FP-1942D-Msum.doc

Dec 1941 Summary Philippines

Dec 9 – 28 1941

Japanese land at north & south of Luzon – after they have disabled US airfields & naval yards

British Battleships at Singapore: Prince of Wales & Repulse are Sunk.

B-17s from Del Monte meter into damaged Clark, the only source of bombs, and fly missions against landings at Vigian, Apari & Legaspi. They are furiously attack by Japanese fighters. B-17 crews are amazed to discover the Japanese fighters can out perform them. Without tail guns or self sealing fuel tanks they can only hit and run – using clouds and distance as their only defense. The Japanese discover and strafe Del Monte making it necessary to move remaining B-17s to Bachelor field Darwin Australia.

The last week of Dec they make one more raid from Australia to Luzon before moving to Dutch bases on Java.

Clark Fld is abandoned Christmas eve, airmen go to Bataan and Mindanao as infantry.

Dec 30, (10) of (11) remaining B-17s fly to Dutch held Malang Java. Only B-17CD to survive becomes Smithsonian “Swoose”.

The Move to Java – Dec 29-31 1941

Bachelor Fld Darwin served as a staging area for the B-17’s – it had not been provisioned with bombs. The Dutch had bombs and facilities on Java and welcomed US and Australian forces to their defense. The remaining aircraft and crews were moved to Malang Java, which placed them closer to advancing Japanese. The Japanese were advancing down on the Malaysia Peninsula, while consolidating their hold in the Philippines. Allied commanders knew the Germans were near Moscow & preparing for an advance on Cairo. Aid intended for the Philippines was stalled as it could not get through – could Java be held?

B-17 Status Dec 1941

35 B-17’s in Philippines Dec 6 – by Dec 31 25 Lost, 10 to Java. (1 at Aus Depot will go to Java)

AC	No	Lost	To Java	AC	No	Lost	To Java	AC	No	Lost	To Java
B-17C	40-2045	121041		B-17D	40-3068	120841		B-17D	40-3087	121341
B-17C	40-2049	120841		B-17D	40-3069	120841		B-17D	40-3088	120841
B-17C	40-2062		‘010142	B-17D	40-3070		010142	B-17D	40-3091	122141
B-17C	40-2067	120841		B-17D	40-3072		010142	B-17D	40-3093	122041
B-17C	40-2072	122541		B-17D	40-3073	121441		B-17D	40-3094	120841
B-17D	40-3059	120841		B-17D	40-3074		010142	B-17D	40-3095	120841
B-17D	40-3061	011741	010142	B-17D	40-3075	120841		B-17D	40-3096	121141
B-17D	40-3062		010142	B-17D	40-3076	120841		B-17D	40-3097	121141
B-17D	40-3063	121041		B-17D	40-3077	120841		B-17D	40-3098	121341
B-17D	40-3064		010142	B-17D	40-3078		010142	B-17D	40-3099	120841
B-17D	40-3066		010142	B-17D	40-3079		010142	B-17D	40-3100	121041
B-17D	40-3067		010142	B-17D	40-3086	121541		B-17D	40-3100	121041

Jan 1942 Summary

On Jan 1 1942 there were 2 B-17C & 8 B-17D at Malang, Java

During Jan. B-17s flew 18 missions consisting of 104 AC take offs with 24 aborts. 80 planes dropped bombs, the results were mostly unknown – perhaps 10% hit targets – Japanese ships.

Weather in this region was a constant problem. They had to see to bomb – and to land.

The initial missions, via Borneo and Celebes bases, to Davao Mindanao went well & they intended to go back.

B-17s were redirected to bomb targets on the Malaysia peninsula, the Japanese were advancing and taking over British airfields in Malaysia.

During Jan the Japanese advanced down Malaysia to Singapore, and landed on Borneo & Celebes.

Everyone worked all out – but knew they were not stopping the enemy.

Frustration prevailed. An arriving aircraft via Africa was forced to land during heavy rain on the unknown grass field. He over shot slamming into a new B17 in the mud at the end of the runway – having landed on the wet field with his precious load of Dutch bombs because he couldn’t find the target in bad weather.

Good news: 70 Airmen had been rescued from Del Monte Mindanao by air & 3 by Submarine from Corregidor. 28 new B17E’s arrived.

Bad news: 2 LB-30 & 2 B-17E were lost and 10 crewmen killed.

