WHis\19FF-JM.DOC

            First:     Flying Fortresses of 19th BG

            Second:  First Bomber Mission

            Third:     Mindanao

Flying Fortresses of the 19th Bomb Group

Aircraft of this story in May 41 pending their flight to Clark Field

            These documents and the photos used were provided by M/Sgt Conrad Marvel.

INTRODUCTION:

            When the Japanese militarists unleashed their war machine in the Pacific in December 1941, the offensive airpower of the United States in the Philippine lslands consisted of the 35 Boeing Flying Fortresses of the 19th Bomb Group based at Clark Field on Luzon. The intent of this article is to tell of the planes, what happened to them, and to some of the brave men who flew them. I am most grateful to those veterans of the Philippine and Java wars who shared their recollections with me, and to those who have written of this period before. With out their help my efforts would have been futile.

            Official records of this first phase of the war in the Philippines are meager. Many of the events were never recorded and many of the orders were oral rather than written. Consequently, most of the history has do be constructed from the recollections of those who were there. Memories tend to become hazy with the passage of time and often are at variance as different people relate the same event. Facts become twisted and errors creep in. I have done my best to determine the actual happenings and beg indulgence for what I report wrongly.

PRELUDE TO WAR

            As the decade of the 1940s began, most Americans lived with a sense of false security. The working population, with the Depression and hard times of the thirties fresh in their memories, were preoccupied with earning a better living in the resurgent economy brought about by the European conflict. The politicians were more concerned with enacting legislation that would ensure their reelection than would contribute to the defense of the country from foreign aggression. The military, to whom the national defense was entrusted, was controlled mostly by hide-bound career types who, if it came to war, were prepared to fight the Hun in the trenches again. And by and large, the public and the leaders were content to trust our safety to the oceans, and to the Navy to keep the enemy from our .shores.

            A few men of vision saw the futility of planning to fight the next war with the weapons and the strategy of the last, but their view of the future was in many cases cloudy and confused. Air power, they reasoned, would be the major factor and probably would determine the victor and vanquished. But since it was a new and unproven concept its effectiveness would require much learning in how best to utilize it.

            By 1940 it was a foregone conclusion by the government in Washington that the U.S. would enter the war against Germany. But our leaders were so fixed in their determination to eliminate the hated Nazis and their Fuehrer, Hitler, they were prone to overlook the Far East where the prime danger was building. The Japanese warlords, taking advantage of a world engaged in the struggle in Europe, seized the opportunity to complete the conquest of their 'Sphere of Co-Prosperity." Even when the Roosevelt administration finally recognized the Japanese intention of aggression. the obsession of awaiting the other side's first move resulted in a disaster to the U.S. Navy and Army Air Corps.

            When war came, the men in the U.5 Armed Forces were almost as unprepared for it as was the general public. Few of the commanders knew much about commanding anything except a peacetime drilling unit. The strategy and tactics of air warfare were largely unknown and the effective use of the airplane in war would be learned only through bitter experience. There would be plenty of that.

            Pearl Harbor was a shocking surprise to Americans -- even to those who had already decided to take the U.S into the war. It was the plan to have the Axis Powers strike the first blow, but such a disaster was not contemplated. Japan pulled a master stroke by destroying the U.S. fleet by surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. Some measure of excuse can be given the command in Hawaii due to the complete surprise the Japanese effected. However, such excuse cannot be awarded the command in the Philippines where part of the U.S. air strength was destroyed at Clark Field.

            MacArthur's headquarters had been notified about 4:30 A.M., December 8, Philippine time, of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Some eight hours elapsed before the Japanese bombers appeared over Clark Field, and then they found the B-17s lined up on the field like sitting ducks. The question of why has never been satisfactorily answered; even General Arnold said he was never able to find out exactly what went on or who was responsible. But, out of the mass of confusion and conflicting reports a few facts have emerged. It appears MacArthur, in following orders from Washington to ensure the enemy made the first move, was so taken by that edict that he failed to see the danger inherent in it. Also, it seems much of the decision making was entrusted to MacArthur's Chief-of-Staff, General Sutherland. who hadn't the foggiest idea of what air power was all about. The airplane was just a too advanced war machine for him to comprehend.

            General Brereton, while in actual command of the Air Corps, appears to have been somewhat overawed by MacArthur's position and hesitated to take what action his better judgment dictated. After the Clark debacle, Brereton seems to have spent more time and effort in justifying his aberrations than in intelligently employing what forces he had left. Most of the operations had to be improvised by the plane commanders and it was also new to them. In short. no one on our side knew how to fight the kind of war the Japanese flung at them.

THE 19th BOMB GROUP

            As constituted on December 8, 1941, four squadrons comprised the 19fh Bomb Group under command of Lt. Col. Eugene Eubank at Clark Field: the 14th Bomb Squadron commanded by Maj. Emmett (Rosie) O'Donnell; the 28th commanded by Maj. William Fisher; the 30th under command of Maj. David Gibbs; and the 93rd under command of Capt. Cecil Combs. Eight planes were assigned to each squadron, and three to the Headquarters Squadron under command of Capt. William MacDonald. The equipment of the group was (29) B-17Ds and (6) B-17Cs, some originating from March Field, California.

            The 14th Squadron had been formed from personnel of the 5th and 11th Bomb Groups in Hawaii and had flown their nine B-17s to the Philippines in September 1941. The route flown by the 14th, and later by the other squadrons, was from Hawaii to Midway. to Wake, then to Port Moresby. New Guinea. Darwin, Australia. and finally to Clark Field. Take off from Wake was after dark so the planes would pass over the Japanese held Caroline Islands at night. One plane, with Maj. Fisher in command, was delayed in leaving Wake and at daylight was square over the Japanese base of Ponape. However, no incident was reported although it is only reasonable to assume the Japanese knew of the passage.

            The 28th Squadron had been in the Philippines since 1940, equipped with B-10 and B-18 bombers which were long since considered obsolete. When the B-17s arrived the B-10s had been given to the Philippine Air Force and the B-18s were relegated to transport duty. Apparently the 28th never operated as a wartime unit in the 19th. With all their planes destroyed in the first day's attack, the surviving personnel were assigned to other squadrons, or the ground forces. Many other Air Corps personnel wound up as infantry when they ran out of planes to fly and service.

            The 30th and 93rd Squadrons were part of the original 19th Group and based at AIbuquerque, N.M. When they left the U.S. in October 1941, they took (26) B-17s with them -- enough to equip the 28th Squadron. The flight across the Pacific was much strung our and it was early November before all the planes reached Clark. Captain MacDonald was delayed in Darwin by engine failure and arrived at Clark on November 20 after a replacement engine had been flown down from Clark by Lts. Bohnaker and O'Bryan. The engine had to be partially disassembled to fit into the bomb bay of a B17 for the flight.

            Clark Field was the only air base in the Philippines adequate to support B-17s. Some 6O0 miles to the south on the island of Mindanao, the Del Monte Pineapple Company had an air field. but the landing scrip was originally a fairway of the golf course and was not designed to support a B-17. So, a 7000 foot strip was cut and lined out in a grass meadow and from this field most of the 19th's operations against the Japanese invasion forces were launched.

            On December 6, the 14th and 93rd Squadrons were sent from Clark to Del Monte to get some of the B-17s out of range of the now expected attack from the Japanese bases in Formosa. Why only the two squadrons were sent was never adequately explained. Sutherland claimed he ordered all the B-17s sent. Brereton is ambiguous in his reports, claiming at times he never received orders to send any, and at other times stating he held some planes at Clark as he wanted to begin offensive operations against Formosa. At any rate, the (16) B-17s at Del Monte were all intact on December 9, while of the (19) at Clark. only seven survived and of these only two were flyabIe.

            About one half of the strength of the 19th Group was destroyed or badly damaged in the first Japanese attack on CIark Field about noon on December 8. Ten days later when the 19th was with drawn to Australia. only (14) B-17s were surviving to make the flight to Darwin. The fact that only three of the losses came as a result of aerial combat attests to the ruggedness of the Fortress structure, and to the quickly learned combat tactics of the flight crews. Also it demonstrated the in effectiveness of the Japanese fighter plane at high altitude where the B-17 operated best. The B-17C and D models were not effective offensive bombers -- actually the term Flying Fortress was a misnomer. Lightly armored and with insufficient armament they would have stood no chance of survival against sustained fighter attacks as was thrown against the bomber fleets as the war progressed.

            The bombing results of the 19th against the Japanese forces were ineffective, to say the least. The Japanese commanders must have been amazed at their much less than anticipated casualty rate in their landing operations. The damage inflicted by the surviving bombers of the 19th on the invasion ships and beaches was minimal. This is not to say had the full complement of 35 bombers been available the invasion would have been thrown back. The Japanese air superiority was so overwhelming that a few more B-17s could have only slightly delayed the Japanese schedule. The lack of coordination in the U.S. defense forces, the confusing and often conflicting orders issued to the flight crews, the high abort rate and the inexperience of the crews. all were factors in the disappointing results of the operations against the invasion forces. The fact any of the missions were even partly successful and any damage inflicted on the enemy attest to the bravery and perseverance of the combat crews. The tactics they learned by experience would prove invaluable in subsequent months when the U.S had the facilities to fully utilize the concept of an air bombing offensive.

            In the confusion following the Japanese air attacks on Clark Field on December 8 it is no wonder the reports and accounts also are confused and conflicting. The stories of the survivors vary greatly in recounting the details of what happened. I have decided the best way to relate the events is to list each day's activities separately. Much will be left out and there will be errors due mostly to the lack of official records, but I will attempt to render as accurate an account as my research permits.

WAR IN THE PHILIPPINES--THE ATTACK ON CLARK FIELD

December 8, 1941

            At Clark three B17s were scheduled for an early morning patrol mission toward Formosa. After the news of Pearl Harbor was received, two planes were canceled and Wheless proceeded alone. Eubank had gone to a conference at MacArchur's headquarters and Gibbs in command at Clark ordered all flyable B-17s into the air after receiving reports of approaching Japanese planes. When the P-40s on patrol reported no sighting of enemy planes, Gibbs recalled the B-17s. Carpenter, who had taken off late, was now on patrol to the east coast of Luzon and Whelcss was still up toward Formosa. Of the 17 planes on the ground at Clark, 40-3075 was in the hangar undergoing repair for a damaged tail section suffered when it landed at Clark in a storm on the flight in from Darwin. Plane No. 40-3088 and one more were also in the hangar to have camouflage paint applied. Most of the other 14 B-17s were neatly lined up along the runway.

            While the planes were being serviced and loaded with bombs for a bombing mission to Formosa, an order was issued to send three B-17s on another photo recon of air fields on Formosa. There was a shortage of cameras so a B-18 was sent to Nichols Field for more equipment. This delayed the take off and the three photo planes were lined up on the runway when the first wave of Japanese bombers came over CIark. The exact time varies with whoever is telling the story, but it was some time around noon. The photo planes -- Broadhurst, Young and led by Maj. Walsh -- were destroyed as they attempted to take off. The first attacking wave was high altitude bombs and while buildings and installations were hit and set afire, only a few B-17s were hit. Then came the Zero fighters and in the strafing all the remaining B-17s were destroyed or badly damaged. The two in the hangar for painting were taxied from the burning building by Cox and Stitt only to be destroyed in the strafing.

