lt. Francis Cappelletti, both in author's collection.

45.  Letters of K. J. Gregg to wife, September 13, 1941 and James H. Cooke to parents, September 7, 1941, both in author's collection; Manila Tribune, August 10, 1941.

46.  Brereton Diaries, p. 36.

47.  Interview of Brig. Gen. Eugene L. Eubank, November 29, 1945, in Edmonds collection.

48.  Memo, Brig. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell to Chief, AAF Historical Office, February 13, 1946, at Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB.

49.  Watson, pp. 188-89.

50.  Casey, p. 149.

51.  Manchester, p. 203.

52.  Weintraub, p. 182.

53.  "On the alert 24 hours now, can't leave the post." (Diary of Melvin McKenzie, entry for November 28, 1941.) "We can't leave the post at any time." (Letter of Don Mitchell to Bayrd Still, December 1, 1941).  Both items in author's collection.

54.  "Far East Air Force Summary of Activities," entry for 7:15 a.m., at Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB.

55.  Brereton Diaries, pp. 38-39.

56.  In his Diaries Brereton does not mention a second visit at 7:15, but clearly this visit was under different circumstances than the 5:00 one, as recalled by Brereton.  It corresponds to the description of the entry in the FEAF summary of activities, which is the first entry in that headquarters diary.  The description included here is from John Toland's But Not in Shame (p. 41) and derives from the eyewitness account of Col.  William Morse, who was across the hall at the time and overheard the exchange between Sutherland and Brereton.

57.  "At 3:50 the General conferred with Brereton," MacArthur diary, December 8, 1941, entry.

58.  Radiogram 736 (WPD 4544-20) in RG 165, War Plans Division, General Correspondence 1940-42, National Archives.  This radiogram was sent at 3:22 p.m. on December 7 and according to MacArthur's reply (urgent secret radio to Marshall, December 8, 1941, RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives) it was received at 5:30 a.m. December 8.

59.  As quoted in Morton, p. 67.

60.  Lee and Henschel, p. 139, which refers to a statement by Sutherland questioning what targets Brereton planned to attack and Brereton's admission that he had no information on targets.  The authors apparently are referring to the June 4, 1945, interview of Sutherland in Manila (in Edmonds collection) in which he recalled that Brereton acknowledged to Sutherland that he had to have photos first to bomb Formosa, since "there was no sense in going up there to bomb without knowing what they were going after"; Sutherland, "Brief Summary of Action in the Office of the Chief of Staff, December 8, 1941-February 22, 1942," in RG 2, MacArthur memorial Archives, 8:50 a.m. entry.

61.  Brereton Diaries, pp. 37, 39.

62.  Ind, p. 92.

63.  Memoir of Melvin McKenzie, 1993, in author's collection.

64.  FEAF Summary of Activities, December 8, 1941, 10:00 entry, and Brereton Diaries, p. 40.

65.  USAFFE G-3 Operations Journal, entry for 09:45, and Sutherland office diary, entry for 09:47, both in RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives.

66.  Brereton Diaries, pp. 40, 41.

67.  Sutherland, "Brief Summary, December 8, 1941," 11:55 a.m. entry; FEAF Summary of Activities, December 8, 1941, 11:56 a.m. entry.

68.  William H. Bartsch, Doomed at the Start (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1992), p. 66.

69.  Diary of Melvin McKenzie, entry for December 8, 1941.  McKenzie was one of the pilots who had been sent aloft earlier in response to an early morning report of Japanese aircraft heading towards Clark Field that turned out to be short-range army bombers on an attack mission on targets to the north of Clark.

70.  Eubank interview; draft of book by Brereton in Arnold papers.  An officer of Eubank's Headquarters Squadron recalled in 1943 receiving the attack order at Clark at 11: 30.  Interview of Capt. Charles Miller, in Priestly papers, "Philippines Records," RG 407, National Archives.

71.  There were two orders being carried out at Clark Field by the 19th Group at the time of the Japanese attack.  In addition to the bombing mission by two squadrons, another three B-17s were preparing to carry out the photo recon mission.  See FEAF Field Orders Nos. 1 and 2, December 8, 1941, in RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives; McKenzie diary, December 8, 1941; interviews of Sig Young, May 8-9, 1945, and Edwin Broadhurst, January 15, 1945, in Edmonds collection.

72.  Signal Security Agency, "Reminiscences of Lt. Col. Howard W Brown," SRH-045, August 4,1945, in RG 457, National Archives.

73.  Sutherland "Brief Summary," 1:10 p.m. entry.

74.  Sutherland Brief Summary, December 8, 1941, 1:12 p.m. entry; FEAF Summary of Activities, December 8, 1941, 13:00 entry: "Report received from Stotrenburg many bombers very high bombed Clark Meld at 12:35 P-M.

75.  Radiogram, MacArthur to Marshall, December 14, 1941, RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives.

76.  Brereton Diaries, p. 50.

77.  "Telephone conversation between General Arnold and General Brereton, Manila, 12-8-41," transcript in Arnold papers, Box 201, Folder 4, "Philippines 1941," Library of Congress.  According to the transcript, Arnold said "I just wanted to check up and see what you are doing and any way we could help you, Louie."

78.  Lee and Henschel, p. 139.

79.  Sutherland, "Brief Summary," entries of 9:00 a.m. December 23, and 12:30 p.m. December 24,1941; memo, Brereton to MacArthur, "Plan of Employment, FEAF," December 24, 1941, in RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives; memo, Sutherland to Brereton, "Instructions," December 24, 1941, in RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives.

80.  Brereton Diaries, pp. 61-62.

81.  Edmonds, p. 188.

82.  Untitled, undated manuscript signed "L. H. Brereton" in Arnold Papers, Box 201, Folder 4, "Philippines 1941."

83.  Brereton Diaries, Preface.

84.  Watson, p. 206.

85.  Morton, p. 81, footnote 14.

86.  Watson, p. 206

87.  Ibid.

88.  Futrell, p. 43.

89.  "MacArthur Denies Brereton Report," New York Times, September 28, 1946, p. 6.

90.  Radiogram, MacArthur to AG, December 8, 1941, in MNIA.

91.  The fog had lifted at 7:50 a.m. Manila time, but it was not before 9:38 that the first Japanese aircraft took off for the attack.  Shiro Mori, Kaigun Sentokitai, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: R. Shuppan, 1979), p. 176 and Boeicho Kenshujo Senshishitsu, Navy Attack Operations Against the Philippines and Malaya, Senshi Sosho, Vol. 24 (Tokyo: Asagumo, 1969), p. 181.

92.  Mori, p. 176, and Koichi Shimada,'The Opening Air Offensive Against the Philippines," Chapter 3 in David Evans, ed., The Japanese Navy in World War II (Annapolis: USNI Press, 1986), p. 92.

93.  Shimada, p. 92.

94.  Bartsch, p. 62.

95.  Ind, p. 94; Bartsch, pp. 62-64.

96.  Sutherland interview in Edmonds collection.

97.  Futrell, p. 41.

98.  Bartsch , p. 66. -

99.  Ibid., pp. 66, 68-70.

100. Ibid., p. 112.

101. Radiogram, Brereton to AGWAR, March 1, 1942, in Edmonds collection.

102. Brereton Diaries, pp. 8-9.

103. Daniel F Harrington, "A Careless Hope: American Air Power and Japan, 1941," Pacific Historical Review (May 1979), pp. 217-38.

104. For Marshall's secret press conference of November 15, 1941, on this subject, see Larry 1. Bland, ed., The Papers of George Catlett Mar-shall, Vol. 2 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 676-81.