Jan 30 1942 status: there were 2 B-18, 3 B-24, 2 B-17C, 8 B-17D, 28 B-17E & 3 LB-30.

February 1942 Summary

Java Feb 1942

The former Samarinda, Borneo & Kendari, Celebes and Palembang Sumatra bases become targets in Feb, as the Japanese moved in.

The newly arrived aircraft were dispersed to multiple fields. Composite and independent missions were flown from various air fields. Weather or damage caused planes to land at alternate fields.

Air raid warnings made it necessary to fly planes needing service, to prevent their being strafed. Missions become shorter & more frequent.

Weather hampered finding a moving enemy, while the enemy knew where they were.

The Dutch began blowing up oil fields so the Japanese could not take them intact.

Mid Feb British, Australian, Dutch & American commanders meet. Singapore had fallen, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes taken – Java could not be held – arriving supplies were too late. A few days later, in the “Java Sea Battle”; 2 Dutch, 2 Australian & 2 American cruisers and 2 British destroyers were sunk – time had indeed run out.

The Plan: 7^th BG would be reorganized in India under Brereton. 19^th would be reorganized in Australia under Eubank.

Missions continued to be flown while a few flew on to India and Australia to prepare for new operations.

The US bought the Dutch freighter Abbekirk for evacuating personnel to Australia.

As the last planes take off, the Dutch blow up the fields behind them.

The Abbekirk barely got away without being attack.

17 B17E’s escaped with passengers. All original B-17’s on Java had been strafed & destroyed on the ground.

Australian troops pulled back from Africa had arrived too late to help defend Java.

Rommel was beginning his advance on Cairo

During Feb they flew 35 missions (266 take offs only 4 aborts)

27 aircraft lost 33 airmen killed.

3 LB-30’s and 11 B-17 arrived Australia – 4 B-17s will be lost in March.

March 1942 Summary

Evacuation from Java and Philippines

The Japanese caused serious damage at Darwin (Bachelor Fld), so planes evacuated to Broome – then Broome came under attack suffering considerable damage. A sister ship to the Abbekerk, carrying Dutch refuges was sunk. The AAC purchased Abbekerk unloaded it’s passengers without incident at Freemantle. It was necessary for those personnel to ride across Australia by train – each half of the transcontinental route used a different gage rail, making it necessary to transfer.

19^th Fly MacArthur Party Out

Henry Godman made the first attempt to rescue MacArthur but missed Del Monte and crashed in the near by sea, killing two crew members. Godman later became MacArthur’s pilot.

Harl Pease, later awarded the Medal of Honor, made the next attempt – but MacArthur had not arrived so stranded airmen were carried out.

Skiles started an attempt but crash landed in Australia – in the process Skile’s eye was scratched and he never piloted a plane again.

Lewis and Bostrom, in B17E’s from Townsville, using 19^th BG co-pilots as Ed Teats, who knew Del Monte field, went next and brought the MacArthur party out.

Existing Australian fields were used to accommodate the evacuated B-17s while a new field at Mariba was being prepared to shorten the distance to Port Morseby New Guinea.

Operations were slow to get underway. Many, not immune to Australian infections, came down sick. There was a delay in getting parts from Leverton repair facility in Melbourne. Pay records were reconstructed, men acquired essential personal belongings and operations got under way.

Hardship is relative – at the time the 19^th evacuated Clark Field, on Christmas Day – in Leningrad, 3700 people starved to death.

Commentary December through March by D. Landau

PI Day One: Gen Marshal learning 12 of 15 B-17’s at Clark Field were lost the first day was devastated, he had gone all out to get the B-17’s to the Philippines. Marshal repeatedly asked what really happened – reports from Gen Southerland, MacArthur’s chief of staff, and Gen Brereton head of the 5^th Bomber Command, differed.

We do known that upon receiving word of Pearl Harbor, L/Col Eubank, CO of the 19^th BG at Clark Field ordered all available B-17’s into the air to find any sign of a Japanese forces. Eubank then joined Gen Brereton head of 5^th Bomber Command in Manila, trying to speak with Gen MacArthur. Brereton sought permission to bomb Japanese bases on Formosa. Gen Southerland, MacArthurs Aid, would not permit contact with MacArthur. It’s uncertain if MacArthur was not there or not to be interrupted. Some believe MacArthur was conferring with Philippine President Manuel Quezon. Brereton never saw MacArthur and Southerland would not authorized bombing Formosa, insisting that reconnaissance flights be made first. Prior reconnaissance flights to Formosa had been prohibited. Marshal had advised Roosevelt, and MacArthur, “do not antagonize the Japanese – we needed time to prepare”. From broken codes Marshal knew the Japanese were planning an attack but did not know were or when. He hoped to have until March 1942 to prepare and had supplies in the pipe line.