Philippine Islands

            The only activity by the two squadrons at Del Monte on December 8 was recon missions around Mindanao. During the attack on Clark, Tash had flown up from Del Monte to have a fuel tank leak repaired and attempted to land during the strafing. He was able to elude the Zeros, but was damaged by their fire and returned to Del Monte. Carpenter landed soon after the attack. also having avoided the Japanese fighters, and when Whelss returned from his recon mission these two were the only flyable B-l7s at Clark. A survey showed that some of the damaged B-17s could be repaired, but a total of (12) had been completely destroyed. Two that were deemed repairable were 40-3100 and 40-3098.

December 9, 1941

            P-40s were scheduled for a dawn patrol to the north of Luzon and on the take off run one pilot lost his bearings in the dust and crashed into a B-17 that was considered repairable. This was 40-3100. Eubank's plane. It was destroyed and now the total lost was 13.

            Carpenter was again sent on a recon toward Formosa, but turned back due to generator trouble and was forced to circle Clark the rest of the day to avoid being caught on the ground by another Japanese air raid. Six B-17s from Del Monte, the 93rd Squadron, led by Combs, searched for a Japanese convoy off Legaspi but failed to locate it, and they landed at CIark late in the afternoon. The other two 93rd planes -- Tash was still out of commission at Del Monte and Parsel was on patrol around Mindanao and came to Luzon later in the day to land with the 14th Squadron at San Marcelino. O'Donnell led the eight planes of the 14th into San Marcelino under orders to stage through Clark for a mission to Formosa on the 10th. San Marcelino was a make shift field to the west of Clark and no facilities existed for the planes, and the crews had only one loaf of bread per crew for rations. On the morning of the 9th, Adams had flown one of the repaired B-17s, 40-3098, from Clark to Del Monte.

FIRST MISSION OF THE 19th BOMB GROUP December 10, 1941

            The Formosa mission was canceled and all flyable planes were ordered to attack the Japanese invasion convoys approaching Luzon from the north. There were (15) flyable B-17s and three B-18s. Connally, of the 93rd, was sent on a recon to Formosa, but turned back due to engine trouble. Combs led the other 93rd planes to attack the invasion forces landing at Vigan on the north coast of Luzon. Besides Combs the pilots were: Vandevanter in 40-3093, Ford in 40-3087, Shedd and Young. This was the first bombing mission of the war for the U.S. Army Air Corps!

            O'Donnell flew from San Marcelino to Clark for orders and the other planes of the 14th were to follow at dawn. However, only O'Donnell and three more were permitted to land -- an air raid alert was in effect and Godman, Teats and Keiser were sent back to San Marcelino and ordered to return to Del Monte. Kelly. Schaetzel and Montgomery landed at Clark and loaded what bombs they could for the mission to Vigan. O'Donnell took off first, bombed the invasion beach at Vigan, returned to Clark, refueled and left for Del Monte. Montgomery made one mission to Vigan, returned to Clark and loaded more bombs and took off to bomb the Japanese at Aparri. Then ordered to Del Monte, he lost course in the darkness and was forced to land on the beach, or just offshore near Zarnboango on Mindanao. The plane was listed as destroyed. but the crew was rescued. Schaetzel bombed Vigan but was damaged by Zeros and landed at San Marcelino.

            Kelly bombed what he thought was a battleship off Aparri and claimed to have sunk it. After the war it was revealed the ship, actually was a cruiser and it was only damaged. Kelly was attacked by Zeros and his plane set afire. One man was killed and the rest of the crew except Kelly bailed out. The B-17, 40-2045. crashed and Kelly's body was found with his chute unopened. This was the first B-17 destroyed as a result of aerial combat.

            Combs' flight of the 93rd had bombed the invasion fleet off Vigan and definitely sank one transport. Vandevanter was damaged by fighters and ordered to Del Monte, but landed at Tacloban on Leyte instead. The rest of the flight landed at Clark and Combs reportedly requested bombs for another strike, but another air raid alert was on so the planes were ordered to Del Monte. Combs and Ford landed at San Jose on Mindanao and on the night of December 10 the B-17s were widely scattered throughout the Philippines. Kelly's and Montgomery's planes had been lost so now (20) B-17s survived.

OPERATIONS FROM DEL MONTE

December 11, 1941

            There appears to have been no missions undertaken this day; the planes were being regrouped and serviced at Del Monte. At CIark, either this day or on the 12th, Carpenter's plane was struck by a crashing P-40 and destroyed. This left (19) B-17s.

December 12, 1941

            Coats flew another repaired B-17 from Clark to Del Monte, and of the (16) planes there, six were in commission. A mission was scheduled for Vigan with takeoff at 7:30 A.M. Adams lost two engines on takeoff and crashed into Ford's plane. Adams' plane, 40-3078. was broken in two and the nose of Ford's 40-3087 damaged. It was later destroyed by Japanese strafers at Del Monte.

            O'Donnell and Combs bombed the Japanese invasion forces at Vigan and returned to Del Monte. Combs landed at Clark and picked up a load of stranded crews. Apparently these were the only two planes to complete the mission. With the two lost in the ground collision the number of surviving B-17s now was (17).

December 13, 1941

            Major Gibbs on his way to assume command at Del Monte, crashed his B-18 into a mountain in a heavy storm and Major Walsh took over the command. Bohnaker and Smith flew recon missions to Legaspi and spotted a Japanese carrier.

December 14, 1941

            Six B-17s were scheduled to attack the Japanese carrier and other shipping at Legaspi. Connally blew a tire on takeoff and Coats and Ford turned back with engine trouble. Wheless, Adams in 40-3073, and Vandevanter in 40-3093, bombed the Japanese ships, but failed to locate the carrier. Wheless and Adams were badly shot up by fighters and both were forced to crash land. Adams' crew was months working their way back to Del Monte. With the loss of these two planes the surviving B-17s now totaled (15). Del Monte was now within range of the Japanese who had occupied Davao on Mindanao and the B-17s were ordered withdrawn to Australia.

December 15-20, 1941

            The surviving B-17s were readied for the flight to Australia. The base at Darwin was not satisfactory for heavy bomber operation so Bachelor Field south of Darwin was to be used. The planes began leaving Del Monte on December 17. On December 19, the Japanese fighters strafed Del Monte destroying Vandevanter's 40-3093 and completing the destruction of Ford's plane, 40-3087, damaged in the collision with 40-3098 on December 12. The total number that survived to make the flight to Australia was (14), and they had all arrived at Bachelor by December 20.

MISSIONS FROM BACHELOR FIELD, AUSTRALIA December 22, 1941

            First mission from Bachelor. Nine planes, Combs leading. Parsel, Keiser, Connally, Ford, Godman, Tash, Teats and Coats bombed Davao at sunset and all landed at Del Monte.

December 23, 1941

            Six planes were serviced and scheduled for mission to bomb Japanese shipping at Lingayen Gulf on Luzon and then land at San Marcelino. Combs' engine failed to start for 3:00 A.M. takeoff, and Parsel took over the lead. Coats aborted with engine trouble and returned direct to Bachelor. Parsel, Tash, Teats and Keiser bombed Japanese transports and flew back to Ambon rather than land at San Marcelino where there were no facilities. Combs finally got airborne, found nothing to bomb, and returned to Bachelor. Connally and Ford took off at 4:30 A.M. and flew direct to Bachelor. Godman bombed Davao on his way back to Bachelor Two more planes were sent out from Bachelor, but both turned back.

December 24, 1 941

            Status report: three on mission, four in commission. and seven out of commission. The three on mission were sent to Del Monte and scheduled to bomb Davao on the 25th.

Emergency landing on Borneo beach enroute to Java

December 25, 1941

            Smith blew a tire taxing out for takeoff at Del Monte. but repaired it and bombed Davao and returned to Bachelor. Schacetzel and Mueller bombed Davao; both were damaged heavily by fighters. One crew member in Schacetzel's plane was killed and two were wounded in Mueller's 40-2072. Both planes returned to Bachelor. Schaetzels 40-3071 was scrapped and 40-2072 was deemed unfit for combat and transferred to the Air Transport Command. One of the other (14) survivals; 40-3079 also was relegated to transport duly.

            The mission to Davao on Christmas Day 1941 ended the operations of the 19th Bomb Group in the first phase of the war in the western Pacific. The (11) B 17s still fit for combat were ordered to Java to help in the defense of the Dutch East Indies on which the Japanese offensive was rolling like a great tidal wave.

THE JAVA WAR-THE 19th MOVES UP

            The first flight of B-17s left Bachelor on December 30. 1941, and all 11 had arrived in Java by January 2, 1942. The serial numbers were: 40-2062, 40-3061, 40-3062, 40-3064. 40-3066, 40-3067. 40-3070. 40-3072, 40-3074, 40-3078, and 40-3077 named The Swoose.

            The B-17s were based near the city of Malang where the Dutch had built an air base. Here the facilities were greatly improved over what the 19th had been used to in the Philippines. There were hangars to work in and with lights the servicing could be carried on after dark But flying conditions were much the same. The tropical weather fronts presented an insurmountable problem and many missions turned back when the crews encountered storms too severe for the planes to penetrate. The distance to the targets required the planes to carry bomb bay fuel tanks which reduced the bomb load and were a fuel hazard during fighter attacks. In order to reach some targets, the missions had to be staged through outlying islands where fields had been established, and on some missions the planes would land at Del Monte to refuel and pick up stranded personnel. Despite the difficulties, missions were attempted daily and the crews performed valiantly in striving to locate and attack the Japanese convoys.

REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE

            On January 10. 1942. the first replacement planes and crews arrived from the U.S. Three LB-30s and five B-17Es carne via the Atlantic and Africa ferry route, and one B-17E flew over the new Pacific route, south and east of the original course These planes and crews were part of the 7th Bomb Group, and their commander, Maj. S.K. Robinson, arrived on January 19.

            The E model of the B-17 was greatly improved over the C and D models. Increased armament in power turrets improved the defense against fighters -- especially the tail turret which soon put an end to the favorite Japanese tactic of attack from the rear. The E weighed considerably more than the earlier models and consequently the speed was reduced For this reason the veteran pilots of the 19th preferred their old C and Ds as they performed better in the 19th's favorite bombing tactic -- hit high. fast, and ONCE. The 7th stressed putting the bombs on the target even if it meant making repeated bomb runs This perseverance cost the life of Maj Robinson. who on January 29 returned to make a second run on the target and was so badly shot up by fighters his plane fell into the sea on the way home and the entire crew was lost.

            One of the first things noticed by the replacement crews when they landed was the extreme fatigue evident in the faces and actions of the veteran crews of the 19th. They soon came to know the reason The average time from arrival to the first mission was five days and some crews were sent on a mission the same day they arrived. There were insufficient ground personnel to perform all the servicing and maintenance so the flight crews helped load and fuel their planes. Officers and enlisted men alike worked with no regard to rank or status

OPERATIONS IN JAVA

            With the 7th Group and their B-17Es taking most of the brunt of attacks on the encroaching Japanese invasion fleets, the 19th was sent to Palembang on January 16 to mount missions against the Japanese armies closing in on Singapore. Missions were flown to Malaya on January 28, 19 and 30. Of the 11 planes the 19th took to Java. 40-3064 had been destroyed in a ground accident at Malang on January 16, and 40-3067 was destroyed in a crash landing on a flight to Darwin on January 28.

            On February 3, Maj. Straubel, who had taken command of the 7th Group after Maj. Robinson was lost, was killed in the crash of a B-18. By now the Japanese had advanced close enough to Java to bring the air fields in range of their fighters and air raids became a daily occurrence. Also on the 3rd, two more of the 19th's original B- 17s were destroyed in strafing attacks 40-3074 and 40-3078. And on the same day, Lt. COX was on a test flight in the only B-17C that went to Java -- 40-2062 -- and was jumped by fighters and shot down. Now six of the eleven remained.

            Since it was dangerous to keep the B-17s on the ground during the day, if the planes weren't away on a mission they were sent into the air to fly up and down the south coast of Java until it was safe to land late in the afternoon. Missions were flown constantly by what planes that could be put in the air, and as the Japanese came ever closer, two or more sorties could be flown in the same day. Some B-17s were lost in air combat. but most of the losses continued to be from Japanese strafing attacks on those caught on the ground, and from operational accidents.

            The strain under which the crews were operating was enormous. Morale was disintegrating and some men broke under the pressure. A flight leader committed suicide on February 12. It was now evident, though not then recognized, the men were suffering from what later would be termed "combat fatigue." Too long a time spent under extreme stress and danger with no end or goal in sight. and eventually even the strongest of wills could endure no more. The flight crews of the 8th Air Force, who in later years would be subject to the intense fighter attacks and antiaircraft fire over Europe, had a quaint term for the condition when men reached their limit of endurance-"FIak Happy."

            On February 17. Brereton assembled the personnel of both groups in the hangar at Malang for a decoration and awards ceremony in an effort to improve morale. A tropical storm was raging and all the speeches were drowned out by the beat of the rain on the hangar roof. After the ceremony, while the ground and flight crews resumed to the all-night task of readying the planes for the next day's missions, the command and headquarters officers attended a huge party where Gen. Pat Hurley, visiting the theater, was the guest of honor. By all accounts. it was a gala affair.

JAVA DOOMED

            By the middle of February, it was apparent the Dutch East Indies were doomed to Japanese conquest and the evacuation of American forces began. In a strafing attack of February 22, four more of the 19th Group's B-17Ds were destroyed 40-3062. 40-3066, 40-3070, and 40-3072. And on February 24, Brereton left Java for India where he would head up the newly formed 10th Air Force. In Crowder's LB -30 he took with him key personnel of the 7th and 19th Groups -- O'Donnell, Combs, Parsel, Keiser. Tash, Schaetzel, Wade, Bayse and Necrason. On this same day, Hoevet, in a B-17D, took an advance party to Broome Australia, which was to be the receiving base for the refugees from Java. Hoevet returned to Java the next day.

            By February 27 the evacuation was in full swing while what planes that could be made airworlhy continued bombing attacks on the invading Japanese forces. Status of this date showed six B-17s and one LB-30 in commission. By this time the Dutch had begun destruction of bases and equipment to prevent it falling into enemy hands. Planes that could not be flown were burned or blown up and on February 28. 40-3061. one of the two remaining B-17Ds, was destroyed at Malang. Only the Swoose, 40-3097, remained of the (11) the 19th had taken to Java.

EVACUATION TO AUSTRALIA

            In the evacuation from Java the series of flights by Lt. Teats was spectacular. On February 26, he left Java with 12 passengers and on arrival at Broome an oil leak developed that defied correction. Returning to Java on the 27th. Teats flew on three engines, using the defective fourth only for takeoff and landing. As soon as he landed at Malang he was scheduled for a bombing mission, but had to turn back due to the oil leak -- then he had to fly off the south coast for two or three hours until it was safe to land. On the 28th, he took off again for Broome with 19 passengers aboard. again flying on three engines. On March 1, he returned to Java, landing at Jogjajurca, and at 10:45 that night took off with 26 passengers. He landed at Broome the next day for servicing then continued to Perth. With the planes and crews remaining in Java, missions continued to be flown as long as the planes could be serviced. The last sortie was flown March 1 by Machewson who bombed the Japanese that had landed on Bali. Also on March 1, five B-17s landed at Jogjakarca from Mandoin as that base had been abandoned. Loading all the passengers that could be crammed in, the planes took off for Australia. One plane flew without a tail wheel -- using a skid fabricated out of a two-by-four. On March 2, at 2:30 A.M., the last plane left Java, an LB-30. That night a B-24 from Broome flew over Jogjakarca but did not land as the Dutch failed to light the agreed upon signal fire. The base probably was already in possession of the Japanese.

            Some civilian planes and flying boats of the British and Dutch managed to escape from the Indies in the first two days of March, and it was later determined the last B-17 to go out was one that was in the repair depot at Andir. Made flyable by T/Sgt. Harry Hayes, it was flown to Australia on March 4 by Dutch pilots who had never flown a B-17 before. Takeoff was at night, on three engines and the instruments illuminated by a flashlight.

            On March 3. the Japanese raided Broome with fighters and dive 'bombers and destroyed many of the planes that arrived from Java. casualties were heavy. General Brett's LB-30 was one of the planes destroyed and the Swoose, one of the 11 the 19th had sent to Java, was assigned as his personal transport. It was said this was the only surviving B-17D of the original 19th's planes at the time. This may not have been true as 40-3079, declared unfit for combat in December 1941 and used for transport work, was still flying until April 8, 1942, when it crash landed in Australia. Also B-17C. 40-2072, which ,had been assigned to the Transport command, apparently was still flying. Its final fate & not known.

            Of the 50 some replacement bombers that left the U.S. for Java. (38) B-17Es and (12) LB-30/B-24s arrived. Of this number (17) B-17Es and three LB-30s were evacuated. The others had been shot down, lost in accidents, destroyed on the ground. or destroyed at the evacuation to prevent them falling into enemy hands.

            In the autumn of 1942, when the 19th Group was relieved from combat duty and returned to the U.S., the Swoose was flown by Kurtz from Australia to Washington. After a tour of the U.S. it was assigned patrol duty in the Caribbean, and after the war it was retired and now rests in the Smithsonian Museum in Washington. The Swoose was the sole survivor of the 35 B-17s with which the 19th Bomb Group began the war.

            The survivors of the two groups in the Java war were reorganized as the 19th Bomb Group in Australia. Much in need of rest there were no combat operations for a period of at least two weeks. Some B-24s made flights to Del Monte to pick up personnel that had been left behind when the 19th withdrew from the Philippines. But for the most part it was a time of recuperation and rebuilding for the struggle that lay ahead.

EPILOGUE

            The curtain of Japanese conquest closed over much of the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia. Singapore and the Indies were conquered and now the Japanese tentacles reached out toward the islands in the path to Australia. Only one bastion of former American power still held out -- the Americans and their allies, the Philippine forces on Bataan and Corregidor. And by March 1942, time for those was running out. Starving and ill-equipped, still they fought on. But by now they had ceased looking over their shoulder for a helping hand -- they knew it would not be forthcoming.

            The potential of America was gearing up to build the greatest war machine the world had ever known. Slowly at first, but with gathering momentum it would eventually crush the conquering aspirations of the Japanese military class. And three years hence it would culminate in a terrible blow that would teach the Japanese people, even with their fatalistic concept of their divine supremacy, a lesson to be remembered for untold generations.

            The powers that decide such things now realized the time had come to salvage the one force that could be utilized one day to reverse the course of Japanese conquest. That force was the Commander of the American forces in the Philippines, General Douglas MacArthur. So the orders came down -- withdraw the MacArthur headquarters to Australia. How to get the General, his family and staff out of the Philippines was the problem. The Japanese controlled the sea around the islands and the air over them. The use of a submarine was considered. but the final decision was to use PT boats, running at night, to take the party to Mindanao where planes would be waiting at Del Monte to fly to Australia.

            The detractors of MacArthur -- and there have been many, including some under his direct command -- have accused him of running out on his men with regard only for his own safety. Apparenty these detractors adhere to the old naval tradition of the captain going down with his ship. On the other hand. the supporters and admirers -- the General has to be included in the admirers -- considered MacArthur as the best possible choice as a leader to manage the American forces if defeat was to be turned into victory. History has proven the wisdom of that choice.

THE MACARTHUR RESCUE MISSION

            Many versions of the MacArthur evacuation to Australia have been related. Everyone who has written of it has the detail differently, We are indebted to Col. Grey O'Bryan. USAF Ret., for his account which no doubt is the most accurate. Col. O'Bryan was copilot on one of the B-17s involved in the first attempt to pick up the party at Del Monte.

            The MacArthur party left Corregidor by PT boat on March 10, 1942. Traveling at night and hiding during the day, they were to reach Mindanao the night of March 12. Four B-17s had been ordered from Australia to reach Del Monte the same night. The 19th Group B-17s left Melbourne on March 11 and probably due to a misunderstanding of when the MacArthur party was due to arrive at Del Monte, the planes made only refueling stops and proceeded on to Del Monte. Leaving Melbourne the B-17s were piloted by Henry Godman in 41-2507, Jack Adams, Clyde Webb and Harl Pease with O'Bryan as copilot. Webb became lost and force-Ianded in the interior of Australia. The other three landed at Daly Waters and at Bachelor. After leaving Bachelor, Adams turned back with engine trouble -- Godman and Pease pressed on. Pease's plane had turbo trouble and was forced to fly at low altitude; Godman climbed and went on ahead. Reaching the vicinity of Del Monte about 9:00 P.M., Godman misjudged his position, and misread his altimeter, and landed in the bay off the north coast of Mindanao. Two crew members Sgts. Whitehead and Lyde, were killed but the others reached Del Monte a day or two later.

            Pease and O'Bryan landed at Del Monte about 1I:00 P.M. on the 11th of March. Their plane had only one brake and the pilots had to ground loop it to stop. They then learned the MacArthur party would not arrive until the next day. While Pease supervised the repair of the turbos, O'Bryan had a conference with Gen. Sharp, the commanding officer at Del Monte. Sharp was concerned with the condition of the B-17 (it was a veteran of the Java War), and with the ability of Pease as a pilot due to his youthful appearance. Actually Pease was one of the most skilIful and experienced pilots in the whole command. O'Bryan was concerned about the danger of remaining at Del Monte during daylight hours, and decided they would not take the risk of being caught on the ground by Japanese fighters. Apparently Sharp did not object very strenuously when O'Bryan decided not to await the arrival of MacArthur. but he did object to Pease and O'Bryan taking any passengers on their return flight. O'Bryan insisted on taking as many 19th personnel as they could and 16 officers and men were loaded on the plane. These included some of Adams' crew who had been shot down on the Legaspi mission in December 1941, and had been all this time making their way to Del Monte.

            The MacArthur party was delayed and did not arrive at Del Monte until March 13. There were no planes waiting and the General reportedly threw a tantrum. One of the party later told O'Bryan that if MacArthur could have gotten his hands on him that day he would have had him shot. Anyway, MacArthur fired off a vehement message to Washington to have the best planes and crews in the Pacific -- or the U.S.-- to fly to Del Monte and pick up the party. General Brett, Air Force Commander in Australia, obtained some newer B-17s from the newly arrived 40th Recon Squadron and two of these reached Del Monte on March 17. None of the 40th pilots had been into Del Monte so veteran pilots of the 19th were assigned as copilots. Teats accompanied Bostrom on whose plane MacArthur, his wife and son, and some staff members flew out in. O'Bryan had requested to go on the second attempt but General Brett, knowing of MacArthurs pique, refused permission. Godman, who somewhat ignominiously had landed in the bay on the first attempt, flew out in the plane with MacArthur and later was chosen by the General to be his personal pilot in the Australian theater.