Finding nothing, B-17’s were called back with orders to refuel and load bombs – in expectation of orders to bomb Formosa. Eubank returned to Clark Field while crews were either going to chow, loading bombs or loading fuel. Eubank immediately ordered reconnaissance missions to Formosa. While preparing for the reconnaissance mission, persons coming out of the mess hall paused to looking up – a flight of planes in perfect formation was coming over the field. Some thought they were Navy planes or new planes from the states – then abruptly realized they were Japanese bombers releasing bombs.

Base commander L/Col Maitland had visited England during air raids, and ordered safety trenches dug. Once aware of falling bombs, all who could, jumped in “Maitland’s trench”

Clark Field was being upgraded to accommodate more B-17’s, half had been dispersed to Del Monte Field, Mindanao, still a pasture with no facilities, where flight crews were setting up their own tents. B-17’s at Clark were parked at service areas to the side of the grass runways, crew members not at the mess hall were preparing them for an expected mission – all parts and supplies were at Clark. Some semi protective dispersal areas had been prepared but were not in use when planes were being refueled and bombs loaded -- emergency fields were still being prepared. From above planes anywhere on the field looked like sitting duck’s. On advanced warning planes were to be sent airborne – there was no way to protect them on the ground. There was no warning and falling bombs found easy targets. The Japanese bombers had been delayed by weather and arrived undetected following the weather front out of sight to ground observers. They had been detected by newly installed radar – who called in a warning – but the warning was not received at Clark Field.

Lt Tash ran to and climbed the tower to warn Carpenter, the last to return, to stay aloft – the field was under attack. Two waves of fighters strafed the field after the bombers left.

All would have been Lost: Experienced B-17 pilots, who coped with Zero’s first hand, agreed it was a good thing there was confusion that morning. They were convinced that if a mission been flown to Bomb Formosa all B-17s and crews would have been lost. Without tail guns and self sealing fuel tanks they were far more vulnerable than anyone realized. Their B-17C&D models were not Flying Fortresses as the name implied.

Must be attack first: . Many there believed we were not permitted to bomb unless attack first. To others this seemed ridiculous – we had already been attack at Pearl Harbor. However, MacArthur reported to the President of the Philippines – it’s easy to forget the special chain of command that existed. MacArthur was Marshall’s field commander, when commanding US troops requested by MacArthur and provided by Marshall. But MacArthur was also in command of the Philippine Constabulary by authority given him by President Quezon. It is not known what MacArthur and Quezon discussed the morning of that first day. Though Pearl Harbor had been struck, the Philippines had not. Quezon may have believed the Japanese intended to spare the Philippines, and objected to a strike before being attack? It is known MacArthur tried to call Clark to order an attack on Formosa, but the phone lines were dead. The order was flown there by Jay Mercer. By the time Mercer could see Clark it was bellowing smoke. Mercer returned to report, saying headquarters was in shocked disbelief when told.

When MacArthur was ordered out of the Philippines to Australia, MacArthur insisted that President Quezon also be taken out, this could have been at the request of President Roosevelt. Bill Johnson, radio operator on the PT boat taking Quezon from Corregidor to Mindanao, said they damaged their boat enroute and had to make repairs. When ready to go they had to go onto the island and bring Quezon back to the boat. Quezon did not want to go to Australia, preferring to hide out in the Philippines.

The Blame Game: The question continues to be asked, who’s to blame for the loss of all those B-17s that first day? History shows the personnel were skill and well trained, those there did their job well, there was no gross neglect or incompetence. Those in harms way could not convert years of isolationist & public neglect to victory. Others could not have done better, we should salute those who faced the enemy for doing their best with what they had.

Mistakes were made – Before the First Day: After the bombs fell, those not injured or killed instinctively performed meritorious acts of courage amidst confusion & disastrous. They too asked what went wrong? People and systems are not perfect, all make mistakes – US voters made the most significant errors, they were the cause of our being unprepared. The Air Corp, while performing admirably, were making fundamental mistakes of a kind they were unaware. L/Col Eubank, 19^th BG CO was near ideal for the task he was given. He was greatly admired by all who served under him. He was well known by his peers and those above him. He was highly qualified by training and experience. His mistake was not being perfect.

Primary Task; get planes and crews there fast”: Of necessity focus was on process first and purpose second. The purpose, to accurately drop bombs on the enemy, was assumed to be a given – if the process placed the planes & crews in harms way. The process began by training personnel in multiple specialties plus preparing fields, facilities and airplanes – then bring them together as a functioning team. In the urgency of getting B-17’s to the Far Pacific fast, attention was focused on flying planes to the other side of the earth. This was a first time ever undertaking, previously planes had been shipped by sea. It was a major challenge to keep airborne for the long distances, perform precise celestial navigation and find the stepping stone islands.

Gunners had been trained to drop bombs on desert targets from B-18’s using the new Norden Bomb Sight. It was assumed a gunner using the Norden Bomb sight in the B-17’s nose, could hit a target. No one claimed they could hit a moving ship at sea, from 20,000 feet. Bombing inaccuracy was learned on the job, operating a Norden Bomb sight was not the same thing as aiming a 50 cal machine gun. Special schools were set up in 1942 to train Bombardiers. This was a wishful thinking stop gap. For the duration of WW II precision bombing remained a goal – area bombing, by many bombers, was the only assured way of destroying a target.

Heavy US airplanes: Eubank had been a test pilot for Wright Field and part of the evaluation team defining criteria for US aircraft. Eubank would have rejected the Japanese Zero as unsafe for US pilots – he said as much in later interviews. The Air Corp suffered from a mind set, insisting on pilot safety – which in reality backfired and caused many to be killed in combat. Unsafe Zeros’ could readily shoot down safe B-17’s, P-40’s & P-39’s. This problem was immediately recognized & newer fighters and bombers were not over burdened with misguided protection.

All Personnel were Flight Rated: By convention, prior to WW II, all Air Corp personnel were “Flight Rated”. Pilots, Co-Pilots & Navigators were cross trained to do each others job. Mechanics and Radio operators were also Gunners, and Gunners served as Bombardiers. This peace time idealism was a luxury soon dropped. Pilot and Navigation training was quickly changed to separate endeavors. On Java Mechanics & Gunners became separate functions. Field Artillery personnel were converted to aerial gunners so skilled mechanics could be kept on the ground.

A Prepared and Committed Japanese Force: Hit hard and fast, focused on the Dutch East Indies oil supplies. The unprepared Allies reacted. The US and it’s allies were no match for the well executed Japanese attacks. The Japanese had planned well for this Asian War – they had much experience, their methods had been successful – they were confident & committed to win or die.

US Forces Pinned Down: Japanese bombers & fighters pinned down our Navy and Air Corp forces the first day. No Navy ships or submarines, and only a few B-17’s attack the invading force. The Japanese landed without opposition and were advancing from the north & south when the US army moved from Manila to meet them. Overwhelmed the Army fell back to Battan, leaving behind huge warehouses full of food they would soon desperately need. At no time did Navy ships or Submarines confront the invading force.

Invincible US vs Inept Enemy: Prior to the war US media described our military as invincible, and Japanese inept – cartoonists drew the Japanese as little, with buck teeth, wearing powerful glasses in order to see. The reality following the attack was chaos, those inept Japanese were beating the hell out of our invincible force. Our military exhibited a mix of exceptional valor, offset by unfortunate blunders.

Superior Japanese Weapons: The Japanese had planned, designed and built top notch weapons. In the beginning their fighter aircraft were superior and their torpedoes could sink ships. The Japanese took advantage of the vastness of the Pacific for their defense, while the US took advantage of this vastness for isolationist Protection. Japan counted on a US Isolationist non-involvement mind set.

B-17 pilots were amazed to discover the Jap fighters could climb faster and get above them – they expected fixed landing gear fighters as used in China.

B-17 was designed for Reconnaissance: In a bidding competition the four engine B-17 lost out to the two engine B-18, a bomber version of the C-47. At Air Corp insistence, Gen MacArthur, then Chief of Staff, created an Air Corp charter, responsibility for a reconnaissance beyond the range of Coast Artillery. This kept the B17 alive with an order for 13 airplanes. These B-17s were equipped with observation blisters, did not have nose or tail gun and no self sealing fuel tanks; they were not a “flying fortress” as the name implied. When hit, Kelley’s plane burst into flames.