SUPPLEMENT

B-17Cs of the 19th Bomb Group -- 8 December 1941

Serial No

Pilot

Destroyed

Where

How

40-2045

Kelly

10 Dec 41

luzon

Shot down

40-2048

---

  8 Dec 41

Clark

Strafed/Bombed

40-2062

Cox

  3 Feb. 42

Java

Shot Down

40-2067

---

  8 Dec 41

Clark

Strafed/Bombed

40-2072

Mueller

25 Dec 41

Darwin

Battle Damage

40-2077

---

  8 Dec 41

Clark

Strafed/Bombed

 

            Of the six B-17Cs existing on December 8. three were destroyed in the first attack on CIark. On December 10, Kelly was shot down. 40-2061 and 40-2072 survived to withdraw to Ausualia on December 20. 40-2072 was damaged on the Davao mission of December 25 and was deemed unfit for combat and assigned to the Air Transport Command. 40-2062 was sent to Java and was shot down February 3 while on a test flight.

 

B-17Ds of the 19th Bomb Group -- 8 December 1941

Serial No

Pilot

Destroyed

Where

How

40-3059

---

no record

 

 

40-3061

---

28 Feb 42

Malang

At Evacuation

40-3062

---

22 Feb 42

Pasirian

Strafed/Bombed

40-3063

---

no record

 

 

40-3064

---

16 Jan 42

Malang

Ground Accident

40-3066

---

22 Feb 42

Pasirian

Strafed/Bombed

40-3067

Teats

28 Jan 42

Darwin

Ground Accident

40-3068

Green

  8 Dec 41

Clark

Strafed/Bombed

40-3069

---

  8 Dec 41

Clark

Strafed/Bombed

40-3070

---

22 Feb 42

Pasirian

Strafed/Bombed

40-3072

---

22 Feb 42

Pasirian

Strafed/Bombed

40-3073

Adams

14 Dec 41

Masbate

Shot Down

40-3074

---

  3 Feb 42

Malang

Strafed/Bombed

40-3075

---

  8 Dec 41

Clark

Strafed/Bombed

40-3076

---

  8 Dec 41

Clark

Strafed/Bombed

40-3078

---

  3 Feb 42

Malang

Strafed/Bombed

40-3079

Skiles

  8 April 42

Daly Waters

Ground Accident

40-3086

---

no record

 

 

40-3087

Ford

12 Dec 41

19 Dec 41

Del Monte

Del Monte

Damaged in Collision

Destroyed in Attack

40-3088

Cox

  8 Dec 41

Clark

Strafed/Bombed

40-3091

Schaetzel

27 Dec 41

Darwin

Battle Damage

40-3093

Vandevanter

19 Dec 41

Del Monte

Strafed/Bombed

40-3094

Broadhurst

  8 Dec 41

Clark

Strafed/Bombed

40-3095

---

  8 Dec 41

Clark

Strafed/Bombed

40-3096

---

no record

 

 

40-3097

Smith/Kurtz

The Swoose

Returned to

the US

40-3098

Adams

12 Dec 41

Del Monte

Ground Accident

40-3099

Kurtz

  8 Dec 41

Clark

Strafed/Bombed

40-3100

Eubank

  9 Dec 41

Clark

Ground Accident

 

            There was a total of (29) B-17Ds. Nine were destroyed at Clark on December 8, 1941. Concerning the fate of the four that had "no record", one would have been piloted by Montgomery and ditched at Zamboanga. The second would have been piloted by Carpenter and was hit by a P-40 at Clark. Wheless was the pilot of the third B-17D and was shot down on the Legaspi mission. And the four plane would have been destroyed on December 8 at Clark.

            Of the 19 at Clark on December 8, 12 were destroyed and seven survived. Added to the 16 at Del Monte this makes a grand total of 23.

            Losses include: Eubank, Kelly, Montgomery. Carpenter, Adams, Ford (damaged at Del Monte and strafed Dec. 19), Adams, Wheless and Vandevanter. This is a total of 9, which means 14 survived.

            Of the 14 that withdrew to Australia, three were deemed unfit for combat. 40-3091 was scrapped. 40-3077 was transferred to Air Transport Command and was later destroyed in a crash landing on April 8, 1942, and 40-2072 was also sent to the Air Transport Command.

            Concerning the 11 that went to Java: 40-2062 was shot down, 40-3064 and 40-3067 were destroyed in ground accidents, 40-3074, 40-3078, 40-3062, 40-3066, 40-3070. and 40-3072 were also destroyed on the ground. 40-3097, the Swoose, survived to return to the U.S. 40-3041 was destroyed at evacuation. 40-3075 was in the hangar at CIark on December 6 for repair to tail section damaged on arrival in the Philippines, and 40-3088 was one of the two in the hangar for painting on December 8.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

            I express my appreciation to those veterans of the 19th Bomb Group who shared their memories in order to make this work possible.

            To Barry Gilkes for his tips on whom to contact and where to look for information.

            To Col. Carey O'Bryan, USAF Ret., for his firsthand accounts of conditions and happenings in those hectic times of the Philippine and Java wars, and especially for his records and recollections of the MacArthur rescue mission in which he played a vital part.

            I would be remiss in not thanking Steve Birdsall, the aviation author and my good friend, for his advice and assistance. Without his encouragement it is not likely my modest efforts as a writer would have materialized.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Edmonds, Walter D., They Fought with What They Had, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1951,

Brereton, Lewis H., The Breretaon Diaries, New Yourk, William Morrow & Co, 1946

White, W.L. Queens Die Proudly, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1943

Jablonski, Edward, Flying Fortresses, New York, Doubleday & Co 1965

Freeman, Roger, B-17 Fortresses at War, New York, Charles Scribner & Son 1977

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Col Edward Jacquet, Katie Mitchell, John Mitchell, Fay Benton

Taken at banquet the evening before Memorial Services for Capt Harl Pease and his crew

            John H. Mitchell is a World War II Air Force veteran. He has done much writing and research on aviation items of historical significance and his experiences during the war. He is a published author of articles in other fields.

*** end first story ***

The First Bombing Mission of the Army Air Corps in WW II

            On 10 December 1941, two days after the clouds of war engulfed the U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific, the U.S. Army Air Corps mounted the first offensive air strike against the Japanese. The 19th Bomb Group, using what B-17 Flying Fortresses had escaped destruction in the devastating air attack on Clark Field, struck at the Japanese invasion forces approaching the island of Luzon. The strike was not a concerted attack by a formation of B-17's but rather a series of sorties by individual bombers. As compared to operations by fleets of bombers in both Europe and the Pacific a year later, this initial strike was a puny effort. But as the title of Walter Edmonds book suggests, They Fought With What They Had, what they had was scant indeed. Of the 35 B-17s assigned to the 19th Group only 21 survived on 10 December and five of these were out of commission. Of the remaining 16 only 10 actually participated in the attacks.

            As war with the Japanese had been considered inevitable for some time, on 6 December 1941 the 14th and 73rd squadrons of the 19th Group were ordered to fly their (16) B-17s to the newly opened air base at Del Monte on the island of Mindanao, some 600 miles south of Clark Field. Here it was deemed the B-17s would be out of range of Japanese aircraft operating from Formosa and thus safe from attack. This proved correct for on 8 December, Philippine time, the Japanese struck Clark Field in a devastating air attack and destroyed most of the B-17s remaining there. All of the B-17s at Del Monte were intact and on 9 December were ordered to Clark Field to prepare for a bombing mission the next day.

            The Planes and the Crews:  Six aircraft of the 93rd Squadron departed Del Monte at 0930. 9 December, each loaded with twenty 100-pound bombs, and proceeded to CIark. Under the command of Capt. Cecil Combs, the other pilots were: Lts. Elliot (Pete) Vandevanter, Walter Ford. Morris Shedd. James Connally. and William Bohnaker. All six planes landed at Clark at 1430, but soon an air raid alert was sounded and the B-17s took off and remained in the air until it was safe to land after dark.

            Seven B-17s of the 14th Squadron left Del Monte after the 93rd and proceeded to a new base at San Marcelino west of Clark where they landed at dusk. Major Emmett (Rosie) O'Donnell was in command of the 14th and the other pilots were: Capt. Colin Kelly, and Lts. Guilford Montgomey. George Schaetzel, Edward Teats, Donald Keiser and Henry Godman. Captain Elmer Parsel of the 93rd, who had flown a reconnaissance around Mindanao, landed with the 14th at San Marcetino after being fired on by friendly troops. San Marcelino was a makeshift base and no facilities existed for the crews who went without food and slept in their planes that night.

            Lieutenant Weldon Smith of the 14th and Lt. Earl Tash of the 93rd remained at Del Monte. Tash's plane had suffered battle damage the previous day when approaching CIark Field during the Japanese attack. It was the first air combat engaged in by a B-17. Zero fighters attacked Tash's plane inflicting some damage and wounding Sgt. Michael Bibin. One of the Zero was reported shot down.

            The Targets: In the Japanese plan of invasion of Luzon the main landing was to be made on the west coast north of the Lingayen Gulf and near the town of Vigan. A secondary landing force was to be put ashore on the northern tip of Luzon at the town of Aparri. Once the Vigan beachhead had been established the invasion force was to drive southward along the coast to the base of the gulf at Lingayen where they would be in position to cut off Clark Field from the American forces expected to make a stand on the Bataan peninsula. Mean while, the northern force at Aparri would drive down the center of Luzon to take Clark Field. Reconnaissance flights on 9 December revealed fleets of Japanese transports escorted by war ships approaching both the Lingayen Gulf and Aparri. It was against these forces the 19th was ordered to launch bombing attacks on 10 December.

            The Missions Are Mounted:  At 0530, 10 December, Lt. Connally of the 93rd was sent on a reconnaissance mission to Formosa. Approaching this Japanese stronghold, the B-17 was attacked by a swarm of fighters and in the ensuing running battle number two engine was shot out. Evading the Zeros, Connally returned to Clark Field where he was ordered to circle the area until it was safe no land after dark.

            Major O'Donnell left San Marcelino at dawn for Clark Field with orders for the other 14th planes to follow. Clark was under another air raid alert and only O'Donnell, Kelly, Schaetzel, and Montgomery were permitted to land. Godman, Keiser, and Teats returned to San Marcelino.

            Lieutenant Bohnaker of the 93rd was suffering from an attack of malaria and his crew was replaced by Lt. Sig Young's crew of the 30th Squadron.

            Combs' Attack at Vigan:  Captain Combs' flight of five planes took off soon after 0600 to attack the Japanese transports in the Lingayen Gulf. The B-17s carried the twenty 100-pound bombs they had brought from Del Monte. Initial attack was made at 12,000 feet with all but Vandevanter ,dropping bombs. Another bomb run was made from west to east and 500 feet higher. Hits were observed on several transports and one was reported sunk.

            Lieutenant Vandevanter made a bombing run at 10,000 feet but the bomb release failed to function and he had to drop down to 7,000 feet for another attempt. No hits were observed. Heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered resulting in slight damage to the plane but no casualties. No enemy fighters were observed by any of the bombers and they returned individually to Clark. Lieutenant Shedd's plane was reloaded with bombs but the others were ordered into the air immediately because of danger of an air attack. When airborne, the B-17s were ordered to return to Del Monte. Bohnaker's and Shedd's planes remained on the ground.