MacArthur’s plan: MacArthur was Army, through and through, with little faith in the Air Corp for doing an Army job. MacArthur depended on the Navy to stop a sea borne force -- it was the Navy’s task to destroy an invading force before it could land ground forces. Philippine Army coastal guns were placed to protect the Manila area. The Japanese knew that, and landed elsewhere. None of our Navy ships or submarines attack the invading force. The Navy & MacArthur did not then know our submarine torpedoes could not sink an enemy ship!

It was Marshall who insisted on getting B-17’s to the Philippines. Billy Mitchell proved an airplane could sink a ship, hoping for an independent Air Force. Billy succeeded more than he thought, the public expected bombers to stop an invading force from the sea. The spotlight focused on how B-17’s expected to stop a landing force had been caught on the ground and destroyed.

Submarine Torpedoes went under the target: It took months for the Navy to admit their Navy built torpedoes had a problem and fix it. The Navy built submarine torpedoes had never been tested with a warhead, with a warhead they went under the intended target. Submarine commanders realized they had a problem and repeatedly claimed their aim was good, but torpedoes bad. They finally got through to Admiral King who ordered the Navy to test their torpedoes with warheads.

Contractor built torpedoes dropped from Navy aircraft worked fine, but US aircraft carriers were elsewhere in the vast Pacific.

Japanese Land Unopposed: The Japanese had already landed and consolidated their forces before the Army ever made contact with them – the Army traveled north to meet south bound Japanese. At no time did our Navy confronted the invading force – they had been hit while docked, just as the Air Corp had been hit with their planes down.

All had not been lost: Luckily half the B-17s had been dispersed on a training exercise to Del Monte Field Mindanao. But all bombs and parts were at Clark Field being daily attack. B-17’s were able to fly missions against the landing forces & the media leaped on how we were fighting back.

Hide bad news with Heros: The nation was instantly hungry for hero’s. Colin Kelly, pilot of the first B-17 shot down, became the first hero, described as having crash dived his plane into a Japanese Battleship. In reality he was within sight of Clark Field following two splashes and a hit, when his plane was attack and shot down. During those first months the media and Hollywood created hero’s and depicted destruction of enemy forces by amplifying small events into major achievements.

Home Front Moral: “Shorty” Wheless, pilot of a B-17 shot up on a raid managed to escape to Mindanao where he crash landed. Shorty was rushed back to the US, talking with the President on the radio, sent on war bond tours and served as advisor for a B-17 movie showing our planes blasting and sinking Japanese ships.

The movie They Were Expendable showed our PT boats attacking Japanese ships. The sinking Japanese ships was all Hollywood. PT boats did carry the MacArthur party to Mindanao. The PT boat taken inland in that movie was real. It got stuck on mountain road trying to get to Lake Lanao to help fuel PBY’s from Australia. Bill Johnson radio operator helped salvaged the 50 cal guns and set them up for anti aircraft protection. PBY’s did come and pick up nurses from Corregidor. That part of the story remained unknown as the participants became POW or AGOM.

Bombers need protected Bases: The remaining B-17s in the Philippines could not sustain operations from unprotected bases – they had to move beyond range of Japanese aircraft.

Dutch Grass Runways: The Dutch welcomed US bombers – they had airfields, hanger facilities, bombs and fuel – and desperately needed help. These fields with grass runways and modest facilities were out of range of Japanese fighters and bombers, long range bombers protected by distance could strike back.

Lousy Results Cast Doubt: In 1994 while reading the operational diaries for PI & Java I was puzzled & disappointed. They were making an all out effort but doing little harm to the enemy.

Before I entered service I’d seen Hollywood movies, though I realized much was propaganda, I did expected to read of our bombers inflicting damage? My initial reaction was to find fault, all I knew of that early phase of the war was from those wartime Hollywood movies. I’d been with the 19^th BG on Guam where one B-29 delivered as many bombs as five B-17s – most of them on target.

Doubts changed to Admiration: As I read, doubts as to the competence of those put in harms way turned to admiration. These were very capable people coping with unanticipated problems and conditions. Through their stories I came to know them and appreciate their tenacity in face of difficulties. I became proud of them, even more so when I came to personally know the survivors from that early period – 50 years later – after I retired.

In 1944-45 B-29s were bombing an island, could see through clouds with radar while using a superior weapon that could shoot down enemy fighters.