            O'Donnell and the 14th:  The four B-17s of the 14th landed at Clark at 0730 for fuel and bombs. O'Donnell and Schaetzel both loaded eight 600-pound bombs but due to an air raid alert Kelly and Montgomery had time to take on only a partial load before being ordered no take off. First to take off was O'Donnell who headed for where he made several attacks at 25,000 feet on what he erroneously reported was an aircraft carrier. The Japanese had no carriers involved in the invasion. O'Donnell reported no hits by his bombs and antiaircraft fire was intense. Fighter aircraft were observed but no attacks were made. O'Donnell returned to Clark.

            Lieutenant Schaetzel took off at 0930 to bomb the Japanese force at Aparri. Bombing from 25,000 feet hits were observed on the transports and one was believed sunk. Fighters swarmed at the B-17 like angry bees. Considerable damage was done to the plane but no casualties resulted and Schaetzel returned to San Marcelino.

            Lieutenant Montgomery took off from Clark at 0930 with only one 600-pound bomb on board and headed for Vigan. Dropping the bomb on shipping with no apparent effect, Montgomery returned to Clark and loaded twenty 100 pound bombs and took off at 1400 for Aparri. Hits were observed on a transport which began to burn and was believed sunk. No enemy fighters were encountered and Montgomery returned to Clark where he was ordered to proceed to Del Monte.

            Colin Kelly, the First Hero:  In reports of the first two days of fighting the new war all the news had been bad as the U-S. forces suffered disastrous losses and defeats. America was in need of a hero and in the bombing missions of 10 December the stage was set to provide one.

            Captain Kelly took off from Clark at 0930 with three 600-pound bombs and headed for Aparri. Arriving over the target area Kelly observed numerous transports unloading troops. Further out to sea warships were bombarding the coastal area and one large vessel which Kelly mistook for a battleship was steaming parallel to the coast firing salvoes at the landing sector. Making a bomb run on this ship Kelly's first bomb dropped short, The second missed the bow by only 50 feet, and the third made a direct hit on the aft turret. Kelly's crew reported the ship sunk.

            As soon as Kelly turned back for Clark Field the B-17 was attacked by enemy fighters. Gunfire started a fire in the bomb bay and engineer/gunner, Sgt. J. W. Delehanty, was killed. The Zeros continued making firing passes and at 12,000 feet as the stricken B-17 neared Clark another fire was started in a wing tank. The plane was a B-17C model without self sealing fuel tanks. At the controls Kelly held the plane even and steady so the crew could bail our and then if was too late for him to jump. The B-17 exploded and Kelly's body was found with his parachute unopened. Some of the crew members were strafed by the Zeros while in their chutes and Lieutenant Bean suffered a slight wound in his ankle.

            Captain Kelly's plane was the first B-17 to be destroyed in air combat.

            Additional Sorties:  Captain Parsel of the 93rd had flown from San Marcelino to Clark and landed for repairs and bombs. Seven 300 pound bombs had been loaded when he was ordered to take off at 0740 to avoid an expected air attack. Proceeding to Vigan, Parsel made a bombing run at 12,500 feet, dropping four bombs which fell some 50 feet short of a Japanese cruiser. A second run was made on a transport close to the shore and direct hits were assumed as the ship was seen burning. Considerable antiaircraft fire was encountered but no damage inflicted on the B-17. Parsel returned to San Marcelino.

            Bohnaker's plane was still at Clark and Lt. Harl Pease was ordered to bomb shipping at Aparri. With nineteen 100 pound bombs on board, Pease took off at 1400 and made two runs at 24,000 feet on a Japanese cruiser and two more runs on a transport. Only near misses were reported. no antiaircraft fire was observed and no fighter aircraft encountered. Pease returned to Clark.

            Godman, Teats and Keiser, who had returned to San Marcelino after being unable to land at Clark, remained in the air until 1100 when they landed for fuel. Godman's plane was grounded by engine trouble. Teats and Keiser, with Parsel who had returned from his mission, lacking further orders, loaded six 500 pound bombs in preparation to attack the carrier reported by O'Donnell to be in the Lingayen Gulf. Before the mission could be undertaken orders were received for all B-17s to return to Del Monte.

            Dispersion of the B-17s After the Mission:  When Combs returned to Clark after the strike at Vigan he requested the B-17s be loaded with bombs for another attack. But as Clark was under constant air raid alert, Combs' planes, were ordered to return to Del Monte. Three of the B-17s departed but encountered bad weather on the course to Mindanao. Combs and Ford landed at San Jose on Mindanao and Vandevanter set down at Tacloban on Leyte. Shedd's plane, which was in progress of being loaded. remained on the ground at Clark, also Bohnaker's which was to be flown by Pease to attack Aparri. When Pease returned from his sortie he was ordered to Del Monte but ran into bad weather and returned to Clark. Connally, back from his reconnaissance mission to Formosa, remained in the vicinity of Clark until safe to land after dark.

            Major O'Donnell, after his mission to Vigan, departed  Clark for Del Monte but was attacked by fighters in the vicinity of Nichols Field. Two of the Zeros were reported shot down and O'Donnell proceeded to Del Monte. landing at dusk.

            Montgomery. after his second sortie of the day, left for Del Monte but was unable to locate the field in the darkness and bad weather. Attempting to find the field at Zamboanga he ran out of fuel and was forced to ditch some four miles off the coast of Mindanao. The plane sank immediately but the crew made it safely to shore.

            Keiser, Teats and Parsel departed San Marcelino at 1530 and made it into Del Monte after dark with bad weather closing down the field.

            Godman repaired the engine on his B-17 and after repairs were made to the battle damage on Schacezel's plane, both left San Marcelino at 2300 but Schaetzel was forced to land on Cebu for fuel. The next day, 11 December, all B-17s were regrouped at Del Monte except Schaetzel who was forced to remain on Cebu two days for repairs.

            Bombing Results of the Mission:  To state the bombing attacks of the 17th Group on 10 December seriously hindered the Japanese landings on Luzon would be far from the truth. Despite the claim of Kelly's crew that a battleship had been sunk. it was later determined the ship attacked was a heavy cruiser and it was only damaged. But the news reporters and U.S. officials eagerly grasped Kelly's deed to supply the American public with a much-needed hero. And the reports became more and more extravagant as each report of the news media tried to outdo the other. "Kelly had dropped his bomb squarely down the smokestack of the battleship!" "Kelly, after ordering his crew to bail out, had flown his B-17 right into the warship!" And the public, hungry for some good news, accepted all the wild reports without question.

            Several transports had been reported sunk by the various crews. In actuality only one seems to have been damaged to the extent it had to be beached. Lieutenant Carey O'Bryan, Ford's copilot on the mission, revisited the area in 1952 and reported the derelict ship was still lying on the beach. No doubt several transports were damaged and casualties among the Japanese troops could have been heavy. But the landings proceeded without interruption and in a few days the Japanese had sizable forces established on the beachheads and the fall of Luzon was assured.

            Casualties among the U.S. air crews in this first mission were light. Two fatalities-Kelly and Delehanty-and a few more wounded. The B-17s had performed well in their baptism of combat. The Japanese fighters were not effective at the altitude the B-17s were operating from and the antiaircraft fire while causing some damage was largely ineffective. In the day's operation two B-17s had been lost -- Kelly's shot down and Montgomery's ditched.

            Summary:  All in all it was not a very auspicious beginning for the U.S. bombing air power but the air crews had displayed courage and devotion to duty. This was to become the glory of U.S. airmen when sufficient and adequate equipment became available to mount sustained bombing offensives. The road to final victory would be long and the cost great. There would be many reversals. but on 10 December 1941 the 19th Bomb Group had made the beginning.

                                                ADDENDUM

            Since writing this article a couple of years ago additional facts have emerged which should be added to make the story complete.

            The first bombing mission attempted after the Japanese attack on Clark Field was by Wheless on 9 December 1941. Lt. Wheless, in aircraft 40-3096, was on a reconnaissance , toward Formosa on 8 December when the attack on Clark; occurred. Returning after the attackers had departed he found Clark Field ablaze and in shambles. Landing amid bomb craters the plane struck a fence but was not seriously damaged. Lt. Carpenter, in aircraft 40-3063, also was on a reconnaissance mission and when he landed later these two were the only B-17s still in commission at Clark. Cpl. William Williams, Wheless' engineer/gunner, says the crew worked all night servicing the plane and loading bombs, and early the next morning, 9 December, they took off to bomb the Japanese invasion fleet in the Lingayen Gulf. However, as the lone B-17 approached the target it was attacked by swarms of enemy fighter planes and was forced to abort the mission. Escaping into the cover, Wheless returned to Clark but due to an air raid alert he was not permitted to land and was ordered to proceed to Del Monte.

            Lt. Carpenter also attempted a mission to Formosa on 9 December but was forced to return to Clark when both generators failed on his B-17. This plane was loaded with bombs for a mission on 10 December but a P-40, attempting to take off in a dust cloud, collided with the B-17 and completely destroyed it.

            For reasons not yet clear, Wheless and aircraft 40-3096 did not participate in the missions of 10 December but remained at Del Monte. Williams states they were awaiting orders for the next three days and did not fly again until 14 December when they participated in the ill-fated Legaspi mission.

            The other two B-17s that remained at Del Monte and took no part in the missions of 10 December were Tash's which had suffered battle damage when attempting to land at Clark ,during the Japanese attack, and Weldon Smith's which was out of commission due to a hydraulic leak. Smith, in aircraft 40-3079, had made a bounding landing at Del Monte on 6 December flight from CIark, and according to Kenneth Park, the radio operator, the plane then was aptly named The Gazelle.

*** end of second story ***

MINDANAO-- A FORGOTTEN WAR

FOREWORD

Historians have duly and adequately recorded the events of the beginning of WW II in the Philippine Islands as pertains to the main campaigns on the island of Luzon.  Bataan, The Death March, Corregidor-- all have been sufficiently covered by journalists at the time and later by authors who wrote of the period.  However the happenings on the other islands of the archipelago, and the people who participated in them have been awarded at best, only footnotes to history.  The current student of history is aware of only those battles and incidents that made the headlines as they occurred in the opening phases of the war.  The American and Filipino servicemen who manned the bases in the defense of Mindanao have largely been forgotten in the passage of time.  Hopefully this article will do something to put into perspective and give a measure of credit to those brave men who built and held the bases on Mindanao until ordered to surrender when all hope of successful resistance was gone.

I – THE ISLAND OF MINDANAO

Mindanao is the largest of the southern islands of the Philippine Archipelago.  Situated more than 500 miles south of the main island of Luzon, Mindanao was the home of the fierce Moro tribesmen and after the American occupation in 1898 it was the last island to be subdued.  Consequently Mindanao lagged behind Luzon in development and was considered rather primitive in 1940.  The island was quite densely populated – the coast line dotted with villages and small towns.  The principal city, Davao on the southern coast afforded an excellent harbor.  Nearby was the Davao Penal Colony – the territorial prison which became an infamous P.O.W camp after the Japanese occupation.  Numerous native villages existed throughout the interior but lack of adequate roads kept them isolated in most cases.  The geodetic maps of the period 1940, listed large areas of the interior as unexplored.  This was inaccurate and no doubt merely reflected the absence of precise maps and charts.

The natives of Mindanao existed by fishing the coastal waters and by the usual garden and small farm agriculture.  A major industry was the pineapple growing and processing operation of the Philippine Packing Corporation, a branch of the California Packing Corporation.  A plantation of several thousand acres of pineapple plantings was located at Del Monte, some 15 miles inland from the port of Bugo on the northern coast where the cannery was located.  The operation was under the direction of President and General Manager, Neil Crawford.  Some 2500 workers were employed at the cannery and plantation most of them Filipinos.  The Del Monte compound situated on a plateau above the coastal plain at an altitude of 1200 feet gave a pleasant and healthful climate and the American managers and their families had a comfortable life in the salubrious surroundings.  A small air strip was laid out along the golf course and airplanes were the chief means of contact with the outside world through the capitol at Manila.

When the Philippines were surrendered to the Japanese in May 1942, most of the American personnel of the Del Monte Plant were interned and spent the war years in P.O.W. camps.  Many of the Filipino employees joined guerilla bands to resist the Japanese occupation forces and 38 of them were killed in defense of their country.  The cannery was destroyed in the fighting around Bugo and the pineapple plantation went untended for more than three years.  When hostilities ceased in 1945 many of the former workers returned to their old jobs and the operation was rebuilt.

Another major industry on Mindanao was lumber production from the hardwood forests.  The Anakan Lumber Company operated a sizeable enterprise on the north coast producing mahogany and other hardwoods.  It was at this operation the four P-40s were assembled that the blockade runner, ANHUI, had brought to Mindanao.

II – MINDANAO'S ROLE IN THE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES

            In the latter part of 1941 with the possibility of war with Japan looming ever more menacing the American military commanders in the Philippines realized the need for bases other than those on Luzon.  Of prime necessity was a base where the U.S. heavy bombers would be beyond range of the Japanese air power on Formosa.  The B-17s of the 19th Bomb Group stationed at Clark Field near Manila were vulnerable to Japanese attack so it was decided to establish a base on Mindanao where they would be safe.  The Del Monte plantation was considered the most feasible location for this base.

            The Del Monte air strip at the golf course was inadequate for B-17 operations so another landing strip had to be constructed.  Actually two strips were constructed – Del Monte One and Two.  These were roughly parallel 250 feet wide and several hundred yards apart, separated by a dry arroyo which was covered with scrub trees and bushes.  Del Monte Two was the principal strip for the B-17s.  It was more than 10,000 feet in length but due to a shortage of electrical wire only about one mile was lighted.  The two strips were located in a natural grass meadow, fairly level and to make them usable, all that had to be accomplished was removal of all rocks larger than a tennis ball.

In the last week of November 1941 engineering equipment and personnel from Clark Field were sent to establish the base at Del Monte.  The Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron of the 5th Air Base Group and a detachment of the 7th Material Squadron were the principal units sent from Clark.  Much of the preparation of the base had already been accomplished and the rest of the construction proceeded rapidity, and by 6 December 1941 the field was adequate to accommodate the B-17s.  Sixteen of the B-17s from Clark landed at Del Monte on that date.

III – WAR

On the morning of 6 December 1941 the 14th and 93rd Squadrons of the 19th Bomb Group landed their B-17s at the new base at Del Monte.  By this time war with Japan was considered inevitable and the U.S. Command saw the necessity of protecting some of the B-17s from an imminent Japanese attack.  Also the 7th Bomb Group was scheduled to arrive at Clark Field and facilities at that base would then be over crowded.  The Japanese had a large settlement at Davao but since this was on the south coast and far removed from Del Monte it was not deemed a threat at. the time.  Conditions were secure and peaceful on 8 December, Philippine time, when news came of the attack on Pearl Harbor.  Some five hours later came word of the attack on Clark Field and the destruction of most of the B-17S there.  The two squadrons now at Del Monte were beyond range of the Japanese attacking force from Formosa and apparently the Japanese at this time did not know the base at Del Monte was in existence.  It would be ten days before they discovered it and subjected it to bombing attacks.

IV – THE 19th AT DEL MONTE

The U.S. Command on Luzon was thrown into confusion by the attack and destruction at Clark Field and in the conflicting reports received at Del Monte no one could determine the actual conditions or knew what action to take.  It appears the only action taken by the squadrons at Del Monte on the afternoon of the 8th and the morning of the 9th was reconnaissance missions around Mindanao.  On the 9th orders came from the U.S. Headquarters on Luzon for the B-17s to proceed to Clark and prepare for a bombing mission the next day.  The 16 aircraft of the 14th and 93rd Squadrons landed at Clark and at San Martellino, a makeshift field west of Clark, in the evening of the 9th.  The next day, 10 December 1941, the 19th Group mounted the first bombing mission of the war against the Japanese invasion forces.  Actually only nine of the available B-17s participated in the mission and the results were disappointing.  One Japanese ship was reported sunk but damage to the invasion fleet was minor and the cost to the U.S. forces was high.  Capt. Colin Kelly was shot down by Japanese fighters and Montgomery became lost on the return to Del Monte and ditched his B-17.  The other B-17s could not remain long at Clark due to recurring air attacks and were scattered widely throughout the Philippines on the night of the 10th.

On 11 December the bombers were regrouped at Del Monte and another mission was scheduled for the next day.  Again disaster befell the B-17s.  Adams lost two engines on take off and crashed into Ford's plane.  Both were damaged and eventually destroyed.  Only two B-17s flew the mission of 12 December which was deemed a failure.  On 14 December, five B-17s got off the ground but two soon turned back due to engine trouble and the other three ran into intense fighter opposition as they attempted to bomb Japanese shipping at Lingayan.  Adams and Wheless were shot up and both made forced landings- Adams on the island of Masbate and Wheless at a small barricaded strip at Cagayan on Mindanao.  Both planes were destroyed but most of the crew members made their way back to Del Monte.

It was a pitiful remnant of the 19th Group's B-17s that gathered at Del Monte after the 14th December mission.  Since it was now certain the Japanese would soon attack the base at Del Monte it was deemed prudent to withdraw the remaining B-17s to Australia.  The planes began leaving Del Monte on 17 December and the Japanese attacked on the 18th, but by 20 December all of the 14 surviving B-17s had arrived safely at Darwin, Australia.

            With the B-17s now safely based at Batchelor Field in Australia it was the plan of the U.S. Command to utilize them in bombing attacks on the Japanese in the Philippines by staging through Del Monte.  As it was not safe to have the B-17s on the ground at Del Monte in the day time they were scheduled to leave Batchelor in time to land at Del Monte at dusk.  There the planes would be refueled and loaded with bombs for the mission.  Take off would be early the next morning and after completing the mission the B-17s would land at Del Monte for fuel then return to Batchelor.  The first such mission was set for 23 December.  Nine B-17s left Batchelor that morning and landed at Del Monte that evening.  Refueled and bombed up, a before dawn take off was scheduled but due to malfunctions, only four of the B-17s got off the ground.  Japanese fighter opposition over the target was fierce and damaged inflicte by the bombing of the B-17s was scant.  That night all nine B-17s re turned to Batchelor.

            The next mission was scheduled for Christmas Day.  This time the' target was the Japanese shipping at Davao and again the B-17s ran into a storm of Japanese Zero fighters.  When the B-17s returned to Batchelor three of them were so shot up they were condemned for combat flying.  The Christmas Day mission marked the end of the 19th Group's operation in the Philippines by staging through the Del Monte base.  The eleven surviving B-17s were sent to Java to assist the Dutch in defense of the East Indies.  In some of the missions from Java the B-17s would land at Del Monte for refueling and to pick up stranded personnel for evacuation.  The only other 19th operations from Del Monte were the MacArthur rescue flights in March 1942 and the Royce mission in April the same year.

V – THE 5th AIR BASE GROUP AND THE 7th MATERIAL SQUADRON

For the accounts of the two principal units in the defense of Mindanao we are indebted to several veterans of these units who searched their records and memories and shared them with us.  Col. Ray Elsmore in a war time letter to the parents of Walter Regehr gave an excellent account of the activities of the 5th Air Base Group's Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron of which he was the commanding officer.  Charles E. (Monty) Montgomery by numerous letters and phone calls brought forth many details of the 7th Material Squadron and its operation at Del Monte.

The 5th Air Base Group was stationed at Ft. Douglas, Utah, in 1941 when the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron under the command of Capt. Elsmore was ordered to the Philippines.  This unit of 250 men arrived at Ft. McKinley on Luzon in November 1941 and with other attached units was promptly shipped to Mindanao by interisland steamer.  Landing at Bugo the men of the 5th were assigned work establishing the bomber base at Del Monte and also constructing auxiliary bases at various locations on Mindanao.  With the help of Filipino natives and working around the clock, within 30 days after Pearl Harbor the 5th had readied the base at Del Monte and built seven auxiliary fields.  By April 1942 they had built more than 40 auxiliary and fighter bases on Mindanao and adjacent islands.  After Mindanao came under Japanese air attack much of the work was carried on under the threat of bombing and strafing.  Fighter bases were constructed where the P-40s could be concealed from Japanese scouting planes and in some locations tunnels were constructed to protect the planes from bombing attacks.

On 29 April 1942 when it became evident the American forces on the southern islands would be overwhelmed by the Japanese, Elsmore, now a major, and his staff were evacuated to Australia.  Most of the personnel of the 5th then became infantry for a last ditch defense effort and at the surrender in early May most became prisoners of war.  More than four score were to perish in P.O.W. camps or on ships taking them to Japan when U.S. subs torpedoed some of the ships.  Four men escaped to join guerilla bands in the hills and two of these were killed resisting the Japanese occupation forces.

Officers, other than Elsmore, of the 5th Air Base:

Capt. R.L. Fry- Executive Officer

Capt. W.J. Monay- S-4; Transportation Officer

Capt. L.O. Gee- Adjutant

Maj. Chauncy Whitney- Operations Officer

Capt. W. Rotherham- Aircraft Maintenance Officer

Maj. Dan Searcy- Medical Detachment Hospital C.O.

 

Among the enlisted men, Cpl.  Walter was administrative N.C.O. and PFC Jim Young was in charge of the air, field lighting system.

            In the Japanese air attack of 21 December 1941, Maj.  Whitney and' PFC Thibodo were killed.

            Other units attached to the 5th Air Base were the 440th and 701st Ordance Companies, the 803rd Engineer Company, the 89th Quartermaster and the 4th Chemical Company.

The above information on the 5th Air Base units was supplied by Walter Regehr, Secretary/Editor of the 5th Air Base Group Association.

Charles E. Montgomery enlisted in the Army Air Corps in June 1940 at March Field, Calif.  He was assigned to the 19th Bomb Group and moved to what later became Kirkland Field, Albuquerque, N.M. when the 19th opened that base.  When the 19th moved to the Philippines in the autumn of 1941, Monty, now a member of the 7th Material Squadron, arrived at Clark Field in November of that year.  The day after Thanksgiving Monty was one of the score of men of the 7th sent to Mindanao to service the B-17s that would be operating from the new base at Del Monte.

The detachment of the 7th Material hardly had time to get settled in their new home before the B-17s arrived, and a couple of days later the war began with the Japanese attack on Clark Field.  In the following days the men of the 7th were kept busy servicing the bombers as they mounted bombing missions in an effort to stem the tide of Japanese invasion forces swarming ashore on Luzon.  Besides the B-17s there were the few civilian planes to service along with other military aircraft used for transportation purposes.