The Far Pacific in 1941-42 was a different more primitive war. B-17s were ruggedly primitive by comparison, requiring eye ball visual contact through uncooperative weather of a moving target. They would drop bombs then head into clouds for protection before fighters could catch up. Those who lingered to check bomb damage were shot down!

They knew where we were, we couldn’t find them: The Japanese knew where our land bases were, but we didn’t know where their mobile forces were.

Blinded by Weather: Weather was a constant problem, equatorial rains that made the island beautiful also made grass runways wet & slick – clouds obscured moving targets and runways.

Not Trained to sink ships: The B-17 crews were, for the first time ever, were asked to fly their planes overseas. Focus was on Navigation and flying long distances. It was assumed enlisted gunners could operate the Norden Bomb sight and hit ships. The first three months proved Bombardiers required special training & without radar they could not hit ships they could not see.

P-40’s did more damage than B-17s: A small number of P-40s were able to attack forces landing on Java. They like Japanese fighters strafed at tree top level, committed to succeed.

The B-17’s Valuable Attributes: The B-17 could fly over enemy held territory carrying personnel & supplies as well as gather reconnaissance information. They were valuable, even if they never sunk a ship. Their very presence cost the Japanese militarily in assets and time. The Japanese did not have a B-17 equivalent.

Trained by Hollywood: All American military had grown up on Cowboy movies, where the good guys wore white hats and the bad guys wore black hats. They knew the guys in the white hats always won. During the most difficult times Americans never doubted that we would win, after all we were the good guys in the white hats.

Fall back to Battan: MacArthur was forced to fall back on Battan – where he believed he could hold out until “The Aid” arrived. He failed to take abundant supplies from Manila warehouses – the forces on Battan ran out of food.

“The Aid” is not delivered: There had been a complete collapse of Navy protection of Commercial cargo ships. Commercial carriers refused to deliver when they could not be protected. In mid Feb 1942 it was decided to deliver supplies en-route to Australia and the remainder to India. By then it was obvious a stand could not be made in Indonesia; Singapore had fallen, Borneo was being occupied and Sumatra was being invaded.

MacArthur Flown to Australia: MacArthur’s name had value, he was known and could be a rallying figure in this time of need – Marshall and the Australians knew there were few to fill the bill. MacArthur’s performance in his assigned task to defend the Philippines is a mixed bag. It’s easy to heap praise and be over critical at the same time. MacArthur was human and made mistakes – he did an admirable job of convincing others he was the one to lead. “Dug out Doug” had many admirers and distracters.

MacArthur’s primary contribution was his name. He, more than anyone else, knew that. MacArthur would not have been selected for Eisenhower’s Job, which required the coordination of many.

Germany had to be defeated first: Marshall was coping with much bigger problems than MacArthur’s repeated requests for supplies. Germany was chewing up Russian Armies. Marshall knew, and declared, that Germany had to be defeated first – it was essential to keep Russia in the war. Priorities had been discussed between Roosevelt & Churchill – stopping the German advance was more important than preventing a Japanese landing on Australia.

A Different Mind Set: The first months proved the US and Japanese were of a different mind set. The Japanese had been trained to die if need be to win an immediate objective, like sink a ship. Later Kamikaze defense of Okinawa should not have been a surprise -- Japanese sunk British Battleships from deck top level – we could not destroy a specific Japanese ship from 20,000 ft.

Our culture placed a high value on each persons life – our weapons and methods were designed to protect the combatant while winning the battle. We retained our culture but had to design better weapons and methods to beat a tenacious enemy who didn’t have a surrender mode – requiring an A-Bomb to cause an already defeated nation to surrender.

Buying Time with Distance: We needed protected hard top runways and radar for seeing through weather. These required time. There was a constant need to improvise and make do with what was available to buy more time.

POW’s learned Western Rules of Warfare did not apply: It was quickly discovered that the Japanese did not operate according to Geneva rules. Japanese officers could and did hit enlisted men, enlisted men could and did hit civilians, a prisoner could be shot for any cause. A Japanese soldier was to die rather than surrender – an enemy prisoner deserved to die. Prisoners had no value except as labor – there was little incentive to care for prisoners. Many prisoners who survived were convinced they had been expected to die.

Philippine People saved AGOM lives: Americans who went into the hills rather than surrender were known as AGOM (American Guerillas Of Mindanao), some half of them had been in 19^th BG. They had nothing but praise of the Philippine people without who’s help they would not have survived. Even the Moro’s, who would kill an person to get his gun, helped -- they hated the Japanese more than they disliked the Americans.