On 18 December 1941, the Japanese having discovered the Del Monte base, subjected it to a strafing attack by four Zero fighters.  Monty was assigned as a truck driver and when the Zeros struck he had a truck backed up to a B-18 which was destroyed in the attack.  After this attack the B-17s were withdrawn to Australia but the men of the 7th Material were kept busy servicing the small aircraft attempting to fly medicines and supplies to the beleagured forces on Bataan and Corregidor.  When the 19th Group flew their B-17s in from Australia the 7th loaded them with fuel and bombs for missions against the Japanese on Luzon.

When General MacArthur, his family and staff' were evacuated from the Philippines in March 1942, the men of the 7th serviced the B-17s that flew to Del Monte to pick up the party.  Later that month President Quezon of the Philippines also was flown to Australia from Del Monte.  In April 1942 when the planes of the Royce mission were sent to Mindanao to mount bombing missions the 7th Material serviced the B-17s which landed at Del Monte and the B-25s which used the fighter base at Maramag.

            After the evacuation of the Headquarters of the 5th Air Base on 29 April 1942 the men of the 7th Material joined infantry units and assisted in the final defense of Mindanao.  When the Southern Forces surrendered on 10 May 1942 most of the men of the 7th became prisoners of war.  Monty was kept first in a P.O.W. camp on Mindanao but in September of that year was shipped to Japan where he worked in a steel mill and an iron ore mine.  He was liberated when the war ended in 1945.  His rank was still a private – jokingly Monty says even the Japs wouldn't promote him.

Of the 20 men of the 7th Material Squadron Detachment, five died while prisoners of war.  Two, Bruce Chirman and Earl Hillard escaped and joined guerilla bands where Chipman was killed.

VI – THE MACARTHUR EVACUATION

Many different versions have been related of the evacuation of General MacArthur, his family and staff from the Philippines.  It seems everyone who has written of the flight from Del Monte tells it differently.  Even those people who were there and participated in the incident are at variance in remembering the details.  Perhaps some of the less than complimentary opinions are due to the feeling of animosity the General's regal attitude generated.  There was the thinking by many that MacArthur was running out on his men and saving his own hide.  I suppose those feelings will always exist to a certain extent, and even can be sympathized with.  But in the final analysis it must be admitted that in a war crisis as existed then some must be sacrificed and some saved.  I think it also must be admitted that history proved MacArthur was one to be saved.  His spending the war as a P.O.W. would not have been in the best interest of the U.S. in defeating the Japanese.  This is not to say one man's life is more worthy of saving than another's.  It merely reflects that in war choices must be made.

            Part of the confusion regarding the details of the evacuation no doubt stems from the fact that two attempts had to be made before the party could be flown out of Del Monte.  In the first attempt two B-17s departed Australia for Del Monte.  One was piloted by Lt.  Henry Godman the other by Capt. Harl Pease with Lt. Carey O'Bryan as co-pilot.  The planes were scheduled to land at Del Monte after dark, pick up the passengers and depart before dawn to avoid being caught on the ground by a Japanese air attack.  However there was a mix up in scheduling -- the MacArthur party was late in arriving by P.T. boat from Corregidor, and misfortune befell the B-17s.  Godman mis-read his altimeter, misjudged his position and landed in the bay off the north coast of Mindanao.  Two crew members were killed but the others got to Del Monte.  Meanwhile Pease and O'Bryan had landed at Del Monte with only one brake and with superchargers inoperative.

Harl Pease was one of the most experienced and capable pilots in the 19th Bomb Group, but his youthful appearance belied his ability.  General Sharp, commanding the forces on Mindanao, did not deem either Pease or his plane to be adequate to transport so important a personage as MacArthur.  It has been told and re-told that it was MacArthur who objected to Pease's youthful appearance, but the fact is, Pease and O'Bryan, not wanting to risk being caught on the ground by a Japanese air attack, took on a load of stranded 19th airmen and departed Del Monte hours before MacArthur arrived.  So MacArthur never saw Pease or his plane.  The tantrum the General threw when he arrived was because there were no planes at Del Monte to take the party out.  Godman was down in the bay and Pease had already left.

The message MacArthur sent to Washington for transportation resulted in a second attempt to get planes to Del Monte adequate to fly the party out.  This time three B-17s were obtained from the 40th Recon Squadron, a new addition to the 19th Bomb Group.  Pilots selected were, Capt. Frank Bostrom, Capt William Lewis, and Lt Harold Chaffin The co-pilots were from the original squadrons of the 19th and familiar with the base at Del Monte.  Ed Teats flew with Bostrom, Bill Railing with Lewis, and Jack Adams with Chaffin.  The third plane had only one bomb bay tank, insufficient fuel to make the flight to Del Monte, so Chaffin and Adams remained at Batchelor while the other two planes proceeded to Del Monte.  They landed in the early evenings and Major Elsmore, commanding the 5th Air Base assigned his Transportation Officer, Capt. Bill Monay, the responsibility of getting the passengers loaded.. MacArthur, his wife and son, and some of the staff mere loaded on Lewis's plane but difficulty arose in starting the engines so the passengers were transferred to .Bostrom's plane.  According to reports the take off was hair raising but successful.  The others of the staff were loaded on Lewis’s plane which finally got started and both B-17s made the flight to Batchelor without incident.  Chaffin and Adams then took a bomb bay tank from Bostrom's plane and flew to Del Monte the next evening and picked up the baggage of the party.  The same procedure was followed a week or so later when three B-17s flew to Del Monte and picked up President Quezon of the Philippines.

There have been many reports that MacArthur brought all of his household furniture, including a grand piano, when he left the Philippines.  Actually the only baggage on Bostrom's plane was a small suitcase carried by the General.  Those that maintain differently evidently have not realized there is no way to fit a grand piano into a B-17.

THE ROYCE MISSION

            Bataan had fallen.  After a courageous resistance of four months the starving and Ill equipped American and Filipino forces had been forced to surrender to the overwhelming Japanese forces.  Now the survivors would be subjected to the infamous Bataan Death March and all the horrors of P.O.W. prisons that an inhuman conqueror could devise.  But Corregidor still held out, crowded with refugees from the lost battle of Bataan.  They burrowed deeper into the tunnels on the Rock in Manila Bay and awaited the Japanese onslaught they knew would come.  And for the American rescue force they feared would not come.

            Far to the south in Australia the U.S. Command under General MacArthur desperately sought to make some kind of effort that would show the beleagured forces in the Philiprines they were not forgotten.  It was decided a bombing strike could be made by staging through the Del Monte base which was still in American hands and had a supply of bombs and aviation fuel.  But finding bombers to make the strike was a problem.  The 19th Bomb Group, the only heavy bomb unit in the Southwest Pacific had suffered one disasterous defeat after another.  Driven out of the Philippines after losing most of their planes in the early days of the war, then were forced to flee from Java as the rampaging Japanese forces conquered the East Indies.  Now the 19th was reorganizing and re-equipping in Australia, and most of their surviving B-17s simply were not combat worthy.

The Third Attack Group was stationed in Australia and they had a complement of B-25 medium bombers newly arrived in the theater.  It was determined the 3rd could furnish eleven B-25s and the 19th had three B-17s that could be used for a mission to the Philippines.  Two of the B-17s would be from the 435th Squadron, formerly the 40th Recont a new addition to the 19th Group.  The pilots from the 435th would be Frank Bostrom and David Rawls, the third B-17 would be from the 30th Squadron and piloted by Ed Teats with Ed Green as co-pilot.  The B-25s would be in two flights, one commanded by Lt.Col. John Davies and the other by Capt. Herman Lowery.  Brig. Gen. Ralph Royce, MacArthur's staff operations officer would be in overall command and the mission would come to bear his name.

            The attack force gathered at Darwin on 11 April 1942 and there one of the B-25s was grounded for maintenance.  The other ten and the three B-17s proceeded to Mindanao where the B-17s landed at Del Monte late in the afternoon..Gen Royce flew in Bostrom's plane.

            The B-25s landed at Maramag, a fighter base some 60 miles south of Del Monte where a dense forest afforded protection and concealment from Japanese scouting planes.

Bostrom landed at Del Monte with one engine inoperative and requiring replacement.  For the bombing mission the next day he took Rawls plane and flew over Corregidor and bombed Nichols Field on Luzon.  It must have been a heartening sight to the desperate American forces on Corregidor to see an American bomber overhead.  Perhaps they thought it was part of the rescue force they had heard was coming to save them.  However that would never be.

Meanwhile the B-25s and Teats' B-17 had flown a mission against the Japanese forces on Cebu but foul weather prevented any coordinated attack.  The morning of 12 April saw the base at Del Monte come under intense Japanese air attack and Bostrom's B-17 was destroyed by a direct bomb hit.  General Royce was greatly agitated by the recurring attacks and ordered the U.S. fighters into the air to afford some protection from strafing by the Zeros.  Two P-35s and five P-40s that had been salvaged from Bataan were able to drive off the Japanese planes but they soon returned.  When Bostrom and Teats landed from their missions the Japanese attacked again and damaged both planes.  Green, Teats' co-pilot was wounded.

Late in the afternoon of 12 April the B-25s struck again at the Japanese installations on Cebu and on the morning of the 13th another mission was flown.  However due to the incessant Japanese air attacks on the base at Del Monte it was decided to return the planes to Australia.  Rawls' B-17 was repaired and Bostrom flew it back to Darwin.  The other B-17 and the B-25s loaded as many stranded airmen as they could carry and on the 14th of April all were flown back to Darwin.

Claimed for the operation were four Japanese transports sunk or badly damaged and near misses on ten more.  The air field at Nichols and naval installations on Cebu were damaged.  The U.S. loss was the destruction of Bostrom's B-17.

The damage inflicted on the Japanese by the bombers of the Royce mission was minimal and did not seriously delay the Japanese conquest of the Philippines.  It may have served to raise the morale of the dispirited Americans still holding out but at this late date it hardly mattered.  The Royce mission marked the end of American bombing missions from Mindanao.  A few P-40s still offered resistance for a while but in May it all ended.  There is an intriguing account of a P-40 being rebuilt by some of the American who escaped capture after the surrender.  One of the fighter pilots supposedly flew it to China from Mindanao, bombing Japanese bases on Formosa on the way.  Unfortunately the P-40 was shot down by American fighter planes in China when the pilot did not, or could not identify himself.  An interesting story but never substantiated.  Probably only an author's fictitious account of what could have happened.

VIII – JOHN BROWNEWELL -- MINDANAO'S ONE MAN RECONNAISSANCE

Lt. John Brownewell was one of the 20 pilots of the 17th Pursuit Squadron that left Selfridge Field, Michigan, in October 1940 and arrived in the Philippines on 5 November of that year.  First based at Nichols Field the 17th later moved to Neilson Field near Manila and finally to Iba on the northwest coast of Luzon.  The flying equipment of the 17th at that time was the obsolete P-35 fighter plane.  The modern P-40 fighter did not arrive until just before hostilities began on 8 December 1941.  Shortly after Lt. Brownewell and three other Officers were sent from Iba to Nichols to take charge of servicing and repair of the P-40s and P-35s the 24th Pursuit Group was using in desperate attempts to protect American bases from the Japanese air fleets.

            On the morning of 19 December 1941, Brownewell was summoned to to MacArthur's Headquarters at Ft. McKinley and there received orders to take a P-40 to Mindanao and perform reconnaissance missions for the defense forces on the southern islands.  At Nichols, Brownewell checked out a new P-40 and flew south the 550 miles to the newly established air base at Del Monte.  Arriving that afternoon he was making a normal landing approach when Anti-aircraft guns around the field opened fire on him.  Startled by the unwelcome greeting Brownewell gunned the P-40 and climbed out of range of the fire.  Puzzled about being fired upon he wondered if perhaps the Japanese had captured the base and somehow Headquarters at Manila were unaware of it.  That didn't seem likely so he decided to try another approach.  Lowering flaps and landing gear he waggled his wings as a sign of being a friendly aircraft- but to no avail.  The guns opened fire again, and again he sought safety in altitude.  Luckily the gunners had no idea of how to lead a moving target and the fire was all behind his plane.

            Circling the field out of range, Brownewell was trying to determine what to do.  There was insufficient fuel left to attempt to locate another bass, and he did not know if there were any other fields open anyhow.  Then he noticed a cloud of dust kicked up by a Jeep as it left the compound and sped toward the gun positions.  As it arrived, fire from the guns ceased and he decided it was safe to land.  Once on the ground he learned the reason for the unfriendly greeting.  The base had experienced its first Japanese air raid the day before and since the gunners had no training in aircraft recognition, and not being aware a friendly plane was due in, they just fired on anything they saw.  Capt Bill Monay of the 5th Air Bass Group was the driver of the jeep that silenced the guns.

            At Del Monte, General George, commander of the Southern Islands, air force gave Brownewell his operating orders.  He was to fly strictly on reconnaissance, avoiding combat if at all possible.  The P-40 was the sole recon plane on the island and George wanted to conserve it by all means.  In the weeks that followed Lt.  Brownewell flew missions very much on his own volition.  He patroled Mindanao and all the adjacent islands to observe Japanese activity.  The only Japanese on Mindanao at the time were at Davao on the southern coast where they utilized the fine harbor as a base for their fleet in operations in the southern Philippines and islands to the south.

            On Christmas Day Brownewell was over Davao and spotted two or three large flying boats in the harbor.  This was too tempting a target to pass up so he sort of bent General George's orders to avoid combat.  He dived on the flying boats to strafe them but discovered only two of his six .-410 caliber machine guns would fire.  Nevertheless he made several firing passes until his ammunition was exhausted.  As he was leaving the vicinity he was startled by bullets striking his canopy and wings.-Looking rearward he saw two Zeros had crept up on him unnoticed.  With no ammo the thing to do was in his words – "Get the hell out of there!"

            It was a close thing for a few moments but with the P-40's engine at full throttle the Zeros were soon out distanced.  When he saw he was out of danger, Brownewell took time to scan his instruments and was amazed to see the manifold pressure gage read a scant 15 inches.  At first he thought gunfire had damaged the engine but it was operating and sounded all right.  Pulling back on the throttle he saw the manifold pressure pointer slowly fall to zero, then across the blank space on the dial until it settled down to a proper redding commensurate with engine RPM.  It was then he realized he-had boosted engine power to an excessively high manifold pressure of approximately 80 inches.  That was almost twice the maximum allowable and what engineers later told him far beyond what the engine could withstand.  However this over boost condition happened to other pilots in the P-40 and in the airman's vernacular was known as, "Wrapping the needle."

Brownewell's base for the P-40 was at Del Monte where he parked it between the two strips in the dry arroyo.  Scrub trees offered concealment from Japanese scouting planes.  His crew chief was M/Sgt.  DeWitt (Pappy) Nettles whom he inherited from the 5th Air, Base when Nettles' plane, a B-18. had been destroyed in the Japanese air attack.

On 1 February 1942 another pilot was sent from Luzon to assist Brownewell but is services were not needed as there was only the one P-40 and the recon missions were not all that demanding.  What he did need was clothing and necessities for living.  When he left Nichols he was under the impression his stay in Mindanao would be only a weeks duration so all he took was his shaving kit.  When the tour lasted on and on he was reduced to borrowing clothes, money and other needs.

Sometime in February Brownewell had occasion to violate the combat avoidance orders again.  Preparing for take off he saw too Japanese flying boats overhead evidently bound from Davao to Manila.  Thinking they may have spotted his hidden P-40 base he decided they should be prevented from reaching Manila where they could report the existence of the base.  He took off in pursuit of the slower Japanese planes and soon overtook them.  One turned back toward Davao but the other continued on course and Brownewell dived on him with guns firing.  His first rounds hit the fly boat which went into a steep dive and crashed close to the Del Monte base.

Brownewell's P-40 was faster than any Japanese planes he encountered.  This was partly due to the modifications he and Nettles performed on the plane -- removing armor plate, the oxygen system, radios, and four of the six machine guns.  Thus stripped the P-40's speed was greatly increased and it was still an effective fighter aircraft.

When Bataan surrendered in early April 1942 the surviving P-40s and P-35S that had been based there were flown to Mindanao.  There they were based at 'Maramag, 60 miles south of Del Monte.  At this base the fighter planes could land along the Sayre highway and taxi directly into a forest area where spaces had been cleared to park.  The dense trees provided effective concealment from spying Japanese planes.  Now the surviving pilots of the 24th Group that could be evacuated from Bataan arrived and Mindanao had a commander for the fighter force.  In fact there were several commanders as personnel were constantly being evacuated to Australia.  Brownewell's P-40 was commandeered by one of the new commanding officers and assigned to a junior pilot who promptly crash landed it on the beach at Cayagan.  Naturally Brownewell was perturbed and gave the unfortunate pilot a thorough cussing.  Now without a plane Brownewell, on 23 April 1942, was evacuated to Australia.  He flew out in a stripped B-24 used for evacuation flights and flown by Al Mueller.

In Australia Brownewell was assigned to the base at Townsville where with the former commander of the 17th Squadron, Buzz Wagner, he assisted in training pilots in combat tactics.  In September 1942 he was returned to the U.S. and served in the Air Force until retirement in 1960.  His jobs in the ensuing years were varied but no doubt he well remembers those desperate, hectic months at the beginning of the war when he and his P-40 comprised Mindanao's One Man Reconnaissance.

IX – EVACUATION FLIGHTS

            With the losses of aircraft to the Japanese on Luzon there were many air crew members and ground personnel without planes to fly and service.  Many of these people were absorbed into the ground forces to assist in defending the islands but others trickled down to Mindanao.  With the establishing of the allied bases in Australia there was great need for these experienced people in rebuilding the forces.  So evacuation of airmen and key ground personnel from Del Monte was a prime requisite.  Whenever a bomber landed at Del Monte, if it was returning to Australia it departed with as many passengers as the pilot thought it safe to carry.  On take off some of the passengers would stand in the bomb bay until the plane had gained sufficint altitude for them to seek other and more comfortable spaces.

When the LB-30s and B-24s arrived in the Southwest Pacific some of these were used specifically for evacuation flights from Del Monte.  Al Mueller of the 19th Bomb Group was pilot on many of these flights.  He flew the last evacuation plane from Del Monte on 29 April 1942 when he took out General George, Major Elsmore and his staff of the 5th Air Base Group.

            The flights from Darwin to Del Monte were always a chancey affair.  The procedure was to leave Darwin in time to land at Del Monte after dark and depart before dawn to prevent being caught on the ground there in the day time.  The course from Darwin passed well to the west of Davao to avoid the Japanese fighter planes based there and then let down over Zamboanga on the western tip of Mindanao.  There an easterly heading was taken to pick up the radio signal and home in on Del Monte. When the plane neared Del Monte, hopefully Jim Young, in charge of airfield lighting would turn on the runway lights.  When asked what the alternate procedure was in case the radio signal was missing one evacuation pilot answered. "There was no alternate procedure.  There were no other fields to land at, and there wasn't enough fuel to get back to Darwin.  So there just had to be a signal." At any rate there always was on his flights.

X – AIRMEN TURNED INFANTRY

            The two squadrons of the 19th Bomb Group at Clark Field when the Japanese attacked on 8 December 1941 – the 28th and 30th, had the misfortune of losing most of their B-17s.  In the following days a few of the flight crews were assigned to other squadrons but most of the personnel were organized into provisional ground defense battalions.  First they were sent to Bataan but later by interisland steamer they were transported to Mindanao.  There the 30th Squadron was assigned the sector on the northern coast around the port of Bugo.  Other than rifles all their armamenttcdnsist6d of was a few machine guns salvaged from wrecked aircraft.

            The 28th squadron was sent to the interior of Mindanao to defend the air bases from the Japanese moving up from their base at Davao.  In April 1942 the Japanese effected a landing on the north coast of Mindanao and the 30th was engaged in heavy fighting as they defended the approach to the air field at Del Monte.  The 28th had seen no action as yet and on 16 April was pulled back to the fighter base at Maramag.  On 7 May the men of the 28th turned in their rifles and were issued shovels and sent to central -Mindanao where they were to prepare entrenchments for the Filipino troops guarding a back trail the Japanese were using to infiltrate central Mindanao and attack Del Monte.  A Japanese patrol was encountered and the 28th, being un-armed retreated and were picked up by trucks and transported to Maramag.  This was 10 May 1942, the date all the Armed Forces of the Philippines had been ordered to surrender, and the 28th along with the 30th were sent to the prison of war camp at tnialaybaly, Mindanao.  Some of the men escaped to the hills and joined guerilla bands and continued to resist the Japanese occupation forces but most of the personnel of the two squadrons spent the rest of the war as POWs.

XI – CONCLUSION

            Bataan fell on 6 April 1942.  On 8 May, after a month of incessant bombardment General Wainwright surrendered Corregidor and on the 10th all of the Southern Forces were surrendered by General Sharp on Yindanao.  The gallant fight of the American and Filipino troops-in defense of the Philippines had delayed the time table of conquest by the Japanese at least four months.  Now it was over and all of the Philippines came under the Rising Sun banner and the Japanese spread their tentacles southward through the islands-toward their ultimate goal of Australia.  The fight to stop the advance, then the struggle to regain the lost islands would be long and bitter.  There would be many more defeats and tragic loss of life.  But eventually the forces of the U.S. and the Allies would prevail and two and a half years later the flags of the free world once again came ashore in the Philippine Islands.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is customary for an author to acknowledge and give credit to those who have assisted in the creation of his product.  This I most certainly wish to do.  But first I would like to tender recognition and gratitude to those without whose sacrifices and devotion to duty and-country this writing would have had no basis or reason.  I cannot list many of these people, and only a few of their military units.  Many of them have disappeared in the passage of time – even the memory of some is no more.  Historians are at fault for much of that.  Mindanao and even much of the action in other of the Islands has been ignored as the focus centered on great names and earth shaking events.  The men of Mindanao deserve better treatment by history. it is my hope this attempt will serve to enhance the rememberances of things too long forgotten.

Here I wish to acknowledge the assistance of those who have furnished information for the preparation of this article:

Mr.  Charles E. (Monty) Montgomery

Mr.  Walter Regehr

Mr.  James Young

Col.  William Monay, USAF Ret.

Col.  John Brownewell, USAF Ret.

Col.  Frank Bostrom, USAF Ret.

Col.  Durward Fesmire, USAF Ret.

Col.  Carey O'Bryan, USAF Ret.

 

Last but certainly not least my good friend Barry Gilk former historian of the 19th Bomb Group Association for submitting much pertinent information from his